


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Political Affairs

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Pro-Union Vote in Gorbachev's Ward Not as Small as Claimed

PM1804102191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Open letter from leaders of referendum electoral commission for Electoral Precinct No. 11: "Obliging 'Independence'"]

[Text] On 21 March 1991 in a piece entitled "M. Gorbachev's Victory in His Own Electoral Precinct" NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA [Independent Newspaper] served up a barefaced lie.

"In the electoral precinct where the USSR president and his wife voted the all-union referendum ended in victory for M. Gorbachev. There were 376 votes cast in favor of the Union, and 375 against. True, it is not known whose vote tipped the balance—the president's or his wife's?"

We members of the commission for conducting the referendum in Electoral Precinct No. 11, where M.S. Gorbachev and R.M. Gorbacheva voted, are most indignant at NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's piece. Who found it necessary to mislead the public and wax ironical on the basis of information they knew to be false, and why? We realize that "independence" is a good thing, but what about honesty?!

The truth is this: The voting lists at Electoral Precinct No. 11 for conducting the referendum contained 823 voters, of whom 666 received ballot papers, which constitutes 80.9 percent of the list. And 356 voters (53.5 percent) voted for the Union, with 268 (40.3 percent) against, and 41 spoiled papers (6.2 percent).

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA should ask its obliging "correspondent" A. Kudryavtsev, people's deputy for the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet, where it got the other figures from.

- A. Goloshchapov, chairman of the commission.
- A. Pristupa, deputy chairman of the commission.
- N. Yevteyeva, secretary of the commission.

Gorbachev's Political Change of Course Analyzed

91UN1233A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by Viktor Gushchin, candidate of historical sciences: "The Objective Logic of Gorbachev's Political Failure; Attempt at a Historical Study of 'Perestroyka'"]

[Excerpts] I assume that by the time this article has been published, M.S. Gorbachev will still be president of the USSR, even after the Lithuanian nightmare. Such is the nature of our country. On the other hand, I am deeply convinced that the military action in Vilnius, like the

bloody internecine militia clash in Riga, merely dramatized the situation without introducing anything essentially new in the tragedy which has befallen M.S. Gorbachev himself.

All of us have long been tortured by the following question: Why is it that perestroyka, which was proclaimed by M.S. Gorbachev and which initially met with universal approval, has turned into the worst possible crisis which has led the president of the USSR to the brink of political collapse and thrown the country into a catastrophe to which we are still unable to find a solution? However, an analysis of this may not be necessary, if in the study of the distance already covered we can separate the wheat from the chaff and the guilt of M.S. Gorbachev from his difficulties and subjective miscalculations, errors, and delusions and that which was dictated by the objective political logic of events.

The simplest of all would be to present M.S. Gorbachev, as is frequently done, as the embodiment of progressive changes and initiator of the struggle against stagnation in the past, and as a renegade of perestroyka, a shortsighted political leader unable to achieve the proclaimed objectives today. Thinking in such terms, many people tend to consider M.S. Gorbachev a figure of the transitional period and even the main culprit for the fact that the country is totally unable to surmount this painful stage. Essentially, however, such logic explains nothing. It merely registers the external manifestations of M.S. Gorbachev's political behavior, without highlighting the reasons for the suicidal decisions he has made. Yet it is precisely this problem that must be unraveled.

[Passage omitted describes Gorbachev's rise to power, early policies]

Why Is Gorbachev Failing To Fulfill His Promises?

There probably exists some kind of universal formula which determines M.S. Gorbachev's political behavior, for if a person plunges into various areas of life with equal lack of success, in addition to the specific reasons for the failures we may be in the presence of some kind of basic fault which could turn even good into evil.

No one questions M.S. Gorbachev's good intentions, even those who today depict the president as a base intriguer and almost a conspirator and a candidate for dictatorship.

The position of those who attack Gorbachev is clear. More than anything else, it is guided not by personal dislike but by considerations of political rationalism: the reason for which the president is making one error or another is not important; what matters is that in practice his results are, as a rule, directly the opposite of those he announces. I believe that anyone could, without particular difficulty, draw up his own "defect record" of Gorbachev's political activities for the six years of perestroyka. Such as:

1. In initiating perestroika, M.S. Gorbachev intended, above all, to implement it within the party. We know what came out of this.

2. He promised to crush political and economic totalitarianism and open the way to an economic upsurge and to improving the well-being of the people. On the sixth year of perestroika, the main structure of the command-administrative system has been essentially preserved although, at best, in a slightly modified aspect.

3. Even prior to perestroika, as the initiator of the formulation of yet another program—the food program—Mikhail Sergeyevich promised that by 1990 there would be an abundance of goods and commodities of agricultural origin. To this day, no one knows where the billions of rubles spent on the implementation of the “abundance program” have disappeared.

4. At the dawn of perestroika, M.S. Gorbachev gave the assurance that it would lead to the blossoming of each republic within the Union. Today the USSR has become a conglomerate of republics fighting each other. In a number of areas matters have actually reached the point of civil war.

5. Finally, when he started perestroika, Mikhail Sergeyevich proclaimed his attachments to the ideals of freedom, humanism, democracy, and human rights. Today, instead of democratic power organs we have a president who, the less he achieves, the more rights he demands for himself. Laws are being promulgated by the dozen and not being implemented. A powerful crime wave has engulfed the country. The only law which gave the Soviet people a breath of freedom—the Law on the Press—has also been threatened. Efforts are being made, with presidential support, to halt or, in any case, restrict its effect. Premonitions and feelings related to this intention have led to dark and, essentially, anti-Gorbachev feelings. The skeptics who said at the very dawn of perestroika, “comrade, believe us, this so-called glasnost will vanish and it is then that state security will recall our names” are now gloating. Once again, M.S. Gorbachev has committed an unforgivable error which proves less the existence of a faulty political awareness than an ordinary commonplace fault: the genie released from the bottle can no longer be pushed back into it by force.

The question is the following: Why is it that with such stubbornness, worthy of better use, are promises made being violated through actions?! Nonetheless, let us not be all that categorical. Let us recall, once again, what M.S. Gorbachev had to start with. The country was at the tail end of global political, socioeconomic, and scientific and technical processes, gradually turning from a great power into a third-rate state, the power of which was essentially based on its nuclear missile potential. It was clear that it would be incredibly difficult to take the country out of stagnation. Those who would assume the

daring and responsibility to initiate a process of change had to have not only political wisdom but also political courage.

Naturally, M.S. Gorbachev realized the difficulty of the role he was assuming. His train of thought was accurate and he found the suitable way of expressing it: “Everyone begins perestroika with himself.” I consider this a key formula among the perestroika aphorisms with which Mikhail Sergeyevich is so generous, an aphorism which can explain a great deal in terms of Gorbachev’s political behavior and fate. He decided to restructure the party and the country simultaneously, trying, in the process, to develop himself as a political leader of a new type.

Well, the game was worth the candle but the implementation of the plans turned out to be beyond Mikhail Sergeyevich’s strength. The task was excessively difficult and the burden of concepts about what makes the authority and influence of a political leader, developed within the old party structures, paralyzed thought as well as action. While M.S. Gorbachev was reaching up to the next “daring” decision, it had already become necessary to change it to something else, which was sometimes its direct opposite. As a result, a great deal of what was being done was irrelevant, too late or, conversely, premature, with results which were destructive to Gorbachev himself and to his political authority. Having overestimated himself and having failed to accomplish his personal perestroika to the necessary extent, M.S. Gorbachev was bound to find himself in the unenviable role of universal deceiver. What was this: his fault or his difficulty?

Who Is ‘For’ and Who Is ‘Against’ Gorbachev

Let us now try to determine the following: who is today for the president? Not very many.

The CPSU: to the extent to which M.S. Gorbachev, being in power, will try to prevent political genocide to be committed on the party;

The so-called democratic forces: to the extent to which he can restrain the aggressiveness of the conservative movement which is structuring its policy on the use of the worsening difficulties and which today are believed by many to be the result of the amateurish activities of the “democrats;”

The professional, creative, youth, and women’s associations and the mass organizations: to the extent to which they share the positions of the democratic or conservative wing;

The Church: as long as M.S. Gorbachev does not hinder the growth of its activeness and influence among the population;

Public opinion: only to the extent to which it fears that the policy of the person who could replace Gorbachev may prove to be even more ruinous;

The numerous groups of "informals:" to the extent to which they believe that until they can assume their final shape it would be better for the reins of government to remain in M.S. Gorbachev's hands.

And who is against Gorbachev? Those same forces, but now depending on the nature of the programs they have for taking the country out of the crisis, absolutely everyone being convinced that M.S. Gorbachev will be unable to accomplish this. The process of the destruction of his political image and decline of authority and influence has become irreversible. All too many errors and omissions were allowed to happen over the past six years, along with untested political steps.

Under those circumstances, it is only the fear of the "right" that the "left" would prevail and the fear of the "left" that the "right" would prevail that is helping M.S. Gorbachev remain in power. There is virtually no political center in the country, such as to draw to itself any somewhat tangible forces. This is a unique situation and also, essentially, an impasse. The efforts of Gorbachev himself to find a way out of it are totally doomed. Those who did not understand this in the past are beginning to realize it now, after the initiation of a process aimed at shaping a new presidential corps, together with which M.S. Gorbachev has already promised to resign should he be unable to stabilize the situation and achieve a change for the better.

All this proves is that the president is politically disoriented or, rather, demoralized. For otherwise he should have known that neither he nor, as yet, anyone else has the ability, in the foreseeable future, to do something which could be viewed as a stabilization of the situation, not to mention a radical turn for the better. The development of events has gone out of control, and in the present situation no one can predict the next "bomb" which will explode on the political testing grounds of the country. Whatever may happen, however, the blame will fall on M.S. Gorbachev, and on the cabinet he is assembling. Whoever the members of this cabinet may be, it is all too clear that it will not include any single truly noteworthy personality, aware of his own political value. I do not exclude that it was precisely for such considerations that A.N. Yakovlev and E.A. Shevardnadze, along with some authoritative experts, distanced themselves from the team of presidential advisers.

Yet another confirmation of the political vacuum which has formed around M.S. Gorbachev was the nomination of G.I. Yanayev to the position of vice president. It is not even a question of the fact that after the doubt which arose in the course of voting on his nomination, at the fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the president found no solution other than to insist on a second vote, although he should have realized that, as they cast their ballots the second time, the deputies would be expressing their views no longer concerning G.I. Yanayev's candidacy, but on the matter of confidence in the president himself, and that the victory which was won was unconvincing.

The nomination of G.I. Yanayev as vice president reflected, as in a drop of water, the diminished political scale of M.S. Gorbachev's personality, the quality in the USSR president which currently rounds up his political doom—hastiness in the steps being taken, from the viewpoint of their inevitable consequences. By making G.I. Yanayev his political right hand, M.S. Gorbachev not only caused irreparable harm to his prestige and reputation as a state leader but, once again, for the umpteenth time!, contributed to the aggravation of the confrontation and to the intensified destabilization of the situation, fraught with the most severe calamities for him and for the people.

And so, what to do in that situation? Should we try to remove the USSR president from power?

Within the strictures of a constitutional procedure, this is impossible. Suggestions calling for depriving him of his position, whatever their origin, will not have the necessary support. Any other candidate who may be nominated to succeed him would face a similar situation.

Nor is an anti-constitutional coup d'etat possible, because of not only domestic but also international political factors.

Nor is a development of events according to the Eastern European scenarios possible. To begin with, the process of change in our country followed a different political line. In our country, it began not from the bottom but from the top. Second, the Soviet people, by virtue of differences in the level of political maturity and activeness, will never be able to assume the initiative. Yet a political force capable of taking the country to the streets with political slogans, involving almost one-half of the population, as was the case, shall we say, in Czechoslovakia, does not exist here. Actually, it is a good thing that the people have so far not rushed to make policy on the streets. We lack the necessary traditions or political standards which would keep such an act within civilized limits. I believe that V.O. Klyuchevskiy had reasons to say that in Russia mass anti-governmental actions are bound to assume a Pugachev-like style (incidentally, the only politically motivated justification for introducing in the country a military-militia regime of patrols could be fear of a popular rebellion. As we know, this would be both senseless and merciless. However, today's authorities would prefer not even to mention this, in order not to bring disaster upon themselves).

The objective analysis of the situation in the country leads to the following conclusion: all that we are about to experience will be not only a pitiful and cruel agony of Gorbachev's political career but also a time of suffering of the people.

Salvation is possible in one case only: if M.S. Gorbachev himself, having realized the critical nature of the situation, would voluntarily leave the political stage. Following the resignation of B.N. Yeltsin in 1987 and that of E.A. Shevardnadze in 1990, the expediency of the resignation of M.S. Gorbachev can be computed as

simply as the valence of any chemical element, based on Mendeleev's table of elements.

The withdrawal from official governmental policy by Shevardnadze who, one would have thought, reflected the most efficient trend of perestroika, could mean one thing only: a harshest possible blow against the confidence in such a policy in general, assuming that anyone still had such confidence. As was the case with B.N. Yeltsin, E.A. Shevardnadze's step initially caused puzzlement, followed by major concern, if the ship of perestroika, captained by M.S. Gorbachev, was being abandoned by its first officer, which meant that either the ship or the skipper were on the brink of trouble. Here is also his statement: "This is my protest against dictatorship."

Given that situation, from the viewpoint of objective political logic, the only chance which Mikhail Sergeyevich had of drawing suspicion away from himself and disavowing E.A. Shevardnadze's statement, was to try, by all possible means, to talk him into remaining in the ranks of the presidential army. The best solution would have been to make him vice president, as seems to have been planned before the minister of foreign affairs resigned, a resignation which, if we are to trust his words, came as a surprise to the president. Essentially, the question of retaining E.A. Shevardnadze became a matter of political honor for the president of the USSR. He was either unable or unwilling to retain Shevardnadze, thus allowing idle political minds to fantasize as to what would be worse!

Gorbachev's voluntary resignation could become the salutary shock to society and make the homespun democrats and conservatives to realize the fatal nature of a confrontation and finally understand that without consolidation and civic consensus the country could not be rescued.

However, as long as Gorbachev remains at the head of the state the objective of consolidation remains unattainable. The magic circle can be broken only by the president himself. To this effect, he should have once again to display political courage, combined with political wisdom. Will Mikhail Sergeyevich have enough of either? We would very much like to think so, for the choices he faces are indeed incredibly difficult: either a horrible end or endless horror.

Do We Need Another Gorbachev?

Well, let us assume that M.S. Gorbachev resigns voluntarily or is forced to do so. Who would replace him? Who could accomplish that which Gorbachev was unable to do?

At this point we are faced with two factors: the functional and the personal. Above all, it is necessary to have a clear idea of what type of rule we wish to have on the Union level, and only then determine the type of person with what specific authority and what political and personal qualities could and should assume this position.

The current situation cannot be described as favorable for the consideration, not to mention the resolution, of such problems. Everything is confused and entangled in a tight Gordian knot. In all likelihood, there should be someone who could unravel this tangle of contradictions with one stroke. It would be better if such a hero turns out to be M.S. Gorbachev himself. His voluntary resignation would radically simplify the situation.

I believe that I am right when I say that the saddest days for M.S. Gorbachev, for the policy of perestroika, and for the people began when the decision was made to establish the position of president of the USSR, for no one could imagine the nature of presidential power in our country. Although this was not considered in the past, it would be proper to consider it now.

As to the personal qualities of any possible heir to M.S. Gorbachev, I would imagine that he should not be a "strong political personality." Considering the development of events in the country, we need less a strong head of the executive branch than a person with a highly developed moral authority and impeccable political intuition, who could, in some difficult situations, find a compromise and, in other, display firmness. The one should not be confused with the other. Such qualities are acquired not as a result of holding high governmental positions but, rather, on the basis of practical experience.

As you can see, in the Eastern European countries, people who had been cruelly repressed under communist totalitarian regimes found themselves in power: Lech Walesa in Poland; V. Havel, in Czechoslovakia; I. Iliescu in Romania, and Zh. Zhelev, in Bulgaria. Was that accidental? Not in the least. If a country finds itself in a difficult situation, its people would like to see at its head someone well-known to have drunk his bitter cup to the bottom. It is such a person who can understand what concerns and worries the people. He would not err in choosing the ways and means for the implementation of his policy and would not act against his conscience. Such is the psychological portrait of a contemporary leader shared by our associates in the now-failed socialist happiness.

Naturally, this does not mean at all that now we too should start looking for sufferers-protectors of the law and to raise any one of them to the peak of authority. However, nor should we labor under the delusion that recognition and authority in the eyes of the people could be secured by someone who, for a number of years, was himself was not operating at the lowest power echelons. Therefore, if we are seeking for a successor to M.S. Gorbachev, it should not be among the members of the political club to which he belongs. Today the position of the USSR president should be held by a person enjoying the moral authority of an Andrey Sakharov or a Vladimir Vysotskiy.

As to the "strong political personalities," today they are very much needed on the republic level. They should be able to secure order on their own territories and be

responsible for the life and safety of the people rather than nodding in Moscow's direction.

M.S. Gorbachev's possible successor should realize that the way to creating living conditions worthy of man goes not through the concentration of power and responsibility within a single pair of hands but through their dispersal and concretization.

On the practical level, he should prove that he has two mandatory qualities. First, he must be familiar with the true situation in the country; second, he should be able to anticipate the course of events. Naturally, such people do exist in our country.

Now a few concluding words on this risky and controversial topic. I did not wish to hurt Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev or even less so to write without having a social mandate. I speak sincerely, for to me he will always be the initiator of perestroika, one of its heroes, and its greatest and, unfortunately, inevitable victim. I would not like for M.S. Gorbachev's name to be linked to the doom of the last hope of the people for a revival, and for the deserved right we have to live like human beings. It was with that idea in mind that I started writing and it is with that idea in mind that I conclude, for all of us, in the final account, are responsible for each other and for the country, and not the president alone. I believe that M.S. Gorbachev realizes this.

P.S. While these notes were awaiting publication, a new drama developed in the country. Speaking live on television, B.N. Yeltsin demanded M.S. Gorbachev's resignation. And again, as in past (October 1987) events, M.S. Gorbachev has the choice: to listen to the voice of political reason and indeed voluntarily resign, for in the opposite case the events will develop along the beaten tracks which promise nothing other than an already programmed tragedy.

However, on this occasion the meaning of B.N. Yeltsin's action is much deeper and his dialectics are more complex. B.N. Yeltsin no longer believes that M.S. Gorbachev is able to make the right choice, for which reason he calls for the people and not Gorbachev to make the choice, although he realizes that the result will most likely be in favor of Gorbachev. What then is the meaning of this step?

Charges have already been leveled at B.N. Yeltsin to the effect that he acted under the urge of his own ambitions and that, in the manner of a new political Herostratus, he is prepared to set the people afire in a civil war. Those who are formulating such charges today will quite soon feel ashamed to recall their "lofty" anger. Nor will they do so. They will simply avoid it. Very soon, they will start demanding M.S. Gorbachev's resignation and, perhaps, even trial and will call for transferring the full power to the Supreme Soviet in order to save the country and its own local committees, and for the harsh punishment of those who violate the political law and order. B.N. Yeltsin understands this perfectly, as well as the fact that neither his accusers nor he personally, whatever

they may be doing, would be able to exert any whatsoever essential influence on the objective course of events, for which reason he left for Pereyaslavl-Zalesskiy. In my view, B.N. Yeltsin felt something which, in our country, in Russia, neither before nor after October no one had been able to understand: there can be no strong power, either in the Center or in the localities, without a moral link between this power and the people.

When they started perestroika, its initiators (at that time B.N. Yeltsin was one of them) thought about anything else but the creation of moral ties with the people. Willi Brandt, the patriarch of Western European democracy, said, soon after the war, when his country had still not yet arisen from the ruins: "We must think not of what type of government we shall have, but of the type of people we would like to have." He realized that a democracy cannot be built on the ruins of totalitarianism, which had distorted not only the landscape of the country but also the souls of the people, in five, 10 or even 15 years. This requires long and, above all, painstaking work aimed at the self-advancement of the people. Such work cannot be carried out on an impulse, at the pace of perestroika.

If this is not understood by the leaders of the country, including the president of the USSR, the people themselves should try to understand it, for they indeed wish to live in accordance with their honor and conscience. It was an attempt at such an awareness that B.N. Yeltsin ask of the people, to every one of us, to attain. We have no alternative. Whatever side we take, that of M.S. Gorbachev or B.N. Yeltsin, is no longer all that important. Whatever the case, we shall accuse anyone other than ourselves for the consequences of our choice, for no such event has ever happened in our country in the past.

It was for the sake of giving us the possibility of defining our own destiny and realizing the meaning of civic responsibility that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin sacrificed himself. Instead, there is talk of ambition.... (abridged.)

Yakovlev on Future Course of Perestroika

91UN1356A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 16,
Apr 91 pp 6-7

[Interview with Presidential Adviser A.N. Yakovlev; place and date not given: "...We Have Been Living a Lie"]

[Text] Paris, 29 March (TASS)—The newspaper LA TRIBUNE DE L'EXPANSION has published the following interview with A.N. Yakovlev. The interview was conducted by the newspaper's correspondent Bernard Guetta.

[Guetta] Are the disagreements between Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev purely political?

[Yakovlev] It is hard for me to answer this question since, in my opinion, there is no solution to our present

difficulties other than the close cooperation of all political forces, including, consequently, both the president of the USSR and the Russian leader.

Nonetheless, this opposition exists. It is a political fact and is connected primarily with the collapse of our economy and the social problems that ensue. Today people prefer Yeltsin to Gorbachev simply because, putting it in round figures, it may be said that one of them has been in office six years, the other, six months. It is this which constitutes the difference for more is expected of one after several years in office, while, on the other hand, at the first stage you can promise everything, even the moon. The Russian leaders may play on the populist mood also. But this does not explain everything. Account needs to be taken also of the mistakes of the previous government.

[Guetta] Which, precisely?

[Yakovlev] History cannot be rewritten. I will not go into details, but these mistakes were quite serious.

[Guetta] A compromise between Yeltsin and Gorbachev was recorded at the end of August. It was a question of transition to a market economy in accordance with the "500 days" program. There was much talk of a "center-left coalition." But the compromise was not realized. What prevented this?

[Yakovlev] The pressure of the forces surrounding the government, the military-industrial complex and this entire mechanism of the state-run economy, which is holding on tightly. The main contradiction is the fact that the reforms which we are implementing—the Enterprise Act, agrarian reform, demonopolization, the cooperatives, the banks and much else—are alien to this system. In approving the "500 days" program it would have been agreeing to its own self-elimination, for all the present economic structures would gradually have been abolished.

[Guetta] So, consequently, there will be no transition to a market economy?

[Yakovlev] Who told you this? The reforms are proceeding and will continue in one way or another. The laws on share holding will overturn everything. The Kama Truck Plant director recently told economists meeting in the president's office about how his enterprise (one of the biggest in the USSR) had been radically transformed by way of share holding.

[Guetta] Be that as it may, the president has now been forced to backtrack.

[Yakovlev] Yes, the president is having to come to terms with reality.

[Guetta] Could you describe these conservative forces which have blocked the process begun in August? What is the military-industrial complex specifically?

[Yakovlev] There is nothing enigmatic, nothing particular in this case in the USSR. As in the United States or other countries, it is an aggregate of the military production machinery, the Army and all the infrastructures connected therewith. I understand full well the frame of mind of people from this complex. They have a powerful research apparatus and highly skilled employees and they do not have to fight to sell their products. The conversion of their plants to the manufacture of civilian products would not only be a source of difficulties but would also be a factor of their transition from privileged to ordinary status. They are fighting for their survival.

[Guetta] And how many are they? About five million?

[Yakovlev] Very likely, perhaps even more.

[Guetta] And what are the other conservative forces?

[Yakovlev] Primarily ourselves, all of us, our society. On the one hand revolutionary enthusiasm, on the other, a dogmatic swamp, and meanwhile personal interests and cynicism became laws of social behavior. People became accustomed to saying one thing, and doing another. They spoke about human life as an independent value and in the name of this highest value, as you know, killed and executed. Man was a cog of the machinery of state, and violence, the "midwife of history." This was not our national privilege, but it is a fact that we have been living a lie.

[Guetta] But what else, aside from this historical legacy, was opposed to the center-left coalition in August? The party apparatus, the Army?

[Yakovlev] The party apparatus within the state economic apparatus and the upper strata of the Army would have been unhappy with the accomplishment of the outlined transformations. Just read the party press. It is already calling perestroika an imported commodity and a petty bourgeois revolution. The "so-called democrats" are agents of the shadow economy there. A return to the former language, to a witch hunt, has begun.

[Guetta] In a word, the party apparatus as a whole is a conservative force?

[Yakovlev] Yes, a substantial part of it is, in any event, an obstructive force. The leadership of the Russian Communist Party explains that the leaders of perestroika have become an object of the manipulation of backstage scenes which have pushed them onto an anti-socialist path. The resolutions of the 19th party conference on political reforms which permitted the liberalization of elections are called mistaken. I personally am called a CIA agent, and it is said that, having removed me, Zionism would be done away with. There are indubitable signs of a counteroffensive against and a weakening of democracy.

[Guetta] What do these conservative forces want?

[Yakovlev] A return to power. They have gone so far today as to say that things were better in the stagnation

years, under Brezhnev, forgetting that a continuation of stagnation would have meant the disappearance of the state and the collapse of the nation.

[Guetta] Following the failure of the August compromise, important reformers quit the president's team. And, on the other hand, petty conservatives appeared. Does this mean that the president has, whether he wanted to or not, adopted a conservative course?

[Yakovlev] I would not draw hasty conclusions. We need to look not only at who is coming, and who, going, it is necessary to take a look also at the actual facts. New economic laws have been enacted, albeit not without difficulties, the agrarian reform is moving ahead, conversion will be accelerated and the measures provided for by the "500 days" plan are gradually being implemented: A different economic infrastructure, which will require political changes, is being created.

[Guetta] But things cannot be advanced with Pavlov or Gromov?

[Yakovlev] Pavlov's opinions do not interest me. The most important thing are the decisions which he makes in the immediate future. If following the price rises next week he is able to absorb 150-200 billion rubles [R], having put state property on sale, I would forgive him his statements about the conspiracies of Western banks.

[Guetta] But how could this be hoped for? Why would the conservative forces, who have grown stronger since August, facilitate today what they prevented yesterday?

[Yakovlev] But what else can they do? Although people are now more conservative because of the supply situation and although the words "democracy" and "freedom" are deprived of content when one has to stand in line four hours for a piece of meat, the general frame of mind has now changed completely. The conditions are now totally different.

[Guetta] Why did you, as distinct from Shevardnadze, not quit?

[Yakovlev] It was a matter of ethics. I have worked with the president since the first days of perestroika and even before. Were perestroika going well, I would have every right to devote myself to science. But perestroika is going badly, and part of the public attributes this to me. Leaving at a difficult moment would be morally impermissible. Shevardnadze dealt with foreign policy, that is, what was proving successful. His situation was completely different. I, however, was involved in domestic policy also....

[Guetta] Shevardnadze quit not because his duty was done but in order to expose the threat of dictatorship.

[Yakovlev] And what am I saying? I am warning in this interview against the threat which the conservative forces represent. Who could do this in the ranks of the president's staff? There are situations when slamming the door is easiest.

[Guetta] You write in your book that Gorbachev is "too good" for politics and cannot bring himself to adopt the necessary measures inasmuch as they could entail people's loss of life. But people died in Vilnius. What happened?

[Yakovlev] I do not know. I still do not know. A dreadful tragedy not only for Lithuania but for the whole Union also occurred. Mikhail Sergeyevich spoke some time later about a violation of the Constitution, but the investigation is not complete, and there are differing versions. I believe that something is, of course, being concealed here, but what precisely? I do not know.

[Guetta] Let us return to your opinion of the present situation. Conservative forces are predominant....

[Yakovlev] No! I said nothing of the sort. This is not the case. Were the conservative forces predominant, I could not be talking with you and saying to you what I am saying where I am saying it. I believe, on the contrary, that the conservative forces are experiencing their death throes. But it is the case that, before death, a man has a surge of energy for two or three days. But I have no wish for anyone's death. As distinct from the conservatives, I am seeking neither witches nor guilty parties. Nor do I wish to bring accusations against anyone—neither the apparatus nor the CPSU. This would mean once again demanding the execution of "enemies of the people." No!

[Guetta] Permit me to continue: If the conservatives are not predominant, they are, nonetheless, forming a bloc, whereas the reformers are scattered, and the people's malaise is growing. For how long is it possible to administer in this way?

[Yakovlev] This is a question to which there is no answer.... Russia has been controlled by totalitarian methods for 1,000 years....

[Guetta] Will it continue thus?

[Yakovlev] It continues, but it is this which we are for the first time in history attempting to end.

[Guetta] To whom do you consider yourself closer—Boris Yeltsin or the conservatives?

[Yakovlev] I am totally opposed to the conservative forces, which consider me their principal adversary. This by no means signifies that I approve of and support all that Yeltsin does. I am observing with alarm how a current which I am prepared to consider reformist is demanding, like the conservatives, the president's resignation. What, in this case, is the difference?

[Guetta] It is enormous! The reformers want an acceleration of the reforms, but the conservatives want to block them.

[Yakovlev] Yes, they would like to achieve this, but they have as yet stopped nothing.

[Guetta] What! The "500 days" plan?

[Yakovlev] Yes, I agree. Well, then, let us look at it in more detail. Shatalin is my very good friend. I may say the same also about Yavlinskiy (former deputy prime minister of Russia and author of the plan approved by Boris Yeltsin), who frequently calls on me. In a word, both know full well that there is in fact no great difference between their compromise program and Ryzhkov's program.

The purpose of both plans were the privatization of the economy, free enterprise, liberalization of the banking system, the introduction of share holding, agrarian reform and so forth. The difference was that the prime minister's plan provided for the purpose of advancement toward the market of administrative price increases, while the "500 days" plan contained another system of pricing—by way of the free play of prices on the market. The government considered (and the president agreed) that the extent of the money supply and the shortages would lead in the event of a total freeing of prices to impermissible hyperinflation.

But I repeat that both plans were plans of a transition to the market, and this was what was, in my opinion, most important. What was important in the concept of the "500 days" plan, which I supported and continue to support, was the fact that it provided a platform for political accord. This was a fundamental point. All republics, Russia included, were in agreement. But the opportunity was missed.

[Guetta] You wish to say thereby that irreconcilability was also a blocking factor? Nonetheless, it was the conservatives who were able to avail themselves of these disagreements, to intensify them....

[Yakovlev] I told you right at the start of our discussion....

[Guetta] Yes, of course. How, then, can you say that the conservatives are in their death throes.

[Yakovlev] I am not saying that they are inactive. I am saying merely that they are not winning. Perhaps they will gain a temporary victory. Perhaps perestroika will proceed in zigzag fashion. Perhaps it will take a couple of steps back, but I am sure that it will continue to progress.

[Guetta] But, your inner conviction aside, what proves to you the irreversibility of perestroika and Mikhail Sergeyevich's devotion to democracy?

[Yakovlev] The ancients said that you cannot enter the same river twice. If the water has flown, it has flown. The majority is absolutely disinclined to go into reverse, and as soon as the supply situation improves, political conditions will once again be conducive to perestroika. As far as Gorbachev is concerned, he is and will remain wholeheartedly a democrat. He has nothing in common with the conservative wing, which does not recognize him as one of its own and, on the contrary, rejects him.

Do not judge by words, judge by deeds. You should understand that our democrats (the radical opposition) also are far from spotless. When I speak with them, they utter very sound words about the ultimate goal, about democracy, and about the struggle against the conservatives. The whole problem is that instead of really harnessing themselves in work and creating a party, they are rejecting everything, confining themselves to slogans. Once again talk as regards the fact that "we will raze the world of violence to its foundations and then," in order the more successfully to build a new life. This is neo-Bolshevism. I hate violence in all its manifestations. I do not believe in any of this. Stalinism has left its mark on the democrats, as on the neo-Stalinists. Revolution is not a one-act play. It is connected with more than just a change of power.

[Guetta] So why is there so little discussion of the true problem—the pace and conditions of the transition to the market?

[Yakovlev] There is constant discussion. A multitude of articles has been published on this matter, but no one knows, no one anywhere yet knows how to accomplish such a fundamental change. Remember the French Revolution: How long it took to stabilize democracy.

[Guetta] What will Gorbachev do with the Baltic republics now?

[Yakovlev] What can he do? There is the law. If the republics want to stay, let them stay. If they want to leave, let them leave, but in compliance with the law.

[Guetta] But the problem is precisely that they do not recognize the terms of this law on secession from the Union....

[Yakovlev] Well, this is their problem. Why do they reject the stipulated referendum procedure—the most democratic form of expression of the people's wishes?

[Guetta] But the problem has essentially been overcome. They organized their own referenda, over and above Soviet law. The results were so convincing that, had they conducted this ballot within the framework of the stipulated legislation, the legitimate procedure of separation would have already begun. Is it not time, therefore, to abandon formalism and come to the point?

[Yakovlev] Rules of law should be respected. I have spoken in defense of the Baltic republics, but it sometimes seems to me that some of their leaders are doing everything in order not to obtain this independence. Can one call oneself a democrat and introduce discrimination on a basis of nationality? To what end are the soldiers being called from left and right occupation forces? After all, these soldiers have nothing to do with things here. And why the desecration of the graves of the fighters against fascism? I was at the front. I fought against the fascists. Such acts offend me. My sympathy is beginning to wane.

[Guetta] Mikhail Sergeyevich also organized his referendum. He also won, having obtained a majority in support of the signing of a new "Union treaty." How will he make use of these results?

[Yakovlev] These are good results. This ballot does not have automatic legal consequences but it is of great political significance because, despite the scale of the social difficulties, people have spoken in favor of a new union. It is now necessary to sign this new treaty, for precise determination of the prerogatives of the central and republic authorities, thereby putting an end to the war of laws....

[Guetta] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, you are indulging in fantasies! This will not happen.

[Yakovlev] How will it not? And how am I indulging in fantasies (he takes a piece of paper and draws two columns). Defense, transport, communications, foreign policy, power engineering, basic research and the major social programs will remain within the jurisdiction of the center. All the rest will revert to the republics. Each will deal with its own and only its own affairs.

[Guetta] This has nothing in common with reality. The Balts, and not only they, will undoubtedly not sign this treaty....

[Yakovlev] But if they do not want to sign, they will not sign it. Our relations will be built as normal international relations. We will purchase from them agricultural produce at world prices, they will purchase from us energy at world prices—and let them get on as they please!

[Guetta] But would you withdraw Soviet forces from the republics concerned and recognize their independence? What, then, about the law on secession from the USSR, compliance with which you have just been demanding?

[Yakovlev] We would negotiate while complying with the laws. The Baltic republics have begun to adopt measures in respect to the guaranteed equality of the nationalities. This is a step in the right direction.

[Guetta] In short, your opinion. Will the Baltic republics be independent?

[Yakovlev] They will be, if they want. This is up to them, but all is not that simple. To whom would the Balts sell their farm produce? To you, the French? This is unlikely, is it not? So, consequently, to us? But if they sell it for dollars, we will try to obtain the best quality for that same money. Why have they decided that we would buy from them, not in Paris, Rome, or London? Ultimately the quality is somewhat better there.

[Guetta] Do you believe in the possibility of a military coup?

[Yakovlev] No, I do not. There is no such precedent in the history of Russia. This has never happened.

[Guetta] If Gorbachev is not threatened by a coup d'état, on whom can he rely today?

[Yakovlev] On the reforms which have begun and which cannot now be stopped.

[Guetta] Final question. You have a photograph of Gorbachev on your desk. His official portrait hangs on the wall. But Lenin? You have no portrait of Lenin?

[Yakovlev] (Smiling) The three nails opposite.

[Guetta] On which nothing hangs. There was a portrait of Lenin there?

[Yakovlev] It was hardly a portrait of Roosevelt.

Moscow's Popov on Battle Between Democrats, Conservatives

91UN1290A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 29 Mar 91 p 3

[Gavriil Popov interviewed by S. Zavorotniy, D. Sabov: "When People Look for Enemies, They Ultimately Find Them Among Friends"]

[Text] What Kind of Legacy Are We Rejecting?

[Question] Gavriil Kharitonovich, it seems that only yesterday both left and right shared a quest, at times a joint one, for an answer to the question, "What is to be done?" Today the subject is a different one—"Who is to blame?" What has caused such a sharp taking of sides?

[Popov] Perestroyka, and I wrote about this back in 1985, had two possible paths of development—the democratic path, and the apparatus path. This stemmed from the fact that our entire old, pre-perestroyka society could be divided into two groups. The first, which constituted the majority, was made up of those who were nothing and still are nothing (that is, who do not have any property). The second, and they were the minority, consisted of those who left the old society with a "safety mechanism": They had power, positions, connections, money, control over property, and the right to dispose of it. It is clear that the approaches to perestroyka taken by these two groups of society are fundamentally different. The first are struggling for the free denationalization of land, the means of production, and real estate, for equal rights for all citizens to the state property created through their common labor. The second group prefers to divide state property through the existing structures—the party apparatus, the ministries, kolkhoz chairmen, the labor unions, and so on. Instead of dividing the property without charge, they wanted to use the principle of buying out the property, in order to shut out the have-nots.

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] But you also supported, in your own way, the apparatus option of perestroyka when you became chairman of the Moscow City Soviet. First you shared power, and later accountability as well, for what was going on, at least in Moscow.

[Popov] Prior to the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies, most of us agreed that the apparatus option was the sole possible option for our country. We believed that the right-center coalition led by Gorbachev would have the strength to devise and implement its perestroika program. Unfortunately...

Following the elections to local and republic Soviets, the radical forces greatly consolidated their positions. A new situation emerged in which the representatives of different political forces resided on different floors of power.

The war of laws broke out: I was no sooner elected chairman of the Moscow City Soviet when our president issued the Decree on Moscow's Garden Ring Road. One can understand him: He found himself in a city in which the interests of the central authorities were in no way secure.

In that situation, we hoped that the president would not embark on the path of war with us, but would prefer a compromise, that he would agree with our ideas in a version acceptable to all sides. The idea of a common economic program with Russia was born—the "500 Days" program. We all know how all this ended. The Supreme Soviet convened in the fall and, along with the "500 Days" program, buried the whole idea of a left-center coalition. The choice was made: The president had sided with the conservative forces. A parade of resignations followed: Yakovlev left at the party congress; Bakatin before the Congress of People's Deputies; Shevardnadze, during the congress; and Shatalin, Petukhov, and Yavlinskiy after the congress. The center was destroyed. The president was left alone.

In the apparatus itself, two schools have formed during these years. One is the reformist wing, which has demanded vigorous change in the interests of the apparatus. But a second school has also become active in the apparatus—those who oppose any real changes. Both schools hope to make the presidential regime their "own." The current presidential regime is supported by a contradictory coalition that includes traditionalists, opponents of perestroika, and apparatchiks who already see their "own" perestroika.

The supporters of apparatus perestroika need the president. But if those who uphold the traditional, apparatus-oriented socialist ideal (and they are in the majority at present) prevail, they will soon replace the president with a leader who is truly one of their own—such as A.I. Lukyanov, for example. You will agree that in this situation, we have no choice. It is indeed time to take sides.

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] Do you see the possibility of your resigning as chairman of the Moscow City Soviet?

[Popov] I am not an apparatchik, but a political leader. For me, the important thing is not the office but the opportunity it offers to implement my political program. For this reason I do not rule out resignation. I will not

allow myself to be made a scapegoat, nor a whipping boy, not a target of daily slander. If the presidential regime persists in its present attitude toward the Moscow City Soviet, perhaps it would be correct to make that regime answer to Muscovites.

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] Why, then, did not you set about creating a broad democratic movement the day after you entered the Moscow City Soviet?

[Popov] On becoming chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, I did not undertake the task of creating a democratic government in the capital. The times were different. I hoped that we would succeed in reaching an agreement with the center. In that case, we would have had, on one hand, to encourage the center to effect more drastic changes, and on the other hand, to become a proving ground where forms of such cooperation could be tested and perfected.

Where Moscow is concerned, our hopes were largely borne out. I had hoped that the executive committee would be able to work with us. Some officials, mostly former party workers, left. But those who stayed worked well with us.

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] In the referendum, more than 80 percent of all Muscovites supported the idea of direct general elections of a mayor for the capital. Was that vote for or against you, and how has it affected your subsequent plans?

[Popov] Muscovites expressed the view that executive authority in the capital should be strong (concentrated in a single pair of hands) and democratic (elected by all residents), and I am happy that my opinion coincides with that of Muscovites. As for my position, I could offer my candidacy for that post only in the event that a Law on Moscow is adopted and it is known in advance what the mayor will be responsible for, and whether he has power commensurate with his share of responsibility. But I fear that the present regime has no need for such a mayor, and we will have to wait a long time for a Law on Moscow—even though the deadline set by the president expired back on February 23.

Who Is To Blame?

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] The terminology of our revolutionary period is more and more often slipping into politicians' speeches of late: the "right and left opposition," the "taking of sides," "division," "friends and enemies of the people." Yeltsin has distanced himself from Gorbachev, Gorbachev from Yeltsin and Popov, and you, in turn, did not keep yourself waiting very long. In your view, is the confrontation with the President serious, and will it persist for a long time?

[Popov] The president's speeches in Belorussia were timely—for the situation in the country is too serious to limit oneself to run-of-the-mill assessments. The essence of the concept he put forward consists in that the forces leading the country (which is to say the CPSU apparatus)

had plans for change all these years and fought to implement them, but have failed to accomplish anything in six years, and so one has to identify those who are to blame, those who obstructed these forces. The positive thing in the statement is that it contains an assessment: For the first time, it is admitted that nothing has been accomplished indeed. The second question concerns the blame that rests with the so-called democrats, who have fought for power all these years.

First, did the leaders of our state have a concept of perestroika when they launched it?

Recall 1985 and 1986, the era of "perestroika with acceleration," when issues relating to changing economic relations were posed only in connection with increasing machinery production and accelerating the pace of economic development. Let us recall how in 1987, it was admitted that the economic system had to be reorganized, and how it later became clear that even that was not enough. It then becomes clear: There was no straightforward concept of perestroika that formulated the ultimate arrangement, what we were ultimately supposed to arrive at. Nor is there one today, for all practical purposes. The forces that launched perestroika were never able to devise their own version of change.

And now as regards the struggle for power. The so-called democrats could not put so-called obstacles in M.S. Gorbachev's way because they constituted a clear minority. The situation has changed—not in the center but in the provinces—only in the past six months, beginning last summer. The president's charges are reminiscent of the scene in Krylov's fable where the wolf says to the lamb: You snubbed me last summer. And the lamb answers: "But I am not even one year old."

In general, I am surprised that people who consider themselves adherents of Marxism are trying to attribute a large period of the country's life to a struggle on the part of certain individuals or groups for power. If one is to proceed from Marxist precepts, one should first of all analyze the social forces in society, identify what is it they are striving for and what their interests are, and then determine from these positions who obstructed whom and why.

Nevertheless, I do not really believe that Gorbachev was calling in Belorussia for a final and complete taking of sides. We know our president rather well. You will agree that he is not a person who makes an unequivocal choice. He has changed his positions more than once, something that has become a trademark and, in some respects, his virtue as a political leader. And it must be said that this has not harmed perestroika. Moreover, Mikhail Sergeyevich himself has always stressed his ability to compromise. Read his Minsk speech very carefully. It has lots of accusations, including accusations against me; but it also shows a clear desire to continue to pursue a centrist policy.

And what about us? It is apparent to us that in politics, one cannot take the position of "no compromise," of

"take it or leave it." But it is also clear that the earlier coalition options are no longer suitable to us. We have learned a lot during these six months. Verbal promises are no longer enough for us. Real action is required.

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] Many people saw the events in the Baltics and the joint patrols by the army and Ministry of Internal Affairs as signs of an impending military dictatorship. Do you agree with these views?

[Popov] It is wrong to think that the army and state security agencies started the new wave of conservatism. In my view, the people who are saying this are trying to obscure the essence of the matter and to channel the democratic masses' anger in the wrong direction. In essence, the former power of the CPSU apparatus is being restored in the new conservative regime. There were no mythical salvation committees and army blocs, nor are there now. There are the ordinary Latvian and Lithuanian CP Central Committees, backed by the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, which has decided to take revenge. A full-fledged battle is under way to put every kind of decision-making back in the party offices: The apparatus wants to regain control of the newspapers, trade, the army, and State Security Committee, and everything else.

It wants to be able to "call people on the carpet" again, to tell people how to plant, to decide what news the television programs will report, who should go abroad, and so on. Incidentally, Mikhail Sergeyevich knows full well just who is striving for power: It is the apparatus of his party that he continually assures of his loyalty.

Strictly speaking, neither the army nor the State Security Committee has lost its positions in recent years. The CPSU apparatus has lost its positions, and it would not be a bad thing if that apparatus were to fight to regain its power through elections—that is the normal democratic process. But the CPSU does not like electoral contests.

In that event, it would have to "purge" itself, to promote into the apparatus not "obedient" people, but those who can fight in a democratic system, who know how to maneuver in the Soviets and so forth. But such "Sovietized" cadres are already disobedient. The fate of the CPSU apparatus is in question. And so there remains but one course: not to go over to the Soviets, but at a minimum to preserve their party posts (it is no accident that A.I. Lukyanov so harshly condemned the Russian law forbidding simultaneous posts). At the same time, the chief strategic task is to pull power away from the Soviets and into their offices. It would be far simpler to once again compel ministers and Soviet chairmen to go to the party Central Committee or the city party committee to report on their work and receive directives. And yet only yesterday we were assured that the CPSU would not abandon its policy of establishing a parliamentary system!

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] But apparatus games alone cannot account for the CPSU's launching a successful strategic offensive.

[Popov] Yes, and I would rank a change of sentiments in the army first in terms of importance. The army has been united by discontent with the social conditions in which it has found itself since the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of soldiers from Eastern Europe. The attitude toward officers' fates borders on mockery.

It is not at all difficult to manipulate people's natural dissatisfaction (for example, by encouraging dissatisfaction with the Moscow City Soviet, which will not provide apartments).

A similar process has occurred inside the military-industrial complex. There has been talk about conversion for many years, but not a single effective method of conversion has been offered. As a result, people who used to be our industrial elite are left with no prospects except unemployment. Sensing this threat, they too have moved to the right.

Among the important factors, I would cite the mistakes that national movements in a number of republics have made with respect to the nonnative population. In some places, this has enabled the CPSU apparatus to become a defender of human rights (the CPSU apparatus!). On the other hand, the CPSU central apparatus has succeeded in using concessions and promises to bring national communists from another group of republics over to its side.

And finally, let us not forget that there are objective limits to the masses' weariness. People have grown tired after five years of empty promises. And if we add to this the steady increase in difficulties, there is nothing surprising about the fact that in 1991, the realities of the Brezhnev era have begun to seem like paradise.

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] Have you sidestepped the democrats' mistakes?

[Popov] The democrats have made mistakes too, of course. Take, for example, the inaction of the Interregional Group since October 1990, when it became clear that the left-centrist coalition had been spurned.

As it moved from tasks of negation to the creation of a positive program, the democratic camp promptly found itself split: You will agree that it is one thing to demand the CPSU give up its monopoly on power, and quite another to devise principles for shifting to the market.

A strong antimarket school has arisen within the democratic movement, a school that I would call neo-Bolshevist.

But turning to the most important consideration, today's difficulties of democracy stem from the country's objective unreadiness for an accelerated shift to the market. The structure of the branch economy is not a market structure. The mix itself of enterprises largely predetermines monopolism. A social dependency mentality prevails, in which a person is prepared to stand in line for meat for more hours than it would take him to plant potatoes, harvest them, and feed them to a piglet.

To sum up, by the winter of 1990-1991, a powerful block of conservatives had emerged in the country. The CPSU apparatus gained a chance to play a big political game, a chance that—let us be fair—it took advantage of in a highly professional way. Incidentally, this shows that the Brezhnev dimwits have been replaced by young cadres who cannot, in principle, answer for all the past and who do not intend to sit it out in the trenches.

What Is To Be Done?

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] In other words, the CPSU had a chance to become a party of order, order that our exhausted society craves. Will this go on for a long time, in your opinion? And will the democrats be able to find something to counter such an attractive slogan?

[Popov] To answer those questions, we must first make some kind of prognosis regarding the course that the president is presently pursuing.

The measures that have been proposed—in the spheres of both the economy and national structure—do not solve the fundamental problems. Indeed, they are aggravating them.

Did the referendum really alleviate the ethnic conflicts? No, it intensified them, I would say it even inflamed them.

Or take the price increases. Why are central agencies now berating the Moscow City Soviet and other local Soviets day and night? Over rising prices? Not at all, for even the center wants to raise prices. They are berating us for an entirely different reason—for the fact that the local Soviets have decided to use contractual prices in a sphere that the center wants to remain a sphere of directives. At a contractual price of two rubles, 50 kopeks, city transport will be left with the same old seven percent, while the entire price increase will go to the egg producer, to stimulate increased production. At the price set by the State Prices Committee, no one knows what part of the price increase will go to the producer and what part will be used to pay the upkeep of the State Prices Committee. And now the center is portraying itself as a defender of the people: I am going to set fixed prices on eggs—high prices, but lower than the current contractual ones. And it says nothing about the most important factor: Can it guarantee to the people as a whole that there will be enough eggs at its price? The center is concerned not about increasing egg production, but about preserving its power.

No matter what action by the center we consider, in every case the primary concern is for itself; the market is of secondary importance. And in general, as long as the market remains small, there are the traditional directives, with the promise of reform in the future. However, the conservatives, having soothed the country, are always soothing themselves, and reducing reform to tinkering.

For this reason, the president's course holds no fundamental improvements in store from the standpoint of the proposed measures.

But there is another aspect to the matter: The very foundation of the presidential regime is unstable.

As I said earlier, this is a contradictory coalition of two utterly different parts of the party apparatus: the part that is prepared to make concessions, and the part that is not. This complex coalition has succeeded in enlisting the army, law-enforcement agencies, the military-industrial complex, and national communists. They are temporary allies. Take the army. Let us say that the apparatus solves all its apartment problems (which is dubious in the first place). But the army needs weapons, and our economy is simply unable to provide the army with modern weapons. For this reason, all the honest and sincere elements of the army, which understand their responsibility to the people, will sooner or later begin to demand real changes in the economy; otherwise, the army will not be able to carry out its duty.

The same is true of the State Security Committee—there are too many smart people there.

The same is true of the military-industrial complex, whose leaders understand that maintaining state orders at the 1990 level is a temporary measure, that the cold war and competition with the Strategic Defense Initiative is suicide, and that conversion and the market are ultimately inevitable.

In short, all the processes that led to the change of course in 1985 are still here.

Moreover, I foresee the start of purely apparatus wars. I find it hard to believe that the generals will agree with an arrangement in which the Central Committee once again decides who to promote to general of the army and who to promote to colonel general. I find it hard to believe that despite all the hatred for democrats and private farmers, kolkhoz chairmen are going to want the rayon CPSU committee to once again start telling them when to reap and what to sow.

And so after a certain amount of success in imposing order and eliminating obvious outrages, a crisis will break out. It will become necessary to make another choice: either restore the old system (which will inevitably require a military dictatorship), or commence perestroika in earnest. And the struggle for one or another option could prove so fierce that it will be impossible to expect the formulation of a concept for apparatus perestroika. To draw an analogy with Russian history, the president has chosen the "landowner" option for freeing the peasants, and the option itself has not even been formulated.

How can this be countered? My view has changed of late. One could conceive of some sort of coalition in the future, but given the fact that the CPSU apparatus is now

opposing us as an organized force, we can put up real resistance to it only by creating a competitive structure.

But it is no secret that Democratic Russia itself is a diverse group. And hence these cells are of a multiparty character. I support the greatest possible acceleration of these efforts. It is time to create a mass opposition party. Millions of people are wavering, they need a support in life, something to firmly hold onto. It is important to know that you are not alone, that there are dozens, hundreds, thousands of people like you. That someone will protect and support you at your workplace. Democratically minded people are very much in need of this today. In some ways, the situation in our country is reminiscent of that in Poland in the 1980s, when the creation of Solidarity was the people's reaction to an offensive launched by the central apparatus.

[Zavorotniy, Sabov] Don't you fear that in our country, that program runs the risk of leading to civil war? People are already talking about such a war on every corner.

[Popov] Civil war has always been a war between classes. We have yet to see any other kind of civil war in history. Therefore, if someone talks about civil war, no such war can occur in our society: There is no social base. If something similar were to happen in our country, it would have to be called not a civil war, but the suppression of the people by the apparatus.

As for our program, its objective is precisely to avert civil conflicts. We want to create a constructive party.

I think that the apparatus itself has a vital interest in the emergence of a second mass party as an alternative to the CPSU. For you will recall how the one-party, apparatus path to a capitalist market that was chosen in 1861 ended for Russia—with the creation of the terrorist People's Will party in the 19th century and the storm of civil war in the 20th.

Yes, the situation in the country today is grave. But it cannot be ruled out that if Gorbachev's place were to be taken by Yeltsin or someone else, the situation would be still be difficult. Transforming the legacy we have inherited from the past is extremely difficult—after all, the leftist (from our viewpoint) regimes in Hungary, the CSFR, and Poland (not to mention Bulgaria and Romania) are also in crisis, and not one of those countries, in my view, is guaranteed as yet against a change of government.

Secondly, it is important today that we finally realize that the process of moving to democracy will be long and difficult, and that the search for enemies solves nothing, that it leads only to the finding of such enemies among friends and compatriots. Yes, the situation is difficult, but not tragic. Dramatic intonations are inappropriate. If the conservative forces that now make up the regime do not make very stupid mistakes, and if the democrats do not succumb to provocations, the options for democratic development will be preserved. The most dangerous option for the country is the 1917 option, with its

anarchy. Amid anarchy, after all, it makes no difference who comes to power—extremists from the right or the left.

Aspects of Future CPSU Program Examined

91UN1352A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yevgeniy Semenov, head of the Policy Analysis and Forecast Division of the CPSU Central Committee Humanitarian Department: "Without Revolutions and Dictatorships"]

[Text] The last five or six years constitute a whole historical period which has accommodated a multitude of dramatic events of an epoch-making nature. The former society essentially no longer exists. The country is living in different historical times, in a different historical rhythm. Today it has new problems, new concerns. Of course, this has also been reflected in the CPSU and its policy and ideology.

Not only many individual propositions but also fundamental ideological principles have in fact been revised in the party. Eloquent testimony to this, incidentally, is the program statement of the 28th CPSU Congress. A new set of fundamental ideas of the CPSU has been polished, as it were, in the complex debate of recent years. The new ideology which is taking shape differs appreciably, strikingly, I would say, from the previous one.

The principles of class struggle and civil war as positive goals are receding into history, I believe, giving way to other reference points—national harmony and civil peace. The idea of revolution is agonizingly dying away—reforms are far closer to present-day thinking. Instead of the idea of dictatorship, the idea of a state based on the rule of law is gaining recognition. An orientation toward a mixed economy is being counterposed to the former principles of the monopoly of state ownership, and the idea of the market to the idea of the totalitarian administrative regulation of economic life.

The idea of man's subordination to the institutions of society has already suffered a complete fiasco, and, on the contrary, the idea of their auxiliary role, including the state, in relation to man has progressed. The attempts to "erase" national differences now seem unnatural. The reliance on forces with "nothing to lose" is being replaced by an orientation toward socially responsible forces.

All these changes are affecting the deep-lying foundations of the CPSU's ideological system. And they are all material. But the most significance, probably, is attached to at least three positions making it possible to speak about a truly fundamental renewal of the ideology and policy of the CPSU.

First position. A central place in communist ideology has always been occupied by the question of classes and class struggle.

It was the case historically that it was here that the line of what was both moral and expedient was fatally crossed. The preaching of the dictatorship of the proletariat served in fact as justification for the self-worth of dictatorship and the cult of power and the potentate. Dictatorship—the totally undivided and completely unlimited power of any political subject—was deemed a natural and good thing inasmuch as this was dictatorship of the proletariat. This led to a flouting of morality and the age-old experience of the people and, simultaneously, to the suppression of the people themselves. This overplayed class approach resulted in an intoxication with struggle and violence. And only now is our society learning with great difficulty and excruciatingly to think in categories of civil peace, not permanent civil war.

This notwithstanding, the problem of class contradictions and the civilized solution of class conflicts and a class approach cannot, of course, escape ideology for there are grounds for them in life itself. But instead of the irresponsible instigation of the total opposition of the classes, the outcome of which can only be disgraceful slaughter and another dictatorship, and instead of the preaching of a ruthless war of the classes and class cannibalism, society is learning the reasonable solution of class contradictions.

Far from all forces in our country have proven capable of such—now extremely necessary!—a flight of intellect and conscience. Modern ideologues of a war of the classes who have learned nothing from the tragic history of their own people have emerged also. But they are now concentrated by no means in the CPSU but in a variety of groupings obsessed with the importunate idea of "salvation" of the country from communism. And it is all the more important, I believe, to emphasize in the new CPSU Program the party's negative attitude toward the misanthropic ideas of class intolerance and a vulgar understanding of the class approach.

Second position. The idea of revolution and the revolutionary transformation of society has traditionally been of not the least importance in communist ideology. And many follies have been committed here, as in the attitude toward class struggle, particularly in recent years, unfortunately.

Revolution was for decades interpreted as the greatest good, as a holiday virtually. We somehow came to forget that revolutions are made not for the sake of it and that they occur where and when there are no longer any possibilities of resolving contradictions rationally. A veritable cult of revolution generally and of the cult of October particularly evolved. This vicious circle and "glorification" of the actual experience of the October Revolution without any consideration of its tragic character and actual contradictoriness and ambivalence remain as yet an inexhaustible source of legal nihilism, if not to say legal absurdity.

A state based on the rule of law cannot in principle be created with a revolutionary approach. The ideology of

revolution is the ideology not of a cause but of discord. With it, it is possible to raise the people to destruction, but not creation.

The legal running wild, if you will excuse the expression, has intensified in our society in the past five years in connection with the striking, perhaps, but not entirely well-founded interpretation of perestroika as revolution. The peoples, who have had time to come to maturity, will not allow politicians to "play at revolution," granting politically infantile peoples their charms. True, the unbridled leaders of the latter like to shift responsibility for what they have done onto the peoples, which have, allegedly, misunderstood the calls for another revolution.

Something similar has been happening, in my opinion, with perestroika also. It should come as no surprise that the idea of perestroika as revolution has been taken by many people as a banal call to rebellion, pogroms, violence, and revolutionary-hooligan excess. After all, why hide it, in the public mind it is all this which constitutes revolution. Therefore, if our orientation toward the creation of a civil society and a state based on the rule of law is really serious, we will have to completely revise our attitude toward the ideology of revolution and dictatorship—the ideology of mass-meeting lumpenism. It will be necessary to change our profession from wild revolutionaries to careful and responsible reformers.

Third position. The concept of the correlation of the individual and society, the citizen and the state, the private and the public, and the personal and the collective principles of life is changing completely in contemporary communist ideology.

Crudely oversimplifying somewhat the outline of the former ideological system, it may be said that within its framework society is the end, man, the means. Even the most well-known formula from "The Communist Manifesto"—the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all—contains a powerful charge of this inhuman socio-centrism.

Let us think: "each" (man) is the "condition" (means) of the development of "all" (society). So it transpires: Society is the end, the individual, the means. No question here of any self-worth of "each" nor of any subordination of society to the interests of actual people.

In practice such an attitude toward man results in the suppression of his rights and interests on the part of those who have an opportunity to act on behalf of "all." The endless reminders to the people that public interests are higher than personal interests and that any doubting this leads to the sin of "bourgeois individualism" served in past years not so much the inculcation of high moral qualities as propaganda cover for the practice of the systematic abridgment of human rights. It is therefore very important that the humane view of the relations of society and the individual as their mutual subordination and mutual responsibility which is currently becoming

established in CPSU ideology and unconditional recognition of human rights necessarily be reflected in its new program.

Speeches From Soyuz Congress Excerpted

91UN1368A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 23 Apr 91 p 2

[Unattributed report on speeches at 20-21 April congress of Soyuz deputies in Moscow: "Crucial! Soyuz Sounds the Alarm"]

[Text] During 20-21 April in Moscow there was a congress of the Soyuz deputy group. More than 600 members of the movement participated in it (including about 140 USSR people's deputies). Those in attendance spoke out particularly in favor of convening an extraordinary congress of USSR people's deputies and having the country's president make a report at it.

We will familiarize RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA readers with fragments of certain of the speeches.

On the Situation

[Ye. Kogan] I came across some shocking information in an article recently. It said that the USSR's total expenditures on the Great Patriotic War amounted to 660 billion rubles [R]. But now, according to certain estimates, the damage from the economic chaos is reaching R600 billion annually... We have gained another monopoly on the mass media and another ideological dictatorship which is stricter than the last one. The so-called democratic governments that come to power, after a certain amount of time, prove to be openly ethnocratic or even simply fascist dictatorships. These are the types who shot unarmed people in Dubossary, established the priorities of the indigenous peoples in the Baltics, and call people of other nationalities insects—there are plenty of examples.

[V. Alksnis] We are being shown heart-rending scenes of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees, but nobody shows the million Soviet refugees who are in the same situation. Why is our democratic community remaining silent? I am afraid that the price of perestroika will be too high. There will be tens of millions of refugees if we halt these processes.

On the Union Treaty

[Yu. Blokhin] We have the treaty of 1922 which was signed by authorized representatives of the republics and there is nothing disgraceful about making necessary additions and amendments to it.

[V. Kazantsev] Like a machine, the state operates according to objective laws. Therefore the treaty for the distribution of power is tantamount to a treaty for the collapse of the state. There are political organs and organs of local self-government. Some develop policy and others solve communal-domestic problems, and that is all there is.

[S. Baburin] We cannot simply reject the idea of a Union treaty out of hand. Whether we like it or not, public opinion is in favor of signing it. As a joint legislative initiative of the Union republics, the document should be brought up at the "large" congress, which makes amendments to the constitution and sends them to the republics for ratification. The draft of the treaty should be reworked, but it cannot be simply ignored.

About Ourselves

[V. Kazantsev] I was at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania. It was about the same as ours. All it amounted to was castigations, complaints, grievances, admonitions, and hope. We need political action and not a lot of prattle.

[N. Pavlov] If the Soyuz movement does not serve a narrow ideology and concentrates on saving the state, I think a considerable number of Russian deputies will support it in the near future.

From the speech by N. Leonov, chief of the analytical administration of the USSR KGB.

...Spend just one day listening to Radio Liberty, which is funded from the budget of the U.S. Congress. These programs literally exude malice against our unified state, and all of their material is aimed at arousing hatred among the peoples of the USSR. In the programs to Azerbaijan they set the republic's population against the Armenians, and their announcers who broadcast in Armenian from a neighboring studio across the hall poison Armenians' minds against the Azeris. And the motive is always to stir up hatred for the Russians. Read the speeches and articles of Zbigniew Brzezinski, former special assistant to the U.S. President for national security. And you will see how pathologically bent he is on destroying the Soviet Union as a unified state. Secretary of State James Baker, during his last visit to Moscow, let it be known that the United States recognizes the USSR within its 1933 borders (that is when they gave us diplomatic recognition). What does this mean? This does not have to do just with the Baltics. The United States has always been in favor of their separation, and for many years has maintained an ersatz embassy for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in Washington at its own expense. The 1933 borders mean a revision of the borders with Finland—people have already spoken out in favor of this—a revision of the borders in the west of the Ukraine and Belorussia and the borders with Rumania, and the separation of half of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. In essence we are encountering a program for dividing up the Soviet Union.

...In no other country in the world do certain parliamentarians travel through foreign countries in such large numbers as ours do, looking for ways to earn extra money while there is plenty of work for them to do at home. I would like to remind people that the American congressman does not have the right to accept gifts valued at more than \$50, to accept payment for travel, to live in hotels at another person's expense, or to accept

other gifts. These are regarded as mandatory ethical norms, and if they are violated the congressmen may be punished right to the point of expulsion. Let me say at the outset that, according to U.S. law, any communist or social organization which in any form sets the goal of destroying the integrity of the United States will be declared unconstitutional and its fate will be decided in court. The Americans encourage in our country everything they forbid at home. The Committee for State Security informs the country's leadership promptly and in detail about everything I have mentioned. And we are very alarmed about the possibility of a repetition of the tragic events that occurred on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, when intelligence gave abundant warning about the inexorable approach of the fascist invasion, and Stalin regarded this information as incorrect and even provocative. You know what this cost us.

Comrade Deputies, with all my heart I share your pain and concern for preserving the Union. As a historian by profession I wish to remind you that we created a certain empire by force. But all great powers have come to the point of their formation through struggle. And the leaders of this struggle have remained in the memories of the people as great patriots. Abraham Lincoln did not allow the United States to fall apart; he was not afraid even to start a civil war in order to destroy the Confederation of Southern States. History has justified him. Queen Elizabeth waged a battle against Scotland before she beheaded Mary Stuart and ended the existence of the Scottish throne. Even now the English have no intention either of withdrawing from Ulster or even leaving the Malvinas Islands.

In order to develop we need large economic spaces, a unified market, a strong monetary system, and reliable law and order. Even the bourgeoisie have always striven for these values. It has always been people with a feudal way of thinking who have called for disintegration, closed national communities, and rural isolation. The future of the homeland is in the hands of the deputies, mainly at the Union level. History will not forgive passivity and inaction; it will judge only according to deeds and results. Today every Soviet citizen wants to see the day when the meeting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies will compare in resoluteness and significance to the Nizhegorod assembly way back in 1611 when Kuzma Minin, with a single speech, turned the country upside down and created the militia.

Soyuz Member on Group's Program, Contacts

91UN1351B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 20 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Anatoliy Chekhoyev, cochairman of the Soyuz parliamentary group and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* special correspondent Sergey Kredov; place and date not given: "Soyuz Is Sounding Assembly"]

[Text] A congress of the Soyuz association of people's deputies at all levels opened in Moscow today. Our special correspondent has met with USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Anatoliy Chekhoyev, a cochairman of the parliamentary group of the same name.

[Kredov] Anatoliy Georgiyevich, your group has gained appreciable influence in the parliament of the country. How many supporters do you have? What keeps them together?

[Chekhoyev] At present, Soyuz has 139 deputies in the Supreme Soviet and 761 deputies in the body of deputies of the country. As you can see, this is a meaningful force. We come out mainly in favor of preserving the unity of the USSR and ensuring human rights throughout its territory.

[Kredov] One can see that the interest of the democratic movements in the topic of individual people has diminished. They operate more often with categories such as peoples, nations, and republics.

[Chekhoyev] Let me add that they have begun to selectively approach the issue of human rights. This is what happens: A tragedy in the Baltic area occurred, and about 15 people died. Major rallies were held in Moscow in support of Lithuanian democracy. At the same time, an unannounced war between Georgia and small South Ossetia claimed hundreds of victims, but, say, Democratic Russia was silent... We are equally interested in the human rights of all people, of the people of all nationalities. For example, if Georgians or Moldovans are discriminated against, we will come out against it.

[Kredov] What is the agenda of your congress?

[Chekhoyev] Initially, we planned to meet in the fall. However, we were forced to hurry. The Soyuz group is seriously concerned about the situation in the country and a war of laws, to which a war of budgets has now been added. Actually, the trend is toward the disintegration of our state... We plan to adopt the platform and statute of the association and discuss the situation in the country.

There are very many questions because of the draft Union treaty. Obviously, we will adopt the draft declaration of USSR sovereignty which we will later submit to the "big" congress. After all, rural soviets have "sovereignty" in our country but the state does not. We will probably discuss the anticrisis program of the government and endeavor to develop our own program. Undoubtedly, the discussion will be harsh, and deputies will be overcome by emotions. However, we do hope to make important decisions.

[Kredov] The supposition comes to mind that the haste of the "Soyuz people" is due to their concern about the possible election of B.N. Yeltsin to the position of RSFSR president.

[Chekhoyev] This is a simplified point of view. We are more interested in the state of affairs in the country.

Why should Russia not have a president at present? Just because Yeltsin may become president? I do not like such games. It is another matter that we should not have started talking about a union of sovereign states earlier. This will be a commonwealth rather than a state... No, we are more interested in something else under these circumstances. For the first time in years, we entered a new year without a Union budget; for the first time, we have been forced to take out loans in order to pay for the needs of the Army...

[Kredov] As is known, Soyuz leaders had a detailed conversation with M. Gorbachev. What was discussed?

[Chekhoyev] We talked for just under two hours. The group was represented by seven people. We suggested that the president offer a specific action program at a parliamentary session or the "big" congress. We made serious complaints about the draft Union treaty, and demanded that it be discussed in the Supreme Soviet. The entourage of the president was discussed, and the situation in South Ossetia... Mikhail Sergeyevich objected to us vigorously, he said that we also destabilize the situation. I got the impression that both sides were dissatisfied with the conversation.

[Kredov] Some of your colleagues, for example, Petrushenko and Alksnis, give the impression of very well-informed people. Connections between the group, and the Army and State Security are conjured up...

[Chekhoyev] These organizations come out in favor of preserving the Union. We have a lot in common. We are convinced that we will have a state as long as we have a unified army... However, we are not fed some kinds of special information. Petrushenko and Alksnis have important information because they request it through official channels.

[Kredov] You are considered to be supporters of "the iron fist." Is this point of view justified?

[Chekhoyev] No. We talk about the dictatorship of the law, be it good or bad, but the law nonetheless. Meanwhile, at present presidential ukases are repealed at the level of rural soviets.

[Kredov] So, it is "the iron fist" after all?

[Chekhoyev] Why? Here is a new example for you: Georgia has decided to secede from the USSR. Well, love cannot be forced. There is a law, so let them leave (having given the autonomies themselves the right to choose). I am against a blockade of Georgia. However, a switch to international prices in economic intercourse should be made. In this case, they will sober up quickly.

[Kredov] It appears that, apart from "bayonets," the center has enough levers to influence republics that are in a hurry.

[Chekhoyev] I would say it has enough for now. I am afraid that even these levers will not be available two or three months from now.

[Kredov] Since we are talking to a deputy from South Ossetia, we cannot but mention the issue of the situation in this area.

[Chekhoyev] The internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs have embarked on disarming paramilitary groups on both sides. My fellow countrymen approve of this. Now that the siege of Tskhinvali has been lifted, negotiations may begin. However, the statement of Georgia on seceding from the USSR complicates the situation. The Ossetians have surmised what this secession is fraught with for them. After all, they have suddenly become "nonindigenous..." There is no optimism; the wounds will not heal any time soon.

Deputy Says Time Is Right for Compromise

91UN1380B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 16, 24 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by USSR People's Deputy Galina Starovoytova:
"I Am for a Government of Confidence"]

[Text] On the first day of the Third Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, an unheard of—until now—event took place: Troops had been brought to Moscow to suppress potential rallies and demonstrations of the working people. It did not come to bloodshed, though—of the kind that had taken place in the Baltics. Two opposing forces—the force of the people and democracy, on the one hand, and the military force of the totalitarian empire, on the other, walked away from each other almost without coming into contact. But everybody was left with the feeling that in this opposition it was the people that won.

During those days people's deputies showed that they had enough will and courage to go to their people in the streets, to prevent potential bloodshed, and to refuse to work in the environment of a city under siege. It was also then that the country's president, Mikhail Gorbachev, met with the leadership of political organs—that is, party committees and the army—and, by the way, received an unexpectedly cold shoulder there. It is understandable that, with Gorbachev's low rating and the decline of confidence in him, military force remains the only prop for his power. Then suddenly it turned out that this prop is not reliable enough.

The Soyuz group immediately started to collect signatures to convene an unscheduled extraordinary USSR Congress of People's Deputies, with the president's report on his accomplishments on the agenda. This has led to a situation of highly unstable balance and the high probability of a power transfer via a coup d'etat with a subsequent introduction of emergency rule in the country. But it looks like we passed over the high point of the crisis at that moment. I think that the combination of many current factors is creating the historically rare precondition of a peaceful change of the power regime. It would be the utmost irresponsibility not to use this chance.

I was talking recently with Adam Michnik, one of the Solidarity leaders, and he unexpectedly told me something that, I know, was said in his interview to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA: We, the democrats, also were responsible for the dictatorship. We were too optimistic. We should have been more realistic; then we could have stopped it by joint effort.

It appears that there are three outcomes to our situation. The first—a military dictatorship. The second—a continuing slide towards chaos, towards a complete economic collapse, the way out of which also will be only a protracted military dictatorship, and not the dictatorship instead of chaos, but the dictatorship together with chaos, as it happens here in Russia. And, finally, the third outcome—a "roundtable," the creation of a government of confidence. The participants should not hope, as they take their seats around this table, that they will fully succeed in pulling their political opponents over to their side. Each must be ready to give up something for the sake of consensus. The people around this table may have little or no sympathy for each other; they may have a different understanding of democracy; but they should be united in one understanding—the desire to stop the dictatorship and the weakness of each of the powers that exist today—both the democratic parliament of Russia and the shaky throne of the president. We should look at things realistically: People start negotiations not because everything goes well, but because they have no other choice. Therefore, during the entire discussion of the future coalition government they have to keep it in mind, and not to count on mutual love.

I believe that Gorbachev is capable of appraising the situation adequately; it is even possible that he has understood that there are forces in the country that are ready to provoke him into bloodshed, and then make him a "scapegoat." Therefore, the objective situation today forces him to turn back to democracy. The democrats, on the other hand, also have extended a hand of cooperation to him. I mean our collective statement by the left-of-center groups of deputies at the third congress that invited him to cooperate. I was the initiator of this document. I also had conducted negotiations aimed at inviting Gorbachev to this congress as a guest. The congress, however, ended before the negotiations bore fruit.

How do I see the future "roundtable?" And on what terms are the democrats ready to cooperate with the president again (for now they can dictate their own terms)? First, giving up the offensive against glasnost and freeing the television. Second, expanding the sources of information for the president: They must extend beyond a single Committee for State Security. Third, the recognizing the real sovereignty of the republics and the readiness to transfer a considerable part of authority and powers to their parliaments. This includes first of all the potential collective control over the gold and hard currency reserves of the country, and also the money-printing presses. Also, it includes enhanced control over military expenditures; in addition, we may also talk

about representation of new social forces that have already established themselves in the public arena at some key government posts.

This process must be combined, I repeat, with the transfer of considerably greater power to the parliaments of the Union republics, and with a diminishing proportional weight of the Union government in politics and economy. I think that people who will sit at this "round-table" may include not only Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and the heads of parliaments, but also the leadership of new parties that are gaining strength—I do not mean, of

course, the obedient dwarf parties of Zhirinovskiy's and Voronin's ilk. I mean the Democratic Party of Russia, first of all social-democrats, and Communists for Democracy—the new faction within the RSFSR Communist Party, headed by Colonel Rutskoy.

The terms of compromise may be varied, though. At this point, perhaps, the process of negotiations is more important than its result. This multilateral process of negotiations is very much needed and should be started soon. With the trust towards each other.

Baltics

Latvian Legislators Express Dissatisfaction With Economics Minister

91UN1231A Riga LAUKU AVIZE in Latvian
22 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by Egils Licitis: "Gnashing of Teeth in Parliament"]

[Text] For a few weeks now, the same gnashing of teeth that to this day can be heard in Latvia's agricultural enterprises, could be heard in Parliament. At the request of farmer-deputies, Latvian Republic Minister of the Economy Janis Aboltins was repeatedly called to the floor of Parliament. Having heard Aboltins out, the dissatisfied farmers prepared to mow the minister down like grass just the same. Feverishly moving about the hall, the most dissatisfied farmers collected the signatures of 28 deputies for their message to the premier. In it, they unambiguously question the suitability of Aboltins for his post, and request a decision from Godmanis. Will we soon be witnesses to the first resignation of a member of the government?

Back in 1959, E. Berklaivs himself "was resigned." During a break, he took a moment to recall the economic planning of the corn campaign: When the sowing of 100,000 hectares of the queen of the highways [corn] had been ordered, Latvian CP Central Committee First Secretary Kalnberzins profoundly noted, "*Latyshskiye komunisty vseгда byli v pervykh ryadakh. Davayte poseyem 200 tysyach ga* [Latvian Communists have always been in the forefront. Let us sow 200,000 hectares]!"

And what do they accuse the head of the economics ministry of?—unemployment. Agriculture, whose products have fixed prices, must decline, for suppliers of building materials and other products use free-floating prices which, as you may surmise, continuously rise. "Yes, but we are anticipating a market," says Mr. Aboltins. The deputies protest, "How can you operate toward a market if there is still a state monopoly, and you do not have private entrepreneurs, competition, or your own money?" In short, they say the minister is idle, for he is not creating a market with ALL its elements.

The most hot-blooded Aboltins "haters" conclude that they must demand concrete work from the minister, manual labor. They believe that either Mr. Aboltins does not find work to be very convenient, or else he is only able to theorize.

Incidentally, the deputies who are angry are former or current leaders of operating farms and chairmen of executive committees. The economic theoreticians appear to be neutral, while a good deal of deputies are not even interested in economic problems. Mention should also be made of the situation that has come about in which some members of Parliament believe that the government should not be on their backs so much. We

will show the government that deputies are not a bunch of wet noodles after all! There is also a bit of getting even to this. Aboltins is only the first, and a few deputies maintain that there is polite interest, as it were, in the performance of Ministers Bisers and Oherins. Perhaps friction is what pushes the world on? Perhaps.

In this regard, on 13 February, Aboltins reported to the Parliament: "...growth in the volume of production only at the expense of a rise in prices ... we will be forced to use levers that are very unpopular among the people ... selfish economic egoism is characteristic of certain groups of producers... The fact that throughout the economy things are really crappy for us is nothing new. The minister also informed us of more concrete things, as well:

Aboltins found out that "Lauktehnika," "Agrokimija," and other service entities are starting up economic quarrels by demanding unheard of payments.

Aboltins grants that economic reform is appropriate at Latvia's leading cadre and economist level.

Aboltins sadly concluded that prices will continue to rise, and that it would be unsocialist in spirit to pass on every kopek of the price increase. We must take care of those who are socially so unprotected.

Aboltins philosophically reflected that in the market the buying power of the citizenry continues to remain unlimited, though it may not at all seem so to everyone individually.

The minister was presented with questions:

Will the government tolerate mass bankruptcies of farms?

According to the minister, the government has in mind a happy medium: Those that are about to go belly up can go by the wayside; those that still have a shot will be stimulated. Supposedly, hidden behind the general threat of bankruptcies is the attempt to raise prices. Farms will have to be freed from the support of the social sector. Some of them pay up to 7-10 percent of sales. "Lauktehnika" and others attempting to dictate monopoly prices must be fought, etc.

A. Krastins, who chaired the meeting, continually opposed pressure from farmers to open the floor for debate. Once again, many were uninterested. Nevertheless, after taking a vote, the farmers got to speak. Upon returning to his seat from the podium, an irate J. Aboltins snapped, "Your mother" in what was clearly not the state language.

During the debates, A. Felss from Jekabpils maintained that in his rayon, 20-30 percent of the farms will reach the critical threshold this quarter, another third "will become casualties" in the next quarter, and by the end of the year, the shelves of the inhabitants of Jekabpils will be empty. The deputy took a jab at Aboltins by saying that under such conditions, he for one would take the

position of an "economic egotist," for the farmers would not nearly be able to cover their losses in the market.

More cutting was Deputy V.E. Bresis, chairman of the Agrarian Union of Latvia. He wondered whether it was out of apathy that ministries and administrations try to silence the Parliament with, "Everything will be all right." According to Bresis, there is a shortage of concrete information, so we get some sort of scientific treatise. Bresis believes that we stand at the brink of another wave of inflation: "Now chairmen are rebelling—you may call them whatever you like, but they see and realistically assess the situation. And the rebellion will be joined by former kolkhoz workers and farmers, who will have to start working on completely unprepared economic soil." Bresis criticized the strengthening of government monopoly, characterizing it as the unwillingness of the state apparatus to release power from its hands.

Finally, apparently not wishing for his minister to be slaughtered like a scapegoat, the premier himself came to Parliament. And indeed, Godmanis still has influence in the Supreme Soviet—you could hear a pin drop as the deputies listened to the government's position. Among other things, Godmanis remarked that this year will still be such that whoever sowed will also have to harvest, lest

there be a breakdown. This means that the new farmers will only go out into their fields in 1992. Apparently, the premier knows when it is realistic to begin. Nevertheless, the government is criticized most for not having created a stratum of small-holders—namely, those very same farmers. Isn't it possible to hurry the farmers and have them sow their own land already this spring?

In closing, as far as the gnashing of teeth goes, one has to admit that Aboltins was innocent. Other ministers, too, should have borne crosses, plus ... the yet to be appointed deputy premier for agriculture. Now sirs, by no means do I intend to sing praise to the efforts of the deputies in this matter. It is oppressively hot in the fields, and the problem is understood by some few dozen deputies. At this time we could "tie the hands of Aboltins," or else not do so (I see no point in making the government waste time), but it is a good thing that the "economic egotists" (Felss, Kide, Lucans, Grube, Ziedins, Krugalaus, Bresis, and others) have brought the matter to light.

Latvian Independence Poll Results by City, Rayon

91UN1231B Riga LATVIJAS JAUNATNE in Latvian
7-9 Mar 91 p 1

[Table: "Poll Results"]

[Text]

Poll Results							
Cities	Participants According to Lists	Number Receiving Ballots	Number Participating in Vote	Percent	Percent Voting For	Percent Voting Against	Percent of Ballots Invalid
Daugavpils	92,716	58,794	58,772	63.29	39.87	8.86[sic]	
Jelgava	52,818	46,061	46,025	87.14	70.98	27.61	1.43
Jurmala	44,519	37,302	37,272	83.73	68.54	29.39	2.09
Liepaja	79,093	67,314	67,235	85.01	62.85	36.40	0.76
Rezekne	31,370	25,495	25,485	81.25	54.35	42.80	2.86
Ventspils	35,393	29,873	29,793	84.18	66.81	32.19	1.02
Riga City Rayons							
Center	39,784	34,397	34,397	86.46	72.89	25.19	1.93
Kurzeme	121,306	102,372	102,337	84.37	53.55	44.58	1.89
Latgale Suburb	172,209	144,610	144,484	83.91	59.99	38.00	2.03
Vidzeme Suburb	169,665	145,598	145,481	85.75	62.01	36.12	1.88
Zemgale Suburb	78,680	66,273	66,124	84.05	66.53	31.72	1.76
North	78,990	64,951	64,919	82.19	58.10	39.98	1.93
Rayons							
Aizkraukle	31,513	29,779	29,762	94.45	90.69	8.65	0.67
Aluksne	20,337	19,625	19,612	96.44	90.03	9.12	0.87
Balvi	25,412	23,686	23,677	93.18	84.97	13.41	1.64
Bauska	38,506	36,214	36,185	93.98	90.87	8.43	0.72
Cesis	44,966	42,747	42,726	95.02	92.93	6.51	0.58
Daugavpils	32,493	26,758	26,737	82.29	65.06	32.34	2.61

Poll Results (Continued)

Cities	Participants According to Lists	Number Receiving Ballots	Number Participating in Vote	Percent	Percent Voting For	Percent Voting Against	Percent of Ballots Invalid
Dobele	29,850	28,137	28,111	94.18	84.76	13.93	1.32
Gulbene	21,283	20,193	20,183	94.84	90.86	8.50	0.65
Jekabpils	44,102	39,899	39,771	90.18	80.21	18.82	0.99
Jelgava	27,365	25,226	25,206	92.12	82.68	16.31	1.02
Kraslava	30,709	25,706	25,681	83.63	63.01	33.82	3.18
Kuldiga	27,752	27,017	27,000	97.30	97.45	2.29	0.28
Liepaja	36,453	35,450	35,414	97.15	96.61	3.11	0.30
Limbazi	28,798	28,145	28,137	97.71	96.50	3.24	0.28
Ludza	31,326	27,859	27,848	88.90	66.81	29.73	3.47
Madona	35,025	33,790	33,768	96.42	92.68	6.76	0.57
Ogre	45,694	42,791	42,749	93.56	89.33	10.00	0.68
Preili	32,991	29,921	29,908	90.66	79.64	19.01	1.36
Rezekne	31,606	28,558	28,530	90.27	65.57	32.78	1.67
Riga	105,383	95,363	95,198	90.34	78.58	20.35	1.08
Saldus	27,618	26,668	26,651	96.50	95.18	4.42	0.42
Talsi	35,064	34,148	34,124	97.32	98.25	1.66	0.10
Tukums	40,373	38,416	38,389	95.09	93.83	5.73	0.45
Valka	26,282	25,239	25,227	95.99	86.57	12.59	0.85
Valmiera	44,523	42,719	42,683	95.87	91.73	7.63	0.66
Ventspils	10,835	10,535	10,527	97.16	94.60	5.13	0.29
In Latvia	1,902,802	1,667,929	1,666,128	87.57	73.68	24.70	1.64

Jurmala Gorkom Elects New First Secretary

PM0404134591 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 23 Mar 91 p 1

[Latvian CP Central Committee Press Center report: "Plenum of Jurmala City Latvian CP Committee"]

[Text] A plenum of Jurmala Latvian Communist Party Gorkom [city party committee] was held to discuss an organizational question. Following a personal application, G.P. Shchukin was relieved of his duties as gorkom first secretary for health reasons.

N.I. Pushkina, until recently a senior organizer at the Latvian CP Central Committee Party Organizational and Cadres Department and previously second secretary of Jurmala Latvian CP Gorkom, was elected first secretary of Jurmala Latvian CP Gorkom.

Lithuanian Legislature Deplores Continued 'Provocations'

PM0504121391 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
23 Mar 91 p 1

[ELTA report: "At the Republic Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] The Third Session of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet, First Convocation, continued on 21 March.

At the morning plenary sitting Deputy Economics Minister Klemensas Saputis presented on the government's behalf a draft resolution on tax concessions for the Lithuanian-American joint venture Braunsharp-Pretsizika [name as transliterated]. The enterprise will develop and manufacture plate-measuring machines and instruments. The Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution exempting the joint venture from tax payments for a period of five years from the moment it goes into profit.

The sitting adopted a Lithuanian Republic interim Law on the Currency Fund and Settlements in Convertible Currency. A resolution on the enactment of this law was adopted.

Supreme Soviet deputies greeted with applause the arrival of a delegation of the European Parliament headed by its vice president, Siegbert Alber.

The Supreme Soviet approved a Lithuanian Republic Government proposal establishing a Lithuanian Republic state patent office under the Lithuanian Republic Government.

A Law on Payments for Natural Resources was adopted. It will come into effect beginning 1 July.

Deputy Kazimieras Saja read out on behalf of a group of deputies a statement about the formation in legislature of yet another deputies' faction—the seventh—not tied to any political ideology. As the deputy reported, the faction's activity will be geared to the pursuit of eternal values and will help unite the left and the right and politics and ethics. It will seek to ensure that a society of free citizens is created and that the system of laws under formation prevents the emergence of dictatorship.

A resolution on the use of official cars was adopted.

Economics Minister Vitas Navickas briefed deputies on the draft Law on Proscribed and Restricted Spheres of Activity for Foreign Investments and on the allocation of plots of land for such activity.

A resolution on the registration of public organizations was adopted.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis then spoke. Assessing the current situation, he noted that seized buildings still remain occupied, that provocations continue, and that the actions of the opponents of Lithuanian independence have been particularly stepped up at the present time, when diplomatic recognition of Lithuania is being talked about ever more realistically abroad. A special "black beret" terrorist subunit has been set up in Vilnius, which carries out armed attacks on Lithuanian Republic officials almost daily. At the same time the life and health of the civilian population is in constant danger. They want by these actions to destabilize and undermine domestic life in the Lithuanian Republic, to provoke counteraction by the public or the state structures of Lithuania, create new bloodshed, and find a pretext for mass intervention by the Soviet Armed Forces.

The legislative leader proposed on the Supreme Soviet's behalf that an immediate request be sent the states of the world, asking them not to remain indifferent to the new Soviet aggression against Lithuania or abandon the defense of the peace and the rights of people in the Baltic region.

This proposal was unanimously approved by deputies.

Deputy Sauljus Razma, rector of the Vilnius Teaching Institute, reported that the rectors of Baltic teaching institutes had sent an appeal to USSR Prime Minister Pavlov expressing their concern regarding Soviet military aggression in Lithuania.

At the conclusion of the sitting Finance Minister Elvira Kunjaviciene presented a draft Law on the Lithuanian Republic Budget. Information was provided on this question by Budget Commission Chairman Audrjus Rudis.

A government hour then took place. Lithuanian Republic Prosecutor General Arturas Paulauskas briefed deputies on the bandit actions of the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] in Vilnius.

Republic Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius and other members of the government answered deputies' questions.

Role of Tautininkai Faction in Lithuania's Parliament

*91UNI355A Vilnius VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 1*

[Interview with Mecislovas Treinis, leader of the Tautininkai parliamentary faction, by VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI correspondent Gedre Milkiaviciute under the rubric "Parliamentary Factions": "The Tautininkai Opt for the Middle of the Road"; place and date not given]

[Text] It is no longer news that our parliament has factions. Recently, a faction of Tautininkai emerged in parliament. What is their contribution to the operation of the Supreme Council? This is what our correspondent discussed with Mecislovas Treinis, a leader of this faction.

[Correspondent] What is the objective of your faction?

[Treinis] The founding declaration says that the Tautininkai seek to develop a middle path in Lithuanian policy. Our actions are based on understanding the fact that our nation is in a state of defense. This is the political aspect. In the economy, we strive to develop a stratum of producer-owners as an opera [as published] of statehood on a national basis. Politics and economics should serve to develop science and culture—the main treasure of our people.

[Correspondent] Is the Tautininkai faction large?

[Treinis] It consists of 12 deputies: K. Grinius, R. Rastauskiene, V. Zemelis, P. Varanaukas, R. Paulauskas, V. Kolesnikovas, I. Macys, and others.

[Correspondent] Are all of them members of the Tautininkai Party?

[Treinis] Seven people belong to this party. However, those who cherish our objectives and ideas may participate in the work of the faction.

[Correspondent] The Tautininkai Party emerged in the early 1920's. Do you consider yourselves the inheritors of their cause?

[Treinis] Yes. We favor the consolidation of all forces of the nation. Our motto is: "The future of the people and the state is our future."

[Correspondent] Are there differences between your faction and the parliamentary center?

[Treinis] For the most part, the center subscribes to leftist views. We balance it out from the right to some degree.

[Correspondent] Recently, the Supreme Council discussed a draft of the extremely important Privatization Law. What does your faction think about it?

[Treinis] We are trying to reconcile extreme ideas. For example, an article on the object of privatization in this draft caused a heated discussion. The opinion of our faction is as follows: At the first stage of privatization, we should prevent smart operators who have accumulated a lot of money dishonestly from gaining control. These "sharks" may swallow up the "small fries." We should not abandon low-income people to their mercy. The broader the circle of people who are capable of becoming owners and producers simultaneously the better. We are in favor of expanding the middle class, and of its participation in the process of privatization on a preferential basis.

[Correspondent] The Tautininkai emphasize the unity of the nation and the state. However, people of other nationalities also live in Lithuania.

[Treinis] Nobody intends to oppress them. Shameless political demagoguery has now been unleashed, and political blackmail aimed at setting people against one another is in full bloom. We maintain that the Russians and the Poles are not to blame for everything but rather the reactionary circles of the Kremlin and their accomplices in Lithuania, regardless of nationality. After the bloody January events, the Tautininkai faction made a statement in which it stressed: "In these hard times for our Motherland, we call on all Lithuanians to help the people of other nationalities understand the confused political situation, save them from possible provocations on the part of reactionary forces, and ease the burden of economic adversity through joint efforts." We called on all inhabitants of Lithuania of other nationalities to remain loyal to the Republic of Lithuania, respect its laws, support democratically elected power structures, and refrain from participation in anti-constitutional, anti-state activities encouraged by the reactionary forces.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the conversation.

Role of Lithuania's Social Democratic Party Viewed

91UN1294A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Mar 91 p 3

[From the "Digest of the Lithuanian Press" column compiled by Tadas Zavariskis: "From LIETUVOS AIDAS"]

[Text] LIETUVOS AIDAS has printed a long article by Romualdas Antanavicius, member of the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania [SDPL], entitled "The Social Democrats of Lithuania: the Western or Eastern Branch?" Because of lack of space and the great number of articles, we can acquaint our digest readers only with some excerpts from it:

"Like all of Lithuania, the SDPL is today cross-breeding the ideas of the West and the East. The desire to become a moderate centrist force, as more often than not the social democratic parties in the West are, has encountered many difficulties. The extremist degeneration of social democracy in Russia, which has physically destroyed not only the moderate (Menshevik) trend but also moral and material values, has over the last half century of occupation also taken its toll on the renewed SDPL. Most of its members are children of the totalitarian order, inclined toward obedience and subordination to the authorities. Unfortunately, this is in no way reflected in the Statutes of the SDPL and the standards of party activity noted in it. But totalitarian thinking is the vice that is probably the most difficult to deal with along the road of democratization. This may explain not only the persistent efforts of SDPL leaders to prove the infallibility of their own position in the Supreme Council but also their failure, and possibly reluctance, to understand the need to agree their actions with the rank-and-file party members. And the statements by delegates to the 2 February republic conference showed that rank-and-file members have no intention of further encouraging such actions. However, Eastern maximalism simultaneously with the cohesion that accompanies it, along with approval of one opinion and intolerance of any other position, is unfortunately gaining the upper hand in the party itself. The circumstance that it is the leader rather than the members who can determine the direction of the party's activity must also be assigned as a legacy of Asiatic thinking. And all that is needed to correct this positive or improve it is for one leader to be replaced by another....

(...)

"The present position in the SDPL and the lack of logic among its leaders, and the confusion and Leftist behavior, can also probably be explained by the dogmatic affirmation of Western social democracy combined simultaneously with the Eastern practice of implementation. This position reflects to a considerable extent the general crisis of the social democrats in Europe. In the West they are already trying to apply more radical models of social development. The social democrats have little by little been losing their firm positions in the countries of the North, and are awaiting the elections with some trepidation.

"What will be the future of the social democrats in Lithuania? The SDPL justifies its existence as a counterweight to the radical forces, and will perhaps be useful only in the event that it is able to abandon Eastern adventurist proclivities and finds within itself the strength to realign itself on Western moderation. Moderation, radicalism, and pragmatism should be the standard not only for its external but also its inner life. But this realignment will not be easy, and probably even painful. The extremist nature of the Eastern doctrine dominates in the SDPL and it is quite possible that it may win the upper hand at the upcoming fourth congress. This would be fatal for the SDPL since it would be

repeating the history of the social democrats in Russia and Lithuania. An independent Lithuania has no need of such broken 'social democrats,'" Romualdas Antanavicius asserts.

Tasks of Lithuania's Democratic Labor Party Outlined

91UN1294B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Mar 91 p 3

[From the "Digest of the Lithuanian Press" column compiled by Tadas Zavariskis: "From TIESA"]

[Text] "Laying Brick Upon Brick." That is the title of an article by Professor Vytautas Liutikas published on 14 March by TIESA.

We offer this summary to digest readers:

"Does the Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania [DPTL] have a firm point of reference for real steps toward Lithuanian independence? It does. Its coordinates are quite clear.

"The first is the resolve of the people of Lithuania to achieve real independence.

"The second is Moscow's line not to permit Lithuania to leave the USSR.

"The third is the line of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) to help Moscow.

"The fourth is the line of the majority in our parliament to continue to sing the song of independence and wait for moral support from the West, thus risking the storming of yet another building.

"What tasks do these coordinates set for the DPTL?

"What is dictated by the first coordinate?

"To act in such a way that neither material difficulties nor psychological or physical terror break the resolve of our people to achieve real independence.

"The enemies of independence should know that even if a tank is put in place by every school, even if the editorial staffs of our newspapers are driven from all their offices, even if presidential rule bans songs about freedom, all the same 'all of Lithuania will be there in that small heart.' And it will never be otherwise!

"What is dictated by the second coordinate?

"The DPTL should seek out from among democratic forces in the USSR the kind of allies who would help it to establish a shock absorber against Moscow's dictatorial designs. The leaders of the DPTL council responsible for links abroad should be visiting the East more often, not the West.

"What is dictated by the third coordinate?

"The DPTL should act to take the last trumps from the Latvian Communist Party (CPSU)—the Poles of Lithuania and the Russians and other national minorities. There are not really many deliberate and inveterate enemies of Lithuanian independence among them. They are mainly people who have been deceived by the propaganda of Kasperavicius and company.

"And it goes without saying that the hotbeds of the Latvian Communist Party (CPSU) should continue to be extinguished in the Lithuanian provinces. This must not be done by malicious talk, even less by actions borrowed from the arsenal of the aforementioned party. Today it is difficult to say how many more victims will be needed in Lithuania to open the eyes of those who champion this party and have the scales fall from their eyes about this fantastic mysticism. However, since 13 January some have awakened. We shall not lose hope and we will wait for those who have matured, and we will invite them under our roof.

"What is dictated by the fourth coordinate?

"There are enough of those who are looking for independence. There are also enough of those who expect moral assistance from the West. There is no lack of people who would mark out real milestones in the achievement of independence, the steps that must be taken to feel free and independent, so that the probability that you will be shot or run over by the tracks of a tank will be less tomorrow than it is today.

"We have heard the words of DPTL Chairman A. Brazauskas many times: 'Whoever can say how we will reach independence should be awarded high honor!' I very much doubt that such a wise man exists in the world—a man who could intellectually master all the aspects of this complex process. However, by breaking this process down into its component parts we, the members of the DPTL, are finding people who may be able to make a proper study of the appropriate part of this problem when it is being solved.

"Perhaps in the eyes of some forces the DPTL constructing the building of independence 'in a businesslike manner,' laying one brick on top of another, will appear unattractive. So be it. The main thing is that our conscience will be clear."

Lithuanian Freedom League's Leader Becomes Adviser to Vilnius Mayor

91UN1294C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Mar 91 p 3

[From the "Digest of the Lithuanian Press" column compiled by Tadas Zavariskis: "From LIETUVOS RYTAS"]

[Text] Two or three weeks ago the unexpected news spread like lightning—the well-known leader of the Freedom League, Antanas Terleckas, had started work as an adviser to the mayor of Vilnius city. And by 13 March

Aldona Svirbutaviciute had already published "The First Working Week of A. Terleckas: 'I Thought That My Enthusiasm Was Fading.'"

This is what the LIETUVOS RYTAS journalist writes:

"When I went to the Vilnius city self-government to talk with the city mayor's new adviser, Antanas Terleckas, I was hoping for the same kind of interview as many that have been published in your newspaper. He had a ready tongue and answered questions quickly and precisely. This time it was different. The mayor's adviser proposed that he provide written answers to the questions. Of course, this method is acceptable, but it requires more time than recording answers on a tape recorder. It seemed to me that A. Terleckas had become more cautious. I understand that his new duties require caution, despite the fact that, as the mayor's adviser emphasized, our newspaper has never once disappointed him.

"In answer to my first question—Who had suggested the leader of the Freedom League for the post?—he said: 'The city mayor promoted me. Of course, he was advised about accepting me. The mayor makes no secret of the fact that I am needed as a person who in his opinion can reconcile the city council and the city self-government. In coming here I was convinced that I could cope. After I had been working for a week I felt as though my enthusiasm was fading. But I am not losing heart. I have no right to be a procurator or a lawyer; I am just an observer on the side. Judges are too self-confident. Speaking objectively, every piece of my advice will be subjective. However, since I do have self-respect I am obliged to tell everyone the truth. I am obliged to think about Lithuania and about Vilnius—the heart of our Lithuania.'

"Antanas Terleckas has started his job as adviser to the mayor at a complicated time. The idea of expressing lack of confidence in the city's mayor has just been voiced. Because of his illness the question was put aside. Was this a risky step to take?

"A. Terleckas responds diplomatically: 'I am a new man and it is difficult for me to decide. I would like the matter to be resolved in such a way that both Vilnius and the whole of Lithuania win.'

"I remarked that in this work A. Terleckas will need the qualities of a diplomat. Up to now the leader of the Freedom League has always been distinguished by his combativeness, sharpness, and straightforwardness. Will he be able to deal with himself? A. Terleckas says that it will not be easy, but that in addition to his faults he also has his merits. 'At least I do not believe that the ability to engage in sycophancy is the most important thing. I will serve Vilnius only if it does not indulge the mayor or the council. I think that I will be able to do this.'"

Moscow Bomb Experts To Investigate Vilnius Explosions

91UN1294D Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Mar 91 p 3

[From the "Digest of the Lithuanian Press" column compiled by Tadas Zavorskis: "From LIAUDIES SARYQBOJE"]

[Text] "Is Setting Off Explosions the Fashion?" We would not want this headline from issue No 11 of the weekly LIAUDIES SARYQBOJE to tempt anyone... However, the explosions in Vilnius are, unfortunately, news to no one.... This is what experts in this field who have arrived from Moscow—A. Semenov and O. Per-vitskiy—had to say to correspondent T. Tubiniene about the explosions in the Lithuanian Communist Party Oktyabrskiy Rayon Committee.

"In the Union scientific criminal investigation center where you work there are only five experts. Is this enough for the entire country?"

"You watch the program "Vremya": you see what is happening in the country, how many explosions there are today. In Nagornny Karabakh, Armenia, Moldova, and Latvia, and now it has started in Lithuania. Whereas in 1988 our group of experts investigated 140 explosions and rendered explosive devices harmless, in 1989 the figure had risen to 160, and last year to 234.

"Today explosions are the fashion. Indeed, they are a very convenient kind of crime: you have to catch the violator when he has laid the charge, days before the explosion. After the explosion the malefactor has already covered his trail.'

"You came to Lithuania after conducting your latest investigation in Latvia, did you not?"

"Yes, there have been 14 explosions there. And this is the interesting thing: We found charges without casings. What does this mean? It means that people can be injured at a distance of no more than two or three meters from the explosion. And the charges are quite powerful—about 400 grams TNT equivalent.'

"I have heard that an aircraft can be blown up with a charge of 100 grams TNT equivalent.'

"Yes, the charges in Riga were more powerful. But they were all placed in the kinds of places (on a square, near the Council of Ministers, near a kindergarten, on the territory of a military unit) where at night (and it was precisely at night that the explosions occurred) there would be few people.'

"Does that mean that the idea was to frighten and cause panic in the city?"

"Perhaps so. There is another interesting detail: None of these devices was made in a factory but they were all assembled from factory components. Obviously someone had stolen them.'

"And now here you are in Vilnius."

"It is still difficult for us to say anything specific. At the site of the explosion in the party rayon committee we found a scorched fir tree. We have felled it and will be studying it. We gathered boxes of dirt and then sifted it and examined each tiny piece of dirt by hand. We found two small metal splinters and we think that they were from the explosive device; we will be checking this."

More on Butkevicius Briefing on Lithuanian Volunteers

PM0904103591 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Mar 91 p 1

[Modest Sheynberg report: "Our Aim Is To Defend the Motherland"]

[Text] "This will be a new structure in Lithuania, it is only just beginning to take shape, and people frequently ask themselves: What sort of subunits are these, what are they doing, what are their aims? Fine, let us try and answer these questions." This was how Audrius Butkevicius, general director of the Territorial Protection Department, opened the meeting with journalists. He was accompanied by Ceslovas Yezerskas, commander of the training subunit, and Jonas Gechas, chief of staff of the volunteers. The department's structure also includes another two subdivisions—the border guard service and the protection of important installations—but their leaders, as A. Butkevicius explained, were busy on urgent matters and were unable to meet us. As a matter of fact, journalists were promised that a trip to border checkpoints would be organized in the very near future, thus providing an early opportunity to supplement this report.

The conversation turned to the demands made of those who have decided to devote themselves to work in the department's various services. For example, those who could end up in the training subunit which prepares warrant officers would be primarily guys who have done their Army service. There would be no room there for those who have been sentenced by courts or are involved with drugs. Of course, physical condition would by no means the least consideration.

"We also attach equal importance," A. Butkevicius emphasized, "to absolute political neutrality, because we assume that anyone who sympathizes with any party or movement would be unable to stand up in everybody's defense at a critical moment. Our aim is to defend Lithuania, to defend the motherland. And finally, everyone will undergo thorough expert psychological examination; after all, not everyone can be entrusted with weapons."

For the time being, however, the future warrant officers are busy—in the literal meaning of the word—sweating from dawn till dusk. One of the groups has only just completed a training session on topography and mobile

radio operations, which was taken by Virginijus Kirvaytis, military school graduate and specialist in radio and electronics.

Soon afterwards, having formed a circle in a spacious hall, they started a workout in hand-to-hand combat. The training session was conducted by a shortish lean guy, without any outward sign of being a superman.

"Don't let this worry you," C. Yezerskas smiled on noticing our questioning looks. "Pranas Kastyatskas was three times champion of the USSR Airborne Assault Forces in hand-to-hand combat, I think we can rely on him."

The department leadership's intention is that the warrant officers should constitute the backbone of its formations. They will also have officers. Regulations for the procedure of awarding ranks will soon be submitted for consideration by the republic's government. As A. Butkevicius explained, psychological and businesslike qualities will be taken into account. Courses for officers, attended by 40 persons, are already under way in Kaunas. It is assumed that candidates with higher education will be offered a chance to prepare by themselves and then sit qualification examinations.

The journalists were really keen to find out about the service headed by I. Gechas and the principles on which it functions.

"A volunteer," I. Gechas said, "is someone who does not give up his full-time job but joins us for training on a part-time basis in compliance with a contract he concludes. Similar reservists' formations exist in most West European countries, the United States, and so on."

Undergoing the same thorough and comprehensive training as future professionals, volunteers will spend four hours a week on training, and afterwards must spend 20 days in a training camp where, if need be, they might be assigned the performance of various tasks that circumstances might require.

Incidentally, while training they will be paid at the rate of their average earnings—but from state funds rather than from the pockets of enterprises and organizations—and will benefit from many social guarantees which are envisaged.

"In the future," A. Butkevicius said, "we will probably need specialists in the struggle against international terrorism, because Lithuania will obviously become a kind of crossroads for various international routes; we are also thinking about professional Civil Defense subunits."

...Our visit was coming to an end. We parted with our hosts, and meanwhile young kids were marching in the inner yard—diligently if not quite in step—wearing multicolored civilian coats. There is no getting away from shortages.

RSFSR

'Communists of Russia' Documents on RSFSR
Presidency

Draft Amendments on RSFSR Presidency

91UN1332A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 18 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Draft RSFSR law "On Revisions and Additions to the RSFSR Constitution (Basic Law) in Connection With the Institution of the Office of President of the RSFSR"]

[Text] Taking as a basis the results of the all-Russia referendum of 17 March 1991, the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies resolves:

I. To supplement the RSFSR Constitution with a new chapter reading as follows:

Chapter 13¹. President of the RSFSR

Article 121¹. The head of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is the president of the RSFSR.

Article 121². A citizen of the RSFSR no less than 35 years of age and no older than 65 years of age may be elected president of the RSFSR. One and the same person may not be president of the RSFSR for more than two terms in succession.

The president of the RSFSR is elected by the citizens of the RSFSR on the basis of general, equal, and direct suffrage by ballot for a five-year term. The number of candidates for the office of president of the RSFSR is not limited.

The president of the RSFSR is deemed elected if more than one-half of the citizens on the electoral rolls votes for his candidacy. The vote is tallied separately by republic and autonomous formation and separately by kray and oblast. The candidate for president of the RSFSR must obtain here more than one-half of the vote of the electorate in a majority of republics and autonomous formations and in a majority of krays and oblasts.

If no candidate obtains the requisite number of votes of the electorate in accordance with the provisions of part three of this article, a runoff election in respect of the two candidates who obtained the largest number of votes in the first round is held within a month's time.

The runoff election is deemed valid if no fewer than one-half of the citizens on the electoral rolls participates therein. The candidate who obtains more than half the vote of the electorate who participated in the ballot, given compliance with the vote-counting procedure stipulated by part three of this article, is deemed elected.

The procedure for the election of the president of the RSFSR is determined by RSFSR law.

Article 121³. Upon assuming office, the president of the RSFSR is sworn in at a meeting of the Congress of

RSFSR People's Deputies. The wording of the oath is confirmed by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

Article 121⁴. The president of the RSFSR:

1. Represents the RSFSR in relations with the USSR and the republics which are a part of the USSR and in the RSFSR's international relations.

2. Presents to the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies annual reports on the state of the RSFSR; addresses messages to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the most important issues of the RSFSR's domestic and foreign policy; has the right of legislative initiative.

3. Presents to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for appointment with the consent of the RSFSR Federation Council a candidate for chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; in the event of a second rejection of the nominee for the chairman of the Council of Ministers by the Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviet elects him from the candidates presented by groups of deputies and factions.

4. In periods when the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is not in session relieves of their office and appoints members of the RSFSR Government, in accordance with a representation of the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, with their subsequent presentation for confirmation by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

5. Following consultations with groups of deputies and factions, presents to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet the nominations for chairman of the RSFSR Constitutional Court, the RSFSR Supreme Court, the High Court of Arbitration of the RSFSR and RSFSR prosecutor general.

6. Signs laws of the RSFSR. Has the right within a period of no more than two weeks to return a law with his observations to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for further examination. If the RSFSR Supreme Soviet upholds by a majority vote in each chamber the decision adopted earlier, the president of the RSFSR is required to sign the law.

7. On the authority of the Federation Council conducts negotiations and signs international and interrepublic treaties of the RSFSR, which take effect following ratification by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; receives the credentials and letters of recall of the diplomatic representatives of foreign states accredited with him; appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the RSFSR in foreign states and at international organizations.

8. Bestows state awards of the RSFSR and confers honorary titles of the RSFSR.

9. Decides questions of the admittance to and relinquishment of citizenship of the RSFSR and the granting of asylum.

10. Pardons persons convicted by courts of the RSFSR.

Article 121⁵. The president of the RSFSR heads the RSFSR Federation Council. The composition, competence, and procedure of activity of the Federation Council are determined by RSFSR law.

Article 121⁶. The president of the RSFSR must act in accordance with the RSFSR Constitution and the laws of the RSFSR and the USSR Constitution and laws of the USSR.

The president of the RSFSR issues edicts on the basis and in execution of the RSFSR Constitution and the laws of the RSFSR within the framework of his authority.

Edicts of the president of the RSFSR not conforming to the RSFSR Constitution and laws of the RSFSR are, according to a ruling of the RSFSR Constitutional Court, canceled by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

Article 121⁷. The president of the RSFSR may be removed from office by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies in the event of his violation of the Union Treaty, the RSFSR Constitution and laws of the RSFSR and also his oath. Such a decision is made following a ruling of the RSFSR Constitutional Court by no less than two-thirds vote of the total number of deputies of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies on the initiative of the congress itself, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet or one of its chambers.

Article 121⁸. The president of the RSFSR may not occupy another state and public office or be a people's deputy.

Article 121⁹. In the event of it not being possible for the president of the RSFSR to exercise his authority, exercise of presidential authority temporarily, prior to the election of a new president of the RSFSR, switches to the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and given the impossibility of his exercising this authority, to the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

Given the early termination of the president's authority, new elections are held within a term of no more than three months.

II. In connection with the addition to the RSFSR Constitution of the chapter "President of the RSFSR," to make revisions and additions to the following articles of the RSFSR Constitution: to exclude from Article 114 clauses 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12; to exclude from Article 115 part 1 and parts 4, 5 and 6.

In part 1 of Article 110 to replace the words "chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet" with the words "president of the RSFSR."

In part 1 of Article 118 to replace the words "chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet" with the words "president of the RSFSR."

In part 1 of Article 125 to replace the words "chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet" with the words "president of the RSFSR."

III. The president of the RSFSR assumes office from the moment he is sworn in.

IV. To supplement the RSFSR Constitution with Chapter 13², reading as follows:

Chapter 13². RSFSR Federation Council

Article 121¹⁰. The RSFSR Federation Council consists of the chairmen of the supreme soviets of the republics and the chairmen of the soviets of people's deputies of the autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, krays and oblasts and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad and is headed by the president of the RSFSR.

The chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers participate in meetings of the RSFSR Federation Council.

Article 121¹¹. The RSFSR Federation Council:

1. Determines measures pertaining to the implementation of policy in the sphere of interrepublic and interethnic relations.
2. Monitors compliance with the Union and Federal treaties and contributes to the settlement of conflicts in interethnic relations.
3. Formulates concerted measures pertaining to the realization of republic programs of socioeconomic and national-cultural development.
4. Authorizes the president to conduct negotiations and sign international and republic treaties of the RSFSR.
5. Consents to the nomination of candidates for the highest state offices of the RSFSR.
6. Performs other functions aimed at improving interethnic relations and strengthening the Russian Federation.

Article 121¹². The RSFSR Federation Council is convened by the president of the RSFSR as necessary, but not less than once a quarter. It may also be convened at the suggestion of no less than 10 members of the RSFSR Federation Council.

The decisions of the RSFSR Federation Council are adopted by majority vote of its members as representatives of the republics and autonomous formations, as also representatives of the krays and oblasts. The decisions of the Federation Council are formalized by edicts of the president of the RSFSR.

V. This law takes effect as of the time it is enacted.

Draft Law on RSFSR Presidential Elections

91UN1332B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 18 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[RSFSR draft law: "Election of the President of the RSFSR"]

[Text] Chapter I. Scheduling and Organization of the Election of the President of the RSFSR

Article 1. Principles and Procedure of the Election of the President of the RSFSR

The president of the RSFSR is elected by citizens of the RSFSR on the basis of the principles of the electoral system enshrined by the RSFSR Constitution and in the procedure stipulated by the RSFSR law "Election of People's Deputies of the RSFSR," unless otherwise stipulated by this law.

Article 2. Requirements of a Candidate for President of the RSFSR

A citizen of the RSFSR not less than 35 years of age and no older than 65 years of age who in terms of his state of health is capable of performing the duties entrusted to him may be elected president of the RSFSR.

Article 3. Scheduling of the Election of the President of the RSFSR

The election of the president of the RSFSR is scheduled by the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR no sooner than four months prior to election day.

Article 4. Electoral Commissions for the Election of the President of the RSFSR

Central and district and precinct electoral commissions for the election of the president of the RSFSR operating in accordance with the RSFSR law "On Election of People's Deputies of the RSFSR" are formed for the preparation and organization of the election of the president of the RSFSR.

The Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR is formed by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies simultaneously with the adoption of the decision on determining the day for the election of the president of the RSFSR.

Upon formation of the Central Electoral Commission account is taken of the proposals of groups of deputies and political party factions submitted at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and also proposals of the supreme soviets of the republics which are a part of the RSFSR and the soviets of people's deputies of the autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, krays, and oblasts of the RSFSR, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad.

The district electoral commissions for the election of the president of the RSFSR are formed by the supreme soviets of the republics which are a part of the RSFSR

and the soviets of people's deputies of the autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, krays, and oblasts of the RSFSR, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad according to the presentation of public associations, the work force and meetings of servicemen by military unit stationed on the territory of the electoral district. The territory of the electoral district is composed, respectively, of the territory of a republic which is a part of the RSFSR, an autonomous oblast, okrug, kray, and oblast of the RSFSR, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad.

The precinct electoral commissions for the election of the president of the RSFSR are formed in accordance with the procedure established in the RSFSR for the formation of precinct electoral commissions for the election of people's deputies of the RSFSR.

Article 5. Nomination of Candidates for President of the RSFSR

The right to nominate candidates for president of the RSFSR belongs to republic political parties, public organizations and movements, and republic organizations of all-Union political parties, public organizations and movements, and also the work force, and meetings of servicemen by military unit stationed on the territory of the RSFSR.

Proposals concerning the nomination of candidates for president of the RSFSR should be submitted to the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR no later than 35 days prior to election day.

Article 6. Registration of Candidates for President of the RSFSR

A decision on the registration of candidates for president of the RSFSR is adopted given evidence of the following papers:

- 1) the record of a meeting (congress, conference, plenum) of the highest body of a public association, meeting of the work force and meeting of servicemen of a military unit officially drawn up in accordance with the requirements of the Law on the Election of RSFSR People's Deputies;
- 2) biographical data on the presidential candidate;
- 3) a declaration of the candidate on his consent to his nomination.

Registration of candidates for president of the RSFSR by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR begins three months and ends one month before election day.

The number of candidates for president of the RSFSR is published by the Central Electoral Commission no later than 25 days prior to the elections.

A refusal by the Central Electoral Commission to register a candidate for president of the RSFSR may be appealed

by the public associations and the work force specified in part 1 of Article 5 of this law in the RSFSR Supreme Court. The RSFSR Supreme Court examines the appeal within three days. The decision of the RSFSR Supreme Court is final.

Article 7. Election of the President of the RSFSR from Several Candidates

In the event, after registration is ended or on election day, of the list of presidential candidates containing less than two, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet postpones the elections until a later date to ensure the nomination and registration of other candidates for president of the RSFSR.

Article 8. Right of Unimpeded Canvassing

From the time of publication of the list of candidates for president of the RSFSR the public associations and the work force specified in part 1 of Article 5 of this law and also all citizens of the RSFSR are guaranteed the right of unimpeded canvassing for or against the presidential candidates.

Canvassing on election day is prohibited.

Article 9. Agents of a Candidate for President of the RSFSR

A candidate for president of the RSFSR may have up to 30 agents, who help him run the election campaign, canvas for his election as president and represent his interests in relations with state and public authorities and the electoral commissions. In accordance with a presentation of the candidate for president of the RSFSR, the agents are registered by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR.

The agents of a candidate for president of the RSFSR enjoy the rights established by legislation of the RSFSR for the agents of candidates for RSFSR people's deputy.

Article 10. Expenditure on the Election of a President of the RSFSR

Expenditure connected with the preparation and organization of elections of a president of the RSFSR is made only from resources of the state allocated for these elections.

Resources for organization of the election campaign are allocated by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet from the state budget.

The financing and material support of the presidential candidates by public associations, state authorities, enterprises, establishments and organizations, and individuals is prohibited.

No direct or indirect participation of overseas organizations or individuals in the financing and other support of an election campaign of candidates for president of the RSFSR is allowed.

Resources for the election campaign are distributed among the presidential candidates and their use is monitored by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR.

Article 11. Guarantees of the Equality of the Candidates for President of the RSFSR

As of the time they are registered by the Central Electoral Commission candidates for president of the RSFSR have equal right to the use of Russian radio, television, and other official mass media of the RSFSR.

Each registered candidate for president of the RSFSR is assured equal opportunities in the material and technical and financial support for his election campaign.

The guarantees stipulated by legislation of the RSFSR for candidates for people's deputy of the RSFSR extend to the activity of candidates for president of the RSFSR.

Article 12. The Ballot Paper

The form and wording of the ballot paper for election of the president of the RSFSR are approved by the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR. The ballot includes in alphabetical order all registered candidates for president of the RSFSR, indicating surname, given name, and patronymic, year of birth, office (occupation) and place of work, and residence.

The ballots are printed in the languages which are employed by the population of the electoral district in the procedure determined by the Central Electoral Commission and under its supervision.

Chapter II. Determination of the Results of the Election

Article 13. Tallying of the Results

The president of the RSFSR is deemed elected if more than one-half of the citizens on the electoral rolls have voted for him.

The vote is counted separately by republic and autonomous formation and separately by kray and oblast.

The candidate for president of the RSFSR here must obtain more than half the vote of the electorate in a majority of republics and autonomous formations and in a majority of krays and oblasts.

If no candidate obtains the requisite number of votes of the electorate in accordance with the provisions of this article, a runoff election is conducted within one month in respect of the two candidates who obtained the largest number of votes in the first round.

The runoff election is deemed valid if no less than half the citizens on the electoral rolls participated therein. The candidate who obtains more than half the vote of the electorate which participated in the ballot is deemed elected, given compliance with the vote-counting procedure stipulated by parts 2 and 3 of this article.

Article 14. Runoff Elections for President of the RSFSR

In the event of a president of the RSFSR not being elected in a runoff election, the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR schedules within three months new elections for president of the RSFSR with observance of the conditions stipulated by Article 7 of this law.

Article 15. Publication of the Results of the Election of President of the RSFSR

News of the results of the election of president of the RSFSR is published in the press of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR no later than 10 days after the elections.

Article 16. Summation of the Results of the Election of President of the RSFSR

Within one month following the announcement of the results of the election of president of the RSFSR the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, which is presented with the report of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of the President of the RSFSR on the results of the ballot, is convened.

In the event of violations of the provisions of this law being ascertained, the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies deems the election invalid.

Article 17. Swearing In of the President of the RSFSR

A president of the RSFSR elected in accordance with this law is sworn in at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and embarks on fulfillment of his duties.

The draft laws were prepared by:

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Russian Opinion Favors Yeltsin, Democratic Russia

*LD1804154991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian
2030 GMT 17 Apr 91*

[Text] A correspondent of ELTA from Moscow reports that, according to a poll conducted by the independent Center for International Sociological and Market Research at the request of businessmen from the United States, 70 percent of those polled supported Boris Yeltsin, while only 14 percent expressed support for Mikhail Gorbachev. Valentin Pavlov is not yet appreciated. His cabinet's activity is approved by only 13 percent of those polled, while 73 percent expressed themselves categorically opposed to it. The USSR is supported by 14 percent of those polled, and the Russian Communist Party by about six percent. Over half those questioned are inclined toward the newly created parties and movements, and most of them sympathize with the Democratic Russia movement. Eighty-one percent of those polled expressed dissatisfaction with the standard

of living in their country, and almost half are convinced that no radical economic reforms are possible in the Soviet Union.

These results are in effect confirmed also by the figures obtained by the all-Union Public Opinion Research Center. Fifty-six percent of people polled do not believe in any power structure—neither the president and parliament, nor the Cabinet of Ministers, nor the Army, nor the Public Security, nor the Communist Party. Juicy answers were received to the question: What does the Soviet Union give its people? Two thirds of the respondents replied: shortages, queues, and poverty; 28 percent—a feeling of lack of rights and humiliation; a quarter—a feeling that we are living on the remote fringes of world civilization. However, Soviet optimists have not yet disappeared: six percent of those polled consider that communism is possible in principle. To be sure, they did not indicate on what planet and in what millenium.

Western Republics

Changes in Moldovan Constitution Examined

Amendments to Law Examined

91UN1305A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 8 Mar 91 p 1

["Law of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova: On Perfecting Executive Authority and Introducing Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Moldova SSR"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova resolves:

To introduce into the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Moldovan SSR the following amendments and additions:

1. Point 9, Article 97 shall be worded as follows:

"9. Confirmation, upon recommendation of the Moldovan SSR president, of the Moldovan SSR prime minister and the composition of the Moldovan SSR government, and the introduction of changes to it; ratification of ukases of the Moldovan SSR president on the formation and elimination of ministries of the Moldovan SSR, state committees of the Moldovan SSR, departments, and other institutions and organizations of republic significance."

2. Article 113¹ shall be supplemented with Part 2, to read as follows:

"The president of the Moldovan SSR exercises the highest executive and administrative authority in the Moldovan SSR."

3. Point 7, Article 113⁴ shall be worded as follows:

"7. Forms and eliminates ministries and state committees of the Moldovan SSR, departments, and other

institutions and organizations of republic significance, appoints and discharges members of the Moldovan SSR government with subsequent presentation for confirmation by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, and the directors of other institutions and organizations of republic significance."

4. Article 113⁴ shall be supplemented with Point 7¹, to read as follows:

"7¹. Presides at sessions of the Moldovan SSR government."

5. Point 9, Article 113⁴ shall be worded as follows:

"9. Suspends and repeals resolutions and directives of the Moldovan SSR government, and acts of ministries, state committees, departments, other institutions and organizations of republic significance, in the event these do not conform with the Moldovan SSR Constitution, laws of the Moldovan SSR, or ukases of the Moldovan SSR president."

6. Articles 115 and 116 shall be worded as follows:

"Article 115. The government of the Moldovan SSR constitutes the executive and administrative organ of the Moldovan SSR and is subordinate to the Moldovan SSR president.

"Article 116. The government of the Moldovan SSR is formed by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet upon recommendation of the Moldovan SSR president.

"The government of the Moldovan SSR is comprised of the Moldovan SSR prime minister, first deputies and deputies of the prime minister, ministers, and chairmen of state committees of the Moldovan SSR.

"The Moldovan SSR president may include other leaders of state organs and republic institutions in the composition of the government of the Moldovan SSR as well.

"The Moldovan SSR prime minister heads the government of the Moldovan SSR and organizes its work.

"The governmental structure of the Moldovan SSR is determined by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet upon proposal by the Moldovan SSR president.

"The authority and obligations of the Moldovan SSR government are determined by the Moldovan SSR Law 'On the Government of the Republic.'

"The Moldovan SSR government is relieved of its authority before the newly elected Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet at its first session."

7. Part 1 of Article 117 shall be worded as follows:

"The Moldovan SSR government is responsible to the Moldovan SSR president and Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, and is accountable to them."

M. Snegur, president,
Moldovan SSR
Kishinev, 5 March 1991.

Decree on Implementing Law

91UN1305B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 8 Mar 91 p 1

["Resolution of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet: On Implementation of the Moldovan SSR Law of 5 March 1991 'On Perfecting Executive Authority and Introducing Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Moldovan SSR'"]

[Text] With the aim of perfecting the system of organs of state authority and government, effecting strict demarcation of legislative, executive, and judicial power, consolidating discipline and order in all sectors of state, economic, and social structuring, and proceeding from the necessity of making every possible effort to strengthen executive authority under conditions of transition to market relations, the Supreme Soviet of the SSR of Moldova resolves:

1. To implement the Moldovan SSR Law of 5 March 1991 "On Perfecting Executive Authority and Introducing Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Moldovan SSR" from the moment of its adoption.

2. That the Moldovan SSR president will present to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet for examination at the next session:

—proposals on introducing amendments into the Moldovan SSR Law "On the Government of the Republic" or a new draft law "On the Government of the Republic";

—proposals on the structure and personnel composition of the Moldovan SSR government.

3. To establish that the Moldovan SSR government is subordinate to the Moldovan SSR president and functions in accordance with the Moldovan SSR Law of 5 March 1991 "On Perfecting Executive Authority and Introducing Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Moldovan SSR."

A unified apparatus will function under the Moldovan SSR president and Moldovan SSR government.

4. This resolution enters into force from the moment of its adoption.

A. Moshanu, chairman,
Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.
Kishinev, 5 March 1991.

Moldovan People's Front Described

91UN1343A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel N. Mulyar, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Mutual Backscratching Prevails"]

[Text] The spring field work in Moldova is in full swing. The social and political situation in the republic should have normalized, it might have seemed—can there be any time for politics when the fate of the future harvest is being decided. But no, the confrontation between various strata of society continues, and this was demonstrated yet again by the referendum. What and who are the reason? Many people believe, and not without reason, it has to be said, that by no means the least part here is being played by the position and actions of the republic People's Front—the leading political force of Moldova.

It has long been no secret that all local authority structures are in fact subordinate to it. The Moldovan People's Front determines the political focus of government decisions, calls the tune in parliament, and orchestrates the clamorous public campaigns. But surprise at this influence would be naive. The structure of the movement was not created by dilettantes. Its founders employed the approved "prescriptions" of the Baltic people's fronters, combining them with their own intellectual "efforts." As a result the People's Front now relies not only on the public but frequently on official republic structures also. After all, as Yuriye Roshka, chairman of the Moldovan People's Front Executive Committee, explained in an interview with the newspaper TSARA, the present leaders of Moldova were promoted by none other than the People's Front.

And it is a fact. A. Moshanu, chairman of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova Supreme Soviet, is a former member of the leadership of both the democratic movement and the People's Front. M. Snegur was elected chairman of parliament before becoming president with the direct support of the People's Front. M. Druk enjoyed, continues to enjoy, and will enjoy the support of the front, having particularly confidential relations with it, regardless of the political conditions. The latter, incidentally, may be confirmed by the recent scandal which erupted in the republic in connection with the publicizing of certain facts concerning the activity of the government and its head.

The Tiraspol newspaper DNESTROVSKAYA PRAVDA recounted in detail the "quarrel in the noble family." It all began with the Merkuriy Association, which, on the personal instructions of M. Druk, was endowed with the right to conclude barter deals and to export commodities overseas. Availing itself of the government indulgence, Merkuriy exported to various countries 148 tons of natural honey, 168 refrigerators, 145 tons of tomato paste, 952 tons of sunflower seeds, 36 tons of oil, and so forth in the third quarter of last year alone.

And this in a situation where the shelves of the republic's stores are practically empty and factories and plants are standing idle on account of a lack of raw material. In exchange Moldova received radio-cassette players, automobiles, VCR's.... As a result of the complicated barter foreign currency—whose tracks, however, were initially lost—was acquired also. The curtain on the "financial mystery" was raised somewhat by A. Inozemtsev's article in the parliamentary paper SVATUL TSERiy. Defending Druk and his policy against the communists' attacks, the author related where the currency had gone: "Mircha Druk and his team are looking far ahead... creating a base for real sovereignty. This consists of the creation of a republic currency reserve and its investment in places inaccessible to the grasping hands of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Relations and Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov personally."

This admission is, I confess, astonishing. In civilized countries the concealment of currency in foreign bank accounts threatens businessmen from the political field with resignation, at least. In Moldova, however, something similar is presented as realization of the strategy of sovereignty. But a scandal erupted, for all that, and some deputies demanded the premier's resignation. But the People's Front came to M. Druk's defense, and... the danger passed....

The premier did not forget the favor. Addressing the republic conference of the front, he did not fail to take the edge off the critical notes of his speech with highly promising evaluations and forecasts. "The People's Front will be victorious," he declared, "because it has healthy roots. Although leaving a bitter after-taste, these roots are strong, and the People's Front will necessarily endure, provided, of course, that it forswears confrontation and violence, which could produce shoots here, there, and everywhere."

The subject of the talk, wrapped in rounded-diplomatic expressions, was by no means fortuitous. The brutality to which the People's Front people are increasingly resorting is jarring upon even those who consider themselves its supporters. Threats of reprisals, for instance, are being heard on behalf of the Moldovan People's Front against Leonida Lara—a founder of the movement. A group of thugs is also terrorizing the world-famous singer Mariya Biyeshu.

"There are two blacklists here," Ilie Ilascu, member of the Moldovan People's Front Council, confessed in an interview, "the first contains 23 names—the entire leadership of the so-called Dnestr Republic. The second contains 480 names—the delegates to its so-called second congress. Serious preparations for their physical removal have been made."

According to that same Ilascu, 80,000 volunteers at the time of the well-known events in the south of Moldova put themselves under the command first and foremost of the People's Front, and only then, as far as was possible, of the government. Once again an eloquent admission.

And a disturbing one, if one thinks of the republic's future. If it is recalled how the volunteers acted. It is not fortuitous, apparently, that the People's Front's authority in the eyes of the inhabitants of Moldova is declining.

Having commenced its activity in 1988 with a struggle for the official status of Moldavian, the sovereignty of the republic, and national symbols, the Moldovan People's Front, as observed at the Moldovan Writers Union plenum, has of late been assuming clear forms of dictatorship, nationalism has been implanted in its ranks, and the slogans "Down With the Occupation Forces," "Russians—Siberia Awaits You" and so forth have been heard increasingly often at mass meetings and gatherings. It is disturbing that this is coming not only from callow youth but also from seemingly mature people, endowed with power, what is more. "Aliens and mankurts [fictional rootless people devoid of institutional memory], traitors to their people and their land, have chosen as their traveling companions lies and lawlessness, Satan is with them...." proclaimed V. Myndykanu, people's deputy of Moldova, addressing the republic Moldovan People's Front congress.

And the conference resolution "The Current Political Moment and the Tasks of the Moldovan People's Front" orders that it be "explained to the representatives of other nationalities that they do not have the right to decide for **Romanian** people questions of their self-determination."

Former dissident Boris Marian, member of the Moldovan Writers Union, secretary of the republic Journalists Union Board, and son of a prisoner of the Beriia-Stalin Gulag, aptly observed in this connection: "Those who undertake to speak on behalf of the whole people and proclaim themselves the chief patriot, calling those who do not dance to their tune traitors and mankurts, love no one but themselves and are deluding the whole people. Even if they have a multitude of supporters."

This is the position of a person who was at the sources of the front and who also believes that the Moldovan People's Front has of late been transformed from a social movement into a political party interfering in the appointment of bishops, prosecutors, and hospital chief physicians and attempting to dictate how people should behave at home and at work. "Just one thought does not bother it," Marian regretfully observes about the People's Front, "what the people will eat and in what they will clothe themselves in the immediate future."

It is not only the writer who is wondering this.

Addressing the "Democracy and Human Rights" international conference, V. Solonar, people's deputy of the SSR of Moldova, called the policy being pursued by the People's Front a regime of state terror.

The deputy also mentioned the attention which the authors of People's Front documents are paying to the Armed Forces. It is, incidentally, explicable. The Army

remains today essentially the sole dam holding back the ambitions and extremism of the "decisive" People's Front people. It is they who are engendering the stream of accusations against the Army and the military. Even Moldovan President M. Snegur (but he is, we recall Yu. Roshka's interview, a protege of the People's Front) declared in a speech on republic radio and television that "the generals also are attempting to undermine the idea of independence...."

According to Snegur, the Army is unnecessary. What is necessary, on the other hand, urgently necessary, is a "well-equipped and excellently trained police force, in whose ranks our sons would serve." Is it any wonder that now, on the eve of the military draft, the anti-Army campaign in the republic is gaining momentum. Not without the efforts of the Moldovan People's Front, of course. Its guard of writers and speakers is preparing actively for the latest political battle with the "center," the Army, the communists, and dissidents.

Ukraine's Kravchuk Answers Citizens' Questions

LD1104153791 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian
2200 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Today in a phone-in radio session which lasted an hour and a half Ukraine citizens were able to ask questions directly to Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet chairman.

Most of the questions referred to the economic life of our republic, particularly to forming market relations. Many of those who managed to get through to the chairman wanted to hear how the Ukrainian Government plans to compensate the population in light of the sharp increase in retail prices.

In his answer Leonid Kravchuk noted that the Council of Ministers, with Vitold Fokin at its head, has already adopted and begun to implement several cardinal measures. As a result, the poorer strata of the population has already received additional payments, namely families with many children, old age pensioners, and mothers looking after children under 16 years old.

Answering a question on whether the Ukraine will sign the new union treaty, the chairman stressed that our republic has first to define its sovereignty—which functions to reserve for itself and which to delegate to the center. At present, he continued, the parliamentary commissions are tackling several variants of the new union treaty.

Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party Calls for Privatization of Land

91UN1241A Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 28 Feb 91 p 2

["Appeal to the Third Session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Not long ago Kiev's Ukrainian Theater "Kin" was the site of the Second Extraordinary Congress of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party (USDP).

The extraordinariness and urgency of this meeting were precipitated by those complex and difficult political, economic, ecological, and demographic conditions in which all the USSR Republics, and the Ukraine in particular, have found themselves.

And so it is only right that the congress's central emphasis should be: the attack of the CPSU Central Committee, of the chauvinistic center on the democratic forces and the Union republics; the Union Treaty and the referendum connected with it; the problems of national union enterprises on Ukrainian territory; private ownership of land and manufacturing resources; the bloody events in Lithuania...

The congress invocations were read by Archbishop Bilotserkivskyy and Volodymyr Romaniuk, Vicar of Kiev.

Ukrainian Peoples Deputies Dmytro Chobit and Ihor Yuchnovskyy greeted the congress and shared their thoughts on nationality issues.

Co-chairman of the USDP Serhiy Plachynda read a speech entitled "The political situation in the republic - strategies and tactics of the USDP regarding the Union Treaty and Ukrainian statehood."

The speaker revealed the destructiveness inherent in the Union Treaty for the nations of the USSR and explained the reasoning behind the alternative project of a Confederated Union of Free States (published in LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA 24 January this year) with the changes and additions introduced by the members of the USDP and the newspaper's readers.

The 159 delegates unanimously voted against the Union Treaty and for the proposal that the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet put forth three questions in a republic referendum: 1) Are you in favor of the Union Treaty and preservation of the USSR - yes or no? 2) Are you in favor of Mutual Friendship between Free States - yes or no? 3) Are you in favor of an Independent Ukraine - yes or no?

At the same time, the majority of delegates, influenced by the "ultra-revolutionary" statements made by some of the speakers, voted against the alternative project of a Confederated Union of Free States.

The reasons for this? Surprisingly (although surprise is not called for, since this party has just been born and is just beginning to stand on its own feet and has not yet gained strength - theoretically, organizationally, or ideologically), most of the delegates were influenced by the assurances of these speakers that the alternative project for a Confederated Union is supposedly "pro-Communist", and can be taken advantage of by the CPSU "for its own propaganda purposes", and so, they claim, "we need neither a federation nor a confederation, but only a free and independent Ukraine."

The congress introduced changes and additions to the by-laws of the USDP regarding its registration, and ratified several documents - "Declaration Regarding Land", "Appeal to peasants and all citizens of the Ukraine", and the "Appeal to the Third Session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet", as well as a demand for the release of Peoples Deputy S. Khmara from prison and that criminal charges be brought against those who illegally arrested him.

The congress looked into organizational questions. The Institution of Party Co-chairmen (there were five) was abolished. In its place it was agreed to have one chairman and several vice-chairmen.

Serhiy Plachynda was elected Chairman of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party, Volodymyr Pleshka - first vice-chairman, Ukrainian SSR Peoples Deputy Dmytro Chobit - second vice-chairman.

Following the conclusion of the congress, the creative group of the "Kin" theater performed a satirical comedy-fantasy "We are the Chukhrayintsi", which to a certain extent parodied those negative aspects which had appeared during this forum of the USDP's activity.

At the request of our readers, we are publishing some documents of the congress.

Honored Peoples Deputies!

February 2 of this year the Second Extraordinary Congress of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party was held in Kiev. The congress was called extraordinary because of the unusually complex and worrisome conditions in the republic.

In connection with this, the USDP congress appeals to the parliament with the following list of extremely urgent questions.

1. Regarding the Union Treaty and the referendum.

The Second Extraordinary Congress of the USDP, expressing the will of the peasants and all Ukrainian citizens, believes that the Union Treaty - if it is ratified - will deal a fatal blow to all the USSR republics, peoples, and nations. Therefore the USDP congress believes the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet should carry out a referendum in the republic, which would pose the following three questions:

"Are you for the Union Treaty and preservation of the USSR - yes or no?"

"Are you for Mutual Friendship between Free States - yes or no?"

"Are you for an Independent Ukraine - yes or no?"

The USDP congress believes that the Ukrainian parliament should initiate the convening of a Congress of representatives of all peoples of the USSR nations in

Kiev in May, so that they can ceremoniously proclaim the creation of an internationalist fraternal association - the Mutual Alliance of Free States.

2. Regarding the nationalization of union enterprises on Ukrainian territory.

Back on October 20, 1990 the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party sent the Second Session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet a telegram, requesting that this high parliament speed up ratification of the Law regarding nationalization within the territory of the Ukraine of all enterprises, transportation routes, and educational institutions which were illegally confiscated from the Ukrainian people September 29, 1965 so they will once again become the republic's property.

In addition, the only representative of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party to the republic's parliament, Ukrainian Peoples Deputy Dmytro Vasylovich Chobit was not once allowed to take the floor during the second session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet in order to introduce the USDP's proposal.

For this reason the Second Extraordinary Congress of the USDP proposes that legislation for nationalization be passed, as it is written and should have been introduced by Dmytro Chobit at the Second Session on December 4, 1990:

"In accord with the declaration of Ukrainian state sovereignty and the law on the economic independence of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

"To nationalize (re-expropriate), effective March 1, 1991, all enterprises within the Ukrainian SSR territory (factories, refineries, shafts, mines, construction firms, transportation routes - railroads, oil and gas pipelines, electrical cables), educational institutions, which until now have been the property of union ministries and concerns, and to transfer them on March 1, 1991 into the ownership of the Ukrainian people.

"This law is to become effective March 1, 1991."

The USDP Congress believes that only when this law is passed will the Ukraine achieve complete economic independence, true state sovereignty, and resolve the present crisis.

3. The USDP Congress considers the Land Code of the Ukrainian SSR a useless half-measure without the following amendment, which it is proposing to the Second Session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet:

"The land is the property of the local soviets, who can distribute it without cost, as completely inheritable property to be worked by those peasants who desire, have the ability and knowledge to work it.

"These peasants will receive the proper technology (at no cost, or to be repaid in installments), credits, and are to be free from taxation for a period of three years.

"The landowner is allowed to sell or transfer his land into tenancy only after seven years of successful cultivation of the property.

"If a landowner becomes bankrupt, his land is to be bought back by the local soviet.

"If the landowner becomes disabled and cannot work his land, it will pass to his heir, and if there is no heir it is to be bought back by the local soviet.

"City dwellers may purchase land in limited quantities.

"City dwellers who permanently relocate in a village receive land at no cost."

The USDP Congress feels that acceptance of this amendment to the Land Code will not only encourage the development of farming in the Ukraine, but will also help prevent unemployment in the republic.

4. The Second Extraordinary Congress of USDP appeals to the Third Session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet to pass the law regarding private ownership of land and manufacturing concerns with the right to hire employees in limited quantities for seasonal work.

Unless such a law is passed, Ukrainian villages will be isolated from the market and will decline, and together with them - economically and spiritually - the whole republic will decline.

The USDP recognizes collective, state, and individual forms of ownership. But today, in the age of economic growth, **private ownership is essential.**

According to statistics available to the USDP, 26-27 percent of Ukrainian peasants wish to hold land in private, deedable ownership. Of these, six percent wish to and have the ability and knowledge to cultivate the land today. These are the peasants with mechanical knowledge, in the age group 23-45 years. USDP feels this is a golden resource for the Ukraine. This is its hope and salvation.

5. The Extraordinary Congress of the USDP believes that adoption of legislation regarding republic convertible currency and a Ukrainian customs bureau are essential. Ratification of such legislation will put a halt to the plundering of Ukrainian goods and resources. At the same time this legislation will lead to stabilization of the republic's economy, halting inflation, speculation and wide-scale misappropriation, and allow entry into the international economic field.

6. The USDP proposes enacting laws creating a republic ministry of defense and a Ukrainian national army. The bloody events in Lithuania convince us how essential and timely the need for each republic to have its own armed forces.

7. The USDP Congress proposes that the parliament and government of the republic utilize the only true principle of today's dialectic of life: the primary, most important

factor in the state's activity within the republic's territory today is the immediate attainment of full economic independence for the Ukraine, so that it becomes the proprietor of everything within its borders, which will make possible the development of productive forces and growth in productivity of work, as an inseparable condition for rebirth of the nation, and as a adjunct to this, in tandem, the creation of a market economy.

We believe that the enactment of these laws will bring an end to the economic tumult and collapse of the Ukraine, and will turn the republic to a rebirth and blossoming.

The Second Extraordinary Congress of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party.

February 2, 1991

Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party Denounces CP, Union Treaty

91UN1241B Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 28 Feb 91 p 2

["Appeal to the Peasants and all Ukrainian Citizens"]

[Text] Dear brothers and sisters! Children of the Ukrainian land!

The Second Extraordinary Congress of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party hereby appeals to you with its sincere and painful statement.

The time has come when no one has the moral right to stand by indifferently and watch what is happening around us today and what awaits the Ukraine in the future...

We, the Ukrainian peasants, have been silent long enough. Although we have survived chaos and devastation such as peasantry throughout the world have not had to bear at any time in its years and centuries of existence. We, the Ukrainian peasants, humbly and silently survived the terrible age of complete collectivization, when we were grossly deceived; when the Ukrainian peasants were deprived of that which was most sacred, most dear to them - their LAND, even that which they were granted in 1917. That best, most upstanding, most industrious, and most productive force in the Ukrainian village - the landowner - was destroyed. EIGHT MILLION of us, the Ukrainian peasants, died from the artificial famine - the worst in all of mankind's history - which was created in the name of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) by Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov and other torturers of the Ukrainian nation. In our great terror we remained silent even when the best sons of the Ukrainian village flooded the Yeshov-Beria torture chambers with their hot, innocent blood and used their bodies to block the deep, innumerable trenches by Bykovnia - the ones who filled the burial mounds in 1937.

We, the Ukrainian peasants, orphaned and widowed, naked and barefoot, were the ones who carried on our

shoulders the whole burden of post-war reconstruction and rebirth. We suffered hunger in 1947, when another two million Ukrainians died; we perished in prisons for a measly five wheat stalks; we survived the compulsory loans to the government and Stalin's cruel finance agents, who swept our houses clear of every last thread for payment of excessive taxes imposed on the peasants; we joined the "nationalists" and "Banderites" because of our ardent love for the Ukraine; we perished like flies in the distant camps. But even then we patiently, silently worked - feeding the world, with nothing but a serf's kopeck in wages for the workday. And it was on this hellish work, our goodness, on the necks of the peasants that there grew the bureaucratic nomenclature, that stratum of a privileged superstructure developed - such as the 18-million member army of leaders and officials, the KGB, MVD, the amelioration, the cosmos, and of course the CPSU.

We did not object. Except that we ran away in droves to the cities. We ran away from our native villages, where we were no longer even allowed to keep a cow or cultivate a large garden. We abandoned our hamlets and picturesque villages, because they were declared to be "without a future".

And so, under the leadership of the Communist Party, a great devastation was brought on the Ukraine: 1,502 villages "without a future" disappeared from the face of the Ukraine in the last 23 years alone. A great agricultural country has died. This is the eleventh year of a process of depopulating the eight historic central Ukrainian oblasts of their peasant residents, and so the ancient Ukrainian villages are dying, and along with them dies the Ukrainian nation, for the village is its basis.

The earth is dying - totally polluted chemically, poisoned with herbicides, pesticides, saturated with hexachloride, ammonia and mineral fertilizers which have entered our own livers and blood. Chernobyl has burned our bodies and souls with radionuclides. With strontium and cesium it has poisoned our rivers, fields, air, children, and together with the uranium ores in southern Ukraine and the atomic generating stations standing throughout the Ukraine like demons of death, it, Chernobyl, TAKES AWAY OUR FUTURE - in all Ukraine, especially in the villages, we have the highest child mortality rate in all of the Soviet Union. And the number of oncologic diseases gives the long-suffering Ukraine the tragic honor of being highest in the world. The indicators of new births have reached the crisis stage: in 1989, for every 1000 individuals, there were 13.3 births and 11.6 deaths. In 1990 12.7 were born, 12.3 died.

0.4 - this is the distance to complete annihilation of the Ukrainian nation. Four meters away from the abyss - this is deathly near. More so - under the conditions when inevitably tomorrow the Union Treaty will push us into that abyss...

Yes, the Union Treaty - this is a death sentence not only for the Ukraine, but for all the republics, their nationalities, cultures, languages.

Think about it...

The Communist Party brought our nation to the brink of total economic collapse. Still the crisis is growing. Can we possibly propose to our multinational society an obsolete (though under the slogan "renewed federation") governmental system, when it, this system, the USSR - has outlived its usefulness and is no longer viable?

The artificially glued together Muscovite kettle has many cracks, it is no longer useful for cooking porridge. And if you consider that the Muscovite officials are forcibly pulling us into that kettle only out of greed for their own gainful purpose, seeking to maintain with the help of demagogic sputter and intimidation (it still has the Army and KGB under its control) their imperial positions, pay rates, exemptions, and privileges. And - their control of the republics. After all the Union Treaty is precisely that dictatorship of the center, which will perpetuate the subordinate status of the republics. Any of the most progressive laws passed by the republics, such as those dealing with land, or private ownership, or sovereignty - become uncertain and without any guarantees when there are two Constitutions - the republic's and the Soviet Union's. Because the USSR's president, citing the Soviet constitution, can at any time void the best of the republic's laws, as he, for example, did already when he annulled the laws passed in several of the republics regarding the right of youth who serve in the Soviet Army to be stationed within their own republics. In this way the president ignored the will of the nations and their parliaments, as well as the just demands of thousands of mothers, whose sons serve in the armed forces. This is a sample of the Union Treaty in action.

The Union Treaty represents economic theft of the republics and the villages, famine, these are threats of armored transports and bullets aimed at all democrats who thirst for freedom for their nations. The Union Treaty represents bare shelves in the stores, long lines to purchase necessities, endless scarcities and deficits, tension and maladjustment of the people.

The Second Extraordinary Congress of the USDP sees only one solution to this difficult situation: **complete sovereignty of all the republics, united in an association based on economically mutually advantageous cooperation, free development of their productive forces, exchange of goods without any dictates from above, all of which will lead to growth in labor productivity, the availability of goods and a natural transition to a market economy.**

This is not, obviously, the road to a "renewed federation", but to a life-giving Association of Free States, which eliminates the imperialist center, the Union constitution, the Union government, and the president.

True, the Ukraine today cannot exist in isolation from the rest of the world, from its neighbors. It has given too

much to others to suddenly separate itself from everyone. But the Ukrainian people, through the ages and times, have been overly generous and good. This generosity and goodness have turned against it with great misfortune. Just look: occupying just 2.8 percent of all the USSR's territory, the Ukraine produces, as we know, 25 percent (one quarter!) of all the combined products of the Soviet Union. Yet it kept only 11 percent of its agricultural products and five percent of its industrial production. All the rest was handed over to the Muscovite treasury. With an annual budget of 33 billion rubles, the Ukraine allowed Union ministries to take away 100 billion rubles of what was essentially national income. No other colony in all of mankind's history ever experienced such thievery. And so we say: enough already!

We support peaceful parliamentary changes within the country, the abolition of the Muscovite empire and the creation, on its wreckage, of an Association of free and equal states. We, the peasants, want peace, land, and the right to work it freely. We want simple human happiness for our short human lifespan - the happiness which we have not experienced in seventy years under a totalitarian-imperialist socialist system.

And all this - peace, work, land, freedom, and happiness - are contained in the Cooperative Alliance of Free States and in full independence of all the republics, as proposed by the Second Extraordinary Congress of the USDP.

YES! - TO A FREE, INDEPENDENT UKRAINE.

YES! - TO COOPERATIVE ALLIANCE OF FREE STATES.

NO! - TO THE UNION TREATY, which represents the mutual coercion, theft, as well as spiritual and physical death for all republics, nations and the village.

With these slogans let us come out for the referendum, dear brothers and sisters!

Let us shake the veil from before our eyes and remove the garments of slaves, those of us who still wear them.

Let us fight for an Association of Free Nations; let us fight for a free, independent Ukraine, let us fight for Peace, Freedom, and Happiness.

The Second Extraordinary Congress of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party.

February 1991

Greens' Leader on Ukrainian Political, Economic Situation

91UN1254A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 15 Mar 91 pp 8-9

[Interview with Yu. Shcherbak by Valentin Smaga, KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA commentator, telephone no. 441-86-51, under rubric: "Pertinent Interview:" "Yu. N. Shcherbak: 'The Time of Leaders Has Passed'"]

[Excerpt] We met with USSR People's Deputy Yuriy Nikolayevich Shcherbak, chairman of the Ukrainian ecological association "Zeleniy Svit" after an intense session of the "Green Soviet." [passages omitted]

[V. Smaga] Well, Yuriy Nikolayevich, there probably is no need to perceive so emotionally what is possibly an awkward phrase. Especially since, you will agree, it was said with some justification. Recently Central Television organized for the members of the opposition in the USSR Supreme Soviet a real informational blockade.

[Yu. Shcherbak] Yes, it really was a blockade. My friend, People's Deputy Sergey Ryabenko, was recently shown on the "Vremya" program without any sound, but only with his mouth open. But, in addition to the offensive against glasnost that has currently been launched throughout the country, there are also objective reasons why my activities as a deputy have been concealed from the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

I was a member of the interregional deputy group from the very first day of its creation. Academician A. Sakharov supported my appeal to the Supreme Soviet to declare a moratorium on the building of new AES [nuclear power stations] for five to ten years, until absolutely safe operating methods have been developed.

In the Ecology Committee, I headed the Subcommittee for Nuclear Power Engineering and Nuclear Ecology. We conducted two hearings on the Chernobyl problem. At one hearing we succeeded in removing the classification of "Secret" from all the information concerning the damage to the public's health that had been caused by the accident at the Chernobyl AES. At the other hearing we spoke out decisively against Academician L. Ilin's criminal 35-rem concept. The "Zeleniy Svit" Association also participated in developing two Ukrainian laws: one governing the status of the Chernobyl zone, and one governing the status of persons living on the territory that had been contaminated by radiation.

Our subcommittee decisively rejected the draft of the law governing nuclear power engineering and nuclear safety that had been prepared by the department, and proposed our own alternative version. I hope very much that it will be adopted by USSR Supreme Soviet. Our country is for the time being, the only one in the world where there is no legal regulation of the interrelationships between the public and nuclear power engineering.

[V. Smaga] Laws are a good thing. But it is generally known that quite often they are not fulfilled in our country.

[Yu. Shcherbak] If we seriously want to survive on our land, then they will have to be fulfilled. I have been convinced of that by my personal participation in an investigation of the causes of nuclear catastrophes. As chairman of a commission made up of members of the Ecology Committee and the Health Protection Committee, I went to the area of the Semipalatinsk test range.

We stood right next to the bore holes in which underground nuclear explosions had been produced, and we visited a classified area where tests are prepared.

We were also shown the home where Lavrentiy Beriia, the true father of the Soviet atomic bomb, used to live. Since the late 1940's, tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons and criminal experiments on human beings were carried out there. Those who remained in the mountain villages were given a bottle of vodka, a kilogram of sausage, and a loaf of bread—and that was all the protection they got. After the explosion all those people were subjected to special research at a classified medical institution that was disguised as a brucellosis laboratory. I was writing my dissertation on brucellosis and I was instantaneously convinced that the laboratory employees did not have even the slightest idea about that disease.

[V. Smaga] And that terrible medical institution is still in operation?

[Yu. Shcherbak] Yes. We demanded that the employees give us the results of the research, but we did not receive anything. We were shown a few things, but only in spoken form. Those are the moral qualities of the medical personnel at Semipalatinsk. In my opinion those medical personnel do not differ in any way from the people who concealed from us the truth about the Chernobyl catastrophe. The military are also good. During one of the underground tests, a radioactive cloud was thrown into the air. The Semipalatinsk civilian services recorded it. A tremendous ruckus broke out...

After Chernobyl, people have been taking a heightened interest to all the information about the radioactive contamination of the terrain. Our Ukrainian misfortune gave rise in Kazakhstan to the powerful "Nevada - Semipalatinsk" movement. It is headed by the well-known poet and USSR People's Deputy Olzhas Suleymenov. We sit next to one another in the country's parliament.

The nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk are a real ecological catastrophe. Three kilometers from the boundary of the test area, the hospitals are overfilled with children who are deformed. Many of them are suffering from cancer. This is the consequence of the open explosions that occurred right up to 1963. But even the underground explosions are no less fearful. Because of those explosions, the water in the wells is disappearing. And a typical detail is that the explosions are carried out only when the wind is blowing away from the housing area where the test personnel live.

During the last underground explosion in 1989, a radioactive cloud again broke out onto the surface. That was the last straw, as far as people's patience was concerned. A document prepared by our commission was considered at a joint session of the ecology, defense, and state security committees. After a prolonged struggle, it was decided to stop the tests at the Semipalatinsk test range.

We also visited Chelyabinsk Oblast. In January 1957 a container filled with nuclear waste products from the production of atomic bombs was exploded there. The Kyshtym catastrophe is completely incomparable with the Chernobyl disaster. The banks of the Techa stream are still fenced off by barbed wire. And in Lake Karachay there is a considerably greater accumulation of radioactivity than in the Chernobyl zone. The attempt is currently being made to simply fill it up with gravel. But this is ridiculous. The threat of the strong contamination of large Siberian rivers is being created.

The Kyshtym problem, like the Chernobyl problem, is a global one. Americans have already visited there and have agreed to cooperate. But where can we get the tremendous amounts of money necessary to eliminate even this accident? The fact that, practically speaking, nothing has been done since the late 1940's is a crime against humanity.

Knowing about the catastrophes at Chernobyl and Kyshtym, and understanding the inadmissibility of tests at Semipalatinsk, our nuclear Mafia could think of nothing better than to shift them to Novaya Zemlya. In the autumn of 1990 a new explosion occurred. At that time I happened to be in Norway, at the Kirkenes polar station. I took part in an antinuclear demonstration and spoke at a protest rally. No, as you can see, every cloud has a silver lining. To a certain degree, we participated in the misfortune that befell Novaya Zemlya and the residents of the Scandinavian countries. But, nevertheless, I am convinced that it is possible to fight successfully against the nuclear threat to the very life of mankind.

[V. Smaga] Apparently everything depends upon the degree of organization of the environmental-protection public?

[Yu. Shcherbak] Yes, of course. Our "Zeleniy Svit," as you recall, was born after much suffering. It was not until 1987 that we announced its creation under the aegis of the Ukrainian World Protection Committee. In 1988 the first political rally was held. And in the spring of 1990, on World Day, the creation of the Ukrainian Greens Party was proclaimed.

[V. Smaga] Are you satisfied with the results of the recent "Zeleniy Svit"?

[Yu. Shcherbak] Well, yes and no. It is good that we have made a clear determination of the place for the future congress of "Zeleniy Svit." That congress will occur on 29 March in Ivano-Frankovsk. We shall conduct the next congress in Dnepropetrovsk. Something else that is gratifying is the almost complete unanimity with regard to the question of the forthcoming referendum. We reject the trap that was prepared for us in the center, and we completely support the posing of the question as formulated by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. But we are distressed by the fact that such a noble movement of "Zeleniy Svit" has produced its own bureaucrats, schismatics, members of the opposition, and even slanderers. I have specifically in mind the article in RABOCHAYA

GAZETA, entitled "Ruckus in a Noble Family" and written by my former assistant, Vladimir Masarik, whose services had to be refused because of his hopeless laziness.

[V. Smaga] At "Green Council" there were frequent statements to the effect that the excessive politicalization of the Greens movement was harming the cause.

[Yu. Shcherbak] Excessive politicalization is definitely harming it. But it seems to me that we have found a happy medium. The participants in the association's work can include members of the CPSU and the LKSMU [Ukrainian Komsomol] (MDS), members of the URP [Ukrainian Republican Party], and members of the Democratic Platform. And the Ukrainian Greens Party is part of that association only in order to guarantee an influence on the resolution of ecological questions by political means. When I was in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, I was convinced that there exists in Europe a kind of Green International that numbers approximately 20 million people. The Ukrainian Greens can occupy a worthy place in it.

Soon we shall arrive at an election to the agencies of authority on a multiparty basis. Recent public-opinion surveys indicate that the Ukrainian Greens Party has good chances of overcoming the five percent barrier that is generally accepted in civilized countries. Putting it another way, if we are supported by five percent of the population, we shall have a completely legal claim to seats in the parliament.

[V. Smaga] How do you, as the leader of the Ukrainian Greens, evaluate the work of the editorial office of the ZELENIY SVIT newspaper?

[Yu. Shcherbak] I am convinced that our newspaper has a good future. It has quickly found its reader, has won authority, and is bringing in an income that is quite substantial. However, one must not forget that ZELENIY SVIT has come under a campaign of the material stifling of the progressive press that has been extended to the entire country. When film disappeared, friends of the newspaper in Czechoslovakia gave us film as a present. The printing capabilities disappeared and we barely succeeded in finding a suitable print shop. Now paper is in short supply. The people who are working at ZELENIY SVIT are avid enthusiasts at what they are doing. So I believe that they are overcoming all the difficulties.

[V. Smaga] Could you please tell me, Yuriy Nikolayevich, whether you do not regret not working at Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Yu. Shcherbak] Yes, I do regret it. At USSR Supreme Soviet there is practically nothing to do. No opposition makes itself heard. Rotation has considerably worsened the makeup of USSR Supreme Soviet. The majority votes only the way that Gorbachev wants. Practically speaking, neither the president nor the union government is accountable to the country's parliament. Today

it is, rather, an agency of confrontation between the centralized unitary state and the republics that are defending their sovereignty. The crux of the matter is that life has changed, but the Supreme Soviet has not. It is for good reason that the opposition proposes transferring the authority to the Council of the Federation, and disbanding the country's parliament.

Deputies are already being told: you do not establish the makeup of the government, but only coordinate it. That is why I left my subcommission: I did not want to be the head of a desk. And many Ukrainian deputies have provided themselves with Moscow apartments and prominent jobs and have completely forgotten the interests of their constituents.

[V. Smaga] Yes, in the Ukrainian parliament one frequently hears reproaches directed at deputies to USSR Supreme Soviet from the Ukraine. They are allegedly failing to defend their republic's interests.

[Yu. Shcherbak] Well, how can one defend them? Give me powers such that this will be a statement made not by a certain Shcherbak, but by a fully equal representative of the Ukraine. Incidentally, I am convinced that currently the fate of our republic is being decided in Kiev. Almost every week I go to the "Zeleniy Svit" secretariat, frequently take part in the work of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and go to the People's Council.

[V. Smaga] Apparently all this had an influence on the decision by the Ukrainian Greens to support only the Ukrainian version of the questions in the referendum.

[Yu. Shcherbak] Yes, of course. I want, however, to emphasize that those who are demanding a final break with Moscow are not correct. We need, just as we need air to breathe, a union with a democratic Russia headed by such leaders as Yeltsin, Afanasyev, Popov, Yablokov, and Sobchak. That idea is convincingly supported by the congress of the country's democratic forces that was held recently in Kharkov. We signed a declaration about the future Union as a union of completely equal democratic states.

[V. Smaga] But the president assures us that there is no alternative to the existing Union.

[Yu. Shcherbak] I do not agree. The thing that is leading to the country's disintegration is specifically the center's continuing predatory policy, of which we are convinced practically every day. The alternative is the creation of a community of union independent states in which the center is given only the coordinating functions and functions that are important for everyone. Only this kind of union can be a lasting one that will be subordinate to the objective economic laws and that express the common mutually advantageous interests.

[V. Smaga] What kind of future structure do you envision in the Ukraine?

[Yu. Shcherbak] In my opinion, the Ukraine must become a federal republic. The Galitsiya area, the

Donetsk-Luganskiy region, the Black Sea area, etc. are parts of our country that developed historically. The more independence that they have and the more strongly that local self-government develops there, the more stability there will be in the new sovereign Ukraine that is developing mutually advantageous ties with Russia, Belorussia, and adjacent countries—Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. I want to emphasize that we must construct a state for all the people's of the Ukraine, rather than a purely Ukrainian national state. Incidentally, this has wisely been stated in the documents issued by Rukh, which certain heads are ready to accuse of nationalism. We have living in our territory 12 million Russians alone, not counting other nationalities. But in no instance should we provide the opportunity for reactionaries to play with the Russian map in the Ukraine as they have done in the Baltic republics.

[V. Smaga] The political processes in society are determined by the economic ones. What can you say about the peculiarities of the economic processes in the Ukraine?

[Yu. Shcherbak] That's a very good question. I remember a joke from the years of the stagnation period. A foreigner tells a Soviet citizen, "In your country, power is money. But in our country, money is power." At the present time, for example, in my opinion there is under way an intensive process of a kind of pumping of the content of real power from the political-ideological forms into financial-economic forms. The upper stratum of the party nomenklatura, coupled with the bureaucracy from the departments, is hurriedly creating companies, joint-stock societies, and joint enterprises. I personally know three secretaries of rayon committee who are ready right now to become businessmen. The difficulties of changing over to market relations, apparently, are explained also by the fact that not all the powers that be in the Soviet version have yet had time to materialize their opportunities.

When that happens, they will be forced to forget the slogans and the Marxist principles and to begin to manage effectively, since the laws of the market are harsh and the weak go bankrupt instantaneously. In general, during the years of the so-called perestroika the bureaucracy has become considerably wiser and, most importantly, has finally become aware of the commonality of its interests.

Just see how skillfully and outwardly convincingly it is shifting the blame for all the current difficulties to the democrats and how it evokes in ordinary people a nostalgia for the period of stagnation, with its cheap vodka and elementary commodities in the stores.

[V. Smaga] Apparently it is not so simple to expose that demagoguery. Why not, then, pose the question of the crimes perpetrated during the period of perestroika?

[Yu. Shcherbak] That's right! Premier N. Ryzhkov and Finance Minister V. Pavlov, during the perestroika, brought the budget deficit to 500 million rubles. In

essence, that money was spent on attempt, on the basis of various pretexts, to preserve the previous system of administration by fiat. During the year of the worst harvest, we are receiving food assistance from abroad. In a country having rich forest reserves, there is no paper for printing newspapers. Certainly these are convincing examples of the ridiculous things that are permeating our entire life. Therefore I am convinced that the system of administrative fiat will inevitably collapse. It has already exhausted itself completely.

[V. Smaga] Yes, but that system has also bred its own faithful followers. It is easy to assume that, once a mechanism for unlimited presidential power is formulated, it will be possible to find some kind of "strong man" who is very necessary to the bureaucracy, and who will bang his fist on the table and introduce the notorious "order." What, in general, is your forecast for the future?

[Yu. Shcherbak] Forecasts are a dangerous thing. It is easy to make mistakes. But nevertheless I shall say that, in my opinion, there exists at least an 80-percent possibility of attempts to get out of the crisis by using customary methods employing force—presidential rule, for example, or martial law. I give a 20-percent possibility to the proposed civilized way out of the blind alley by means of the most rapid democratic reforms and a radical economic reform.

There is just one thing that I do not have any doubts about. A sharp turn to the right cannot be either long-lived or successful. It is impossible, by using methods employing force, to resolve a single one of the problems that have accumulated. And if one drives a disease inward, the consequences will be very serious.

We no longer will march ahead into a bright... past. Whoever has breathed the air of freedom can no longer become a slave. Moreover, messianism in politics (follow me and don't think about anything, because I'm the only one who will show you the true path) no longer works. People have stopped believing the leaders of any political coloration.

In politics I am a proponent of the evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, path of development. I am a proponent of compromises and nonviolent methods of struggle. Obviously, this does not mean that in fundamental questions the Ukrainian Greens Party can make concessions.

The future belongs to the politicians who are capable of being guided in their activities by categories of morality, who are capable of choosing from among all the possible paths only the one path that will never harm their nation.

Ukrainian Procurator Discusses Khmara Case

91UN1347A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
11 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian Procurator M.A. Potebenko, by *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* correspondent E. Logvin,

under the rubric: "By Conscience and by Law:" "Now Let the Court Issue Its Verdict"; place and date not given]

[Text] Well, the incident that took place on the morning of 7 November last year at Kiev's central October Revolution Square (or to be precise, under the square, in the pedestrian underpass) has now come to its logical conclusion. We will remind the reader that the incident involved a vicious attack on Militia Colonel I.V. Grigoryev, who was beaten and robbed. However, this seemingly purely criminal case has acquired considerable political overtones. The point is that among the attackers was S.I. Khmara, people's deputy of the Ukrainian SSR. This is what sent passions flying. There were heated discussions in the parliament and in the press. *RABOCHAYA GAZETA*, too, published materials on this topic more than once. Readers showed great interest in it, and the editorial offices were flooded with letters containing many different questions.

At the same time, an investigation was being conducted. One of the members of the investigative group was A.P. Belik, deputy chief of the administration on investigations and chief of the investigative group of the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy, who was detached by the republic procurator to the Kiev City Procuracy. This fact speaks of a responsible professional approach to the investigation of a case which was out of the ordinary. Now the investigation is completed; the Kiev Procuracy has approved the indictment, and the criminal case has been referred by the republic procurator to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Court for trial on its merits.

Our correspondent met with Ukrainian SSR Procurator M.A. Potebenko and asked him to answer some of the questions related to various aspects of the sensational case which caused such interest among our readers.

[Logvin] Mikhail Alekseyevich, after the incident between Colonel Grigoryev and Deputy Khmara, videotaped on the spot, was shown on television, many of those who saw the videotape immediately formed their own understanding of the role of each actor. However, as we were told, attempts to exert pressure, and the use of disinformation, where established facts either were distorted or brushed off, did not stop up to the last day of the investigative group's work. Now that the investigation is completed, the factual side of the incident is established, and charges have been formulated—what is it that Khmara and his confederates are accused of?

[Potebenko] About the disinformation that accompanied the investigation: In accordance with the USSR Law "On the Status of People's Deputies in the USSR," the procuracy has sent notification of the investigation's results into the case of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy S.I. Khmara to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. He is under criminal charges in accordance with Article 166, Part 2 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code for excess of official powers and actions involving use of force; Article 86, Part 2 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code for

robbery with the purpose of taking possession of state property, conducted by a group of persons; and Article 193, Part 3 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code for theft of personal documents.

Now let us reconstruct the course of events which led to the articles of the Criminal Code enumerated above. On the morning of 7 November 1990 a group of people gathered in the underground pedestrian underpass in the center of Kiev; their purpose was to stop a military parade on Kreshchik Avenue. Among them were several people against whom, together with Khmara, criminal charges have now been filed: Berezenskiy, Batovkin, Golovach, Kovalchuk, and Ratushnyy. With them was Zhirnaya and her acquaintance Repin; she had positioned herself on a folding bed set up so as to interfere with normal pedestrian traffic.

[Logvin] The situation is reminiscent of a theatrical staging, where the director places actors and objects on stage in accordance with his design. A folding bed blocking the passage, and some extras on hand—is this not a prologue to scandal? All we need is to wait for the main actors.

[Potebenko] Well whatever it was, Grigoryev, deputy department chief of the administration of criminal investigations of the Kiev Administration for Internal Affairs, who was on duty at that time, did not ignore it. He suggested moving the folding bed next to the wall. Since there was no reaction, he moved it himself. It is important to note that in the process Zhirnaya did not receive any injuries. In her testimony during the investigation she said that during the argument somebody hit her hard in the back. This was not Grigoryev, who was standing three paces away from her, but a guy in a white cap; as she learned later, it was Kovalchuk, who was standing next to her. Kovalchuk, together with a woman in a white scarf (her name was Skachko), accused Grigoryev of allegedly beating up Zhirnaya. All the while the latter was telling those present that it was not Grigoryev who had hit her. Nevertheless, a group of people acting on their own motives started to insult Grigoryev, calling him a "provocateur" and the like. Having let off steam, the crowd dispersed.

[Logvin] Thus, the first act was played out.

[Potebenko] Yes, after this events went into a new round. This is what Grigoryev said in his testimony:

"By the time I reached the end of the underpass, and there was about 20 meters from there to the place where the folding bed was standing, Zhirnaya, Skachko, and Khmara had come over to me. Skachko pointed at me and said: 'This is the militiaman, this is the militiaman who beat up the woman and broke her arm,' and she and Khmara seized me."

Now let us go back to Zhirnaya's testimony. According to her, Skachko, along with her and a guy, found Deputy Khmara and told him that some man had beaten up a woman, and pointed at her, Zhirnaya. Having in mind

the events that had already taken place, and trying to attract the attention of bystanders to herself, Zhirnaya confirmed what Skachko said; after that, she, Skachko, Khmara, and the guy went to the underpass to look for Grigoryev.

In the underpass, Skachko saw Grigoryev and pointed him out to Khmara. Khmara approached Grigoryev, showed his identification, grabbed him by the arm, and started to demand his papers. Meanwhile, Skachko called Grigoryev a "fascist." At that moment Kovalchuk ran over to them, grabbed Grigoryev with one hand and hit Khmara in the abdomen with his other hand, as the latter was showing his identification to other people. After that Kovalchuk yelled that Grigoryev had hit Deputy Khmara. Some other guys ran over and started beating Grigoryev.

After the confrontation Zhirnaya explained that Khmara hit Grigoryev in the abdomen three times, and was holding him by the neck.

As we can see, even if some questions did enter his mind, Deputy Khmara, instead of lawfully sorting out the situation by bringing in other militia officers who were at the same underpass, chose to exceed his powers. Clearly exceeding the boundaries of his powers, he stopped Grigoryev with the use of physical force. And even when Grigoryev identified himself as a militia officer, Khmara continued his unlawful actions. Moreover, by exclaiming: "Hey guys, over here!" he called on his confederates for help. Golovach, Berezanskiy, Ratushnyy, Batovkin, and Vorobyev, who had been standing nearby, surrounded Grigoryev in a tight ring and, together with Khmara and Kovalchuk, started beating him, tormenting him, and tearing at his clothes.

Khmara himself, while holding Grigoryev was beating him in the back and legs. By giving an order to search Grigoryev, Khmara contributed to the commission of a robbery and the theft of property and papers. Among items stolen from Grigoryev were 30 rubles [R], consumer coupons with a face value of R300, a two-way radio worth R753, and other objects; his umbrella was demolished, and his gun taken away from him.

During the beating Grigoryev received more than 30 bruises and scratches and other injuries, which affected his health negatively. This is how this beating was described in testimony by witness V.P. Savchuk:

"Khmara himself took an active part in the mob law, and also a guy in a sheepskin jacket and cloth cap. In particular, I can say that Khmara was holding Grigoryev from the back and hit him several times in the back of his head. The guy in the "fancy hat" was beating Grigoryev in the chest with his fists. A fair-haired guy was squeezing Grigoryev's mouth and nose with his hand, and also his lower jaw, and then sadistically tore Grigoryev's mouth apart with two fingers... Somebody from the crowd started to yell: 'Kill him! He is a cop!'

"Grigoryev was yelling: 'People, help me, I am being killed!'" There were militia members in the underpass, and when the commotion started, they ran to Grigoryev's help, but Rukh members made a live cordon and would not let them through."

It is surprising, though, that the militia officers were stopped by Khmara's warning: "I am a people's deputy. Do not interfere; I will sort things out myself." The waving of the deputy's identification card does not give anybody the right to commit a crime.

And here is what the victim himself, Grigoryev, testified. In particular, in regard to the actions and behavior of S. Khmara, Grigoryev said that the latter demanded to be called "Master," and was holding him by the shoulder from the right side. When Grigoryev was already almost lying on the ground, Khmara hit him in the back with his knee, while holding him and saying: "Your end has come, commie," "You will be in Nizniy Tagil along with Churbanov," and "You are already in jail, nothing will help you." Despite the fact that Grigoryev kept saying that he was a militia officer, Khmara and his friends held his hands and would not let him reach for his identification. When he called for other militia officers to free him, Khmara continued to hold him, directing the actions of other attackers; he kept holding Grigoryev while the latter's gun was taken and while he was led out of the underpass, which made Khmara a participant in the theft of the identification and the radio.

[Logvin] All these actions by the "magnificent seven" future occupants of the dock resemble to an amazing degree a criminal settling of accounts. What can you say about the personalities of the accused?

[Potebenko] It is true, four of the accused already have criminal records. L.V. Berezanskiy was convicted twice (in 1983 and in 1987) for malicious hooliganism, or to put it simply, for beating up people. In between incarcerations he also spent time in a preventive treatment and labor facility from which he escaped. O.V. Batovkin was sentenced in the past to four years in prison for premeditated aggravated assault and hooliganism. Criminal charges for hooliganism were also filed in the past against N.I. Golovach.

One of the key figures in this unsavory story also fits right in with this company. L.G. Zhirnaya, who ostensibly was the reason why this whole thing flared up, was convicted twice in the past: the first time for residential burglary, and the second—for theft, robbery, and banditry. Now she is under arrest for killing a child. Zhirnaya is not a Kiev resident. She was located and detained by investigative organs after having stayed in the apartment of a Rukh representative with whom she had a close relationship. She was hiding here to avoid investigation. How did she come to be in Kiev? In September 1990, representatives of the popular Ukrainian Rukh came to Kherson Oblast to conduct propaganda work. They suggested she participate in a student hunger strike in Kiev, and promised her she would get paid for it. She

came with them to Kiev and spent some time in a tent on October Revolution Square together with other participants in the hunger strike, passing herself off as a student; for this, she received monetary remuneration. (Zhirnaya also came to Kiev at the request of Rukh representatives to participate in the 7 November action.)

According to Zhirnaya's testimony, there were many others like her in the tent city, passing themselves off as students. And although they presented themselves as students on a hunger strike, they were all fed there. Ratushnyi, another of the accused in Khmara case, also took an active part in this action. So, the people's deputy kept company on the "it could not be worse" principle.

By the way, when in 1980 S.I. Khmara was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, with five years internal exile, it was not only for state crimes—in his work as a dentist he had violated laws regulating the private dental prosthetics practice.

Finally, speaking of Khmara's role in the upcoming trial, I want to note that in addition to the "Grigoryev case" he is also part of the case related to the event at St. Sophia Cathedral. Khmara is charged with intent to disrupt the service in St. Sophia Cathedral on 28 October 1990, and with taking part in group actions that grossly violated public order and were accompanied by an obvious refusal to obey legitimate demands from the representatives of the authorities. These actions were classified by the investigation as falling under Articles 139 and 187-3 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code, that is, interfering with religious rites, and the organization of, or active participation in, group actions violating public order.

[Logvin] Mikhail Alekseyevich, what is your appraisal of the claims that Khmara is being persecuted for political reasons?

[Potebenko] All actions undertaken by Khmara and his confederates meet the definition of a purely criminal offense and have nothing to do with "political persecution," no matter how much supporters of this version—including Khmara's lawyer Ayvazyan—would like to present it this way.

This is a purely criminal case. And I must say that the investigation in this case has been fast, objective, and comprehensive. This is despite the fact that the accused and their lawyers have been constantly engaging in delaying tactics. For instance, the accused Kovalchuk even simulated a mental illness, as a result of which expert psychiatric evaluation had to be conducted twice. Over 300 witnesses have been questioned in connection with the case, many of them videotaped; there were also 20 formal expert examinations. Other evidence has also been collected.

[Logvin] Mikhail Sergeyevich, in connection with the circumstances accompanying this investigation, what can you say about the statement made by People's Deputy A.I. Yemets, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR

Supreme Soviet Commission on Human Rights, who said in an interview for LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA on 7 March that he had been slandered, and that the procurator allegedly went as far as reading out, without having verified it, a deposition that claimed that "I allegedly interfered with the conduct of the 7 November demonstration, although at that time I was not even on Kreshchik Avenue."

[Potebenko] Well, we cannot ignore such a statement, since it disinform the public and requires objective clarification, which is what I will try to do. Yemets should recall where the events involving Grigoryev, in which he himself participated, took place. The fact of Yemets' presence in the pedestrian underpass was recorded on videotape. At first Yemets denied he had been there, but then he admitted it during a confrontation with a witness. It is also on record that, having taken possession of Grigoryev's gun, Yemets did not immediately turn it in when the internal troops officer requested it. The gun was forcibly removed from him by the military who were providing the cordon in connection with the demonstration. Yemets' denials can also be explained by the fact that in this extraordinary situation, which in Yemets' own words was criminal in nature, when a militia officer was being tormented, Yemets took no actions to stop it, to protect human rights. Considering his position, it was his duty to immediately call for help from the militia. But he, as they say, just stood by.

[Logvin] Mikhail Alekseyevich, certain circles have an interest in blowing the case of Khmara and his confederates out of proportion, not only to the point of making it a political trial, but almost to an international scale. The first indication was probably the arrival in Kiev—at the Rukh's invitation—of American Gregory Stanton, who was presented as a university professor specializing in international law and human rights.

[Potebenko] It is true, some mass media presented American citizen Stanton as a professor and a specialist in law. I am not in a position to judge his academic title, since I have not seen his professorial identification card, but as a jurist he has shown himself to be an extremist, both legally and ethically. There are good grounds for this conclusion. He actively participated in an unsanctioned rally on 16 March in Kiev, thereby violating our state law on procedures for organizing and conducting rallies. Also, in his interview, Stanton maintained that he had personally met with Khmara in preliminary detention and that he had ostensibly familiarized himself with the investigation materials. These statements do not reflect the truth: The American had not met Khmara and had not acquainted himself with the case materials. Accordingly, all of Stanton's other conclusions and opinions are not based on facts. Which did not stop him from stating, without blinking an eye: "I have concluded my investigation, and I am convinced that Stepan Khmara is innocent, and that he is being persecuted for political reasons. All the accused included in this case with him should be freed."

Therefore, if we call things by their proper names, everything said by the American traveler is nothing but intentional conjecture and may even be seen as another attempt to put pressure on the upcoming trial. By the way, Stanton's contention that he spoke with the judge who will preside over this trial is laughable, since even the procuracy does not know in advance the composition of the court which will preside over this case.

Anyway, the episode with Rukh's visiting American adviser is only one of many that accompanied the investigation and were aimed at exerting psychological pressure on procuracy personnel. Which did not, in the process of investigating and making decisions on this case, keep them from being cool-headed and composed and from being guided only by the law. Now only the court has a right to hand down its fair verdict.

Caucasus

Independent Georgian CP Outlines Pre-Election Platform

91US0471A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
28 Mar 91 p 3

["Toward a Common Goal—Election Platform of the Independent Communist Party of Georgia"]

[Text] The renewed Communist Party of Georgia is participating in the elections of local power organs as an independent political organization which has its own positions regarding all the basic problems related to our society's development.

The basis for the election platform of the independent Communist Party of Georgia in the current elections is the election program developed for the campaign for the elections to Georgia's Supreme Soviet.

The Communist Party of Georgia considers its goal to be active participation in the restoration of Georgia's state independence, where the primacy of human rights and national and general human values will actually be ensured.

The Communist Party of Georgia is resolutely ridding itself of the burdensome legacy of the past, rejecting ideological dogmas, and striving to strengthen its authority exclusively by performing concrete deeds and serving the interests of the people.

The Communist Party of Georgia will strive to cooperate actively with state structures at all levels and, in conjunction with them, to consistently show concern for solving the most important problems, which are:

- restoration of Georgia's full state independence through the development and operation of the corresponding constitutional mechanism;
- the provision of stable state guarantees of unwavering observance of Georgia's territorial integrity;

- the establishment of national political institutions, the introduction of Georgian citizenship, and the adoption of a law on parties;
- complete dismantling of the command-bureaucratic system and the creation of updated power structures at all levels;
- the creation of a system of independent economic relations.

The Communist Party of Georgia will participate actively in protecting the interests of the citizens of Georgia so that they can fully realize their rights and personal freedoms, taking into account international legal norms and principles, and in developing and implementing a program to provide social protection for the population during the period of the transition to a market economy. The Communist Party of Georgia will pay special attention to pensioners, disabled persons, people who live alone, and the elderly, and will consistently and concretely participate in ensuring that they have a guaranteed minimum standard of living.

The Communist Party of Georgia will actively support maximum freedom for subjects of the economy—individuals, businessmen, enterprises, and organizations—and the creation of stable legal guarantees of the recognition and inviolability of their rights as property owners, and will contribute to the creation of equal conditions for the development of all forms of property, the implementation of measures for the release of a considerable quantity of state property and its transfer to citizens.

The Communist Party of Georgia will participate in the implementation of radical economic reforms of all branches and the creation of a new branch structure of the national economy, the solution to agrarian problems, and the creation of peasant, family, and Western-style farms.

The Communist Party of Georgia will actively contribute to solving such problems as:

- the formation of a nationwide education program, the implementation of state programs for the study and research of the Georgian language and history;
- the creation of the necessary conditions for the development of science and a significant increase in the republic's scientific and technical potential;
- the promotion of increased cooperation with figures in literature and art and the deepening of historical traditions and national uniqueness;
- participation in the creation of highly professional regional centers of education, science, and culture;
- regular concern for the protection of monuments of material and spiritual culture and the return of ethnically significant material and spiritual property that is now located outside Georgia;
- the implementation of immediate measures for physical improvement of the republic's population and work for Georgia's full-fledged representation in international sports organizations;
- consistent concern for ensuring freedom of religion for all residents of Georgia.

The Communist Party of Georgia considers the following to be subjects for its constant concern:

- recognition and support by representatives of all peoples living in Georgia of the sovereign, constitutional rights of the republic and respect for the state language and Georgian culture, history, and traditions;
- respect for the language, culture, and traditions of representatives of all nationalities living in Georgia and participation in the creation of the appropriate conditions for satisfying their cultural needs;
- expansion of cultural and educational ties with compatriots living outside Georgia, and strengthening of cultural ties with other countries and peoples.

The current election campaign offers great opportunities for strengthening individual forms of accommodating various opinions, cooperation, and mutual understanding. Each of us has the chance to express a concrete attitude toward present and future problems, how we wish to achieve an independent state life for Georgia, and what kinds of relations we wish to have with one another and with other states.

The Communist Party of Georgia, striving during the course of the election campaign to contribute in all ways to the deepening of democratic processes and the consolidation of healthy national forces, is prepared for concrete, equal cooperation with all political parties and movements and the unification of efforts to solve all vitally important problems facing Georgia.

We express our confidence in the fact that citizens of the republic will rise above personal biases, party differences, and other motives and will make a correct choice on behalf of full state sovereignty, national accord, and the socioeconomic and political progress of Georgia.

[Signed] The Central Committee of the Independent Communist Party of Georgia

Georgian MVD Official on Passports, Travel Abroad

91US0471B Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
27 Mar 91 p 4

[Interview with Givi Indzhiya, chief of the Department of Visas, Registration, and Passport Work of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, by SAKINFORM correspondent Vladimir Yaralov: "Travel Abroad: Easier or Harder?"; place and date not given]

[Text] That sweet word freedom presupposes each person's right to travel throughout the world as he wishes. While we have been given this opportunity in principle, we are still not in a position to realize it unimpeded. The situation here changes almost daily, and therefore the people—in order to avoid excessive fuss and nervous strain—are constantly in need of fresh information. The

latest news was gladly shared by the chief of the Department of Visas, Registration, and Passport Work of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the Republic of Georgia, Givi Indzhiya.

[Yaralov] Mr. Givi, first I would like to know what you have managed to accomplish during the two months you have been in your present position.

[Indzhiya] I hope to delve fairly deeply into the essence of the existing problems and take the first steps to make it easier for my compatriots to travel abroad. As for legislative conditions, here too we expect to simplify procedures, particularly, to abolish the requirement for invitations which are mandatory now, but—after the Supreme Soviet adopts the law on exit and entry.

[Yaralov] When speaking about problems, do you have in mind temporary exits or departures for permanent residence abroad?

[Indzhiya] The total number of people who left Georgia for good last year reached 5,588—twice as many as the year before. We are fully capable of handling a flow of this intensity. It is more complicated with people who depart in response to invitations or for tourism. Unfortunately, many of them have troubles with their foreign passports. I must say that our request for 80,000 of these documents last year was more than fulfilled. About 230,000 passports were issued to residents of the republic. But there are still 120,000 people who wish to cross the border (not counting residents of Abkhazia and Adzharia) whom we have not been able to help. We have now ordered a quarter of a million passports. So far, Moscow is not able to fill our order. The reason: Goznak [Moscow Printing Plant for State Documents and Monetary, Postal, and other Emblems] does not have enough of the imported paper used in making passports. True, we have received encouraging information to the effect that they have found a way to use our own paper for this purpose. The new kind of passport will be sent to Georgia this spring.

[Yaralov] And until then...

[Indzhiya] ...We will have to be patient, since we have temporarily discontinued the issuance of passports to Turkey, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

[Yaralov] Why to those places?

[Indzhiya] The governments of the countries of the former socialist camp refused to admit our citizens with inserts in Soviet passports. So again we are struggling with a shortage of documents. We cannot provide them for people who intend to go to Turkey either because our reserve is minimal. Now compare: Almost 170,000 people applied to go there while there were only 13,000 going to the next most popular country—Greece. You will agree that it would be wrong to delay such a small number of people for the sake of those who want to go

"in the Turkish direction." Therefore we are issuing passports to all who wish to go to other countries.

[Yaralov] The Department of Visas, Registration, and Passport Work has probably analyzed the situation. According to your predictions, will the Turkish "boom" last long?

[Indzhiya] Probably not. Let me explain. Since last year we have been considering documents for travel to Turkey, Greece, Austria, and Singapore only if the applicants have invitations dated before 15 November. If they are later, they definitely must be verified in the corresponding USSR consular institutions abroad. Thus, in Turkey the cost of this service, taking into account state duties and transportation costs, is as high as \$40, and in the other countries it is considerably less.

[Yaralov] Your warning is confirmed by data reported by the command headquarters of the Transcaucasus Border District. They are disturbed about increasingly frequent attempts by republic citizens to cross the border with other people's or forged documents at the Sarpi crossing point. During the period from 14 December 1990 to 11 February of this year 51 people were arrested, including 41 with documents certified by forged seals of the Department of Visas, Registration, and Passport Work of the cities of Tbilisi and Batumi. Moreover, people are being arrested over a larger area: In January, for example, a citizen of the republic was detained at the Chop checkpoint when attempting to go into Hungary. District forces chief Major General Pleshko suggests that the Georgian Government coordinate and step up the actions of law enforcement organs to most rapidly curtail the activity of individuals engaged in forging documents.

[Indzhiya] Naturally, this is necessary. Incidentally, in one of the rayons of the capital they have already arrested people suspected of the crime you have in mind.

[Yaralov] And what about the realization of our long-standing dream of computerizing the process of documentation?

[Indzhiya] The computer is on line and we are entering all the information about people departing into the data base. For example, it is known that a person has the right to an unlimited number of trips over five years on one passport, even though foreign currency is only issued once a year. Some people are trying to acquire several passports. Armed only with pen and paper up to this point, we have not always been able to halt illegal attempts, but now we have our first results. In this connection, I recall that one must wait for his regular turn in order to have a lost passport replaced.

[Yaralov] But still a computer is a computer, but the authority of the service is determined by its workers.

[Indzhiya] In the first place, computer control extends equally to all the workers. Everyone works in his own area—Turkey, Greece, and so forth—and has a strictly accounted-for quantity of numbered passports, which is

controlled electronically. With this system there is no longer a possibility of abuse. Moreover, 90 percent of our collective are new people. I assume that we will be able to restore the confidence in us which was previously shaken.

Central Asia

Kazakh Laws Published

Law on Supreme Soviet Committees

91US0442A *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 7 Mar 91 pp 1, 2

[A law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic: "On Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text]

I. Basic Principles of the Organization and Activity of Committees and the Procedure for Forming Them

Article 1. In accordance with the Kazakh SSR Constitution, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall elect from among the Kazakh SSR people's deputies committees with the duty of facilitating its efficient activity as the highest organ of state power.

Article 2. Laws and other decisions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be adopted after preliminary discussion of their drafts by the appropriate committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

The procedure for preparing and adopting laws, as well as the participation in this process by the committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, shall be determined and specified by regulations of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 3. The principal tasks to be undertaken by the committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be as follows:

working on draft legislation, i.e., bills;

preliminary examination, consideration, and preparation of matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;

preparing conclusions on matters submitted for examination and consideration by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;

facilitating the implementation of Kazakh SSR laws and other decisions adopted by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet;

monitoring the execution by the Kazakh SSR ministries, state committees, and departments—as well as by enterprises, institutions, and organizations—of the Kazakh SSR Constitution, the Kazakh SSR laws, and other decisions adopted by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 4. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be formed at the first session of the newly elected Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet for the full term of its official powers.

The list and personnel staffs of committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be determined and specified by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

In case of necessity, new committees can be formed, whereas previously created ones can be eliminated or reorganized.

Article 5. The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall elect the committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, including the committee chairmen and members.

Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall elect the deputy chairmen and the committee secretaries. A Kazakh SSR people's deputy can be a member of one committee of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. Committee members shall enjoy equal rights.

Committees shall have the power to form subcommittees and sections with regard to the principal lines of activity engaged in by these organs.

Article 6. The following cannot be elected to committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet: the chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, his deputy, the prime minister of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, nor other Kazakh SSR people's deputies who occupy positions in organs whose activities are subject to monitoring by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 7. The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to re-elect committee chairmen.

Motions to renew committee staffs shall be discussed by the committees and then submitted by the chairmen for consideration to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 8. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be responsible to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and accountable to it.

Coordinating the activities of committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be performed by the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall adopt measures with regard to organizing well-coordinated and smoothly harmonized joint work by the committees; it shall assist in providing scientific support for their activities; and it shall render them legal, organizational, material-technical, and other assistance as necessary.

Article 9. The procedures for the activities of committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be specified by the Kazakh SSR Constitution, the present Law, and other legislative acts of the Kazakh SSR.

Article 10. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be free to choose the forms and methods of

their activities within the framework of legality; they shall cooperate with other state organs and public organizations; they shall study public opinion and take it into account.

Committee Jurisdiction, Rights, and Obligations

Article 11. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be entrusted with the following assignments:

1) preliminary examination and preparation of matters regarding the status and development of appropriate spheres of state, economic, social, and ethnic-cultural construction falling within the committees' jurisdiction, as well as working out proposals on such matters;

2) working out—at the behest of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium, or upon its own initiative—drafts of laws and other acts of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet on matters falling within the committees' jurisdiction, as well as preparing conclusions with regard to matters previously submitted to the committees for preliminary or additional consideration; preparing matters connected with improving legislation.

3) listening to information and reports from the leading officials of the appropriate ministries, state committees, and departments, republic-level and local state organs and organizations on matters falling within the jurisdiction of the appropriate committees;

4) preliminary examination and consideration of the appropriate sections and indicators of draft plans for the economic and social development of the Kazakh SSR, the State Budget of the Kazakh SSR, and reports concerning the fulfilment of plans and execution of the budget, as well as the most important republic-level programs for the economic and social development of the Kazakh SSR and the preliminary conclusions regarding them;

5) preliminary examination and consideration of candidates for the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers and other officials to be elected, appointed, or approved, i.e., confirmed, by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, and the preparation of conclusions, as well as discussion regarding their being relieved of the positions which they occupy.

Members of the committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be accorded well ahead of time the chance to familiarize themselves with biographical data on the nominees to, or contenders for, the positions in question. They shall also be provided with programs of their activities and materials on the state of affairs in the appropriate sectors of this republic's economy and socio-cultural life.

Article 12. Approval by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet of the most important, republic-level programs for economic and social development, the Kazakh SSR State Budget, introducing changes into it, as well as approving the composition of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers

and making changes therein, electing the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court along with oblast-level judges and those of the Alma-Ata Municipal Court, appointing the Kazakh SSR Procurator General and his deputies, the Kazakh SSR Chief State Arbiter, approving the Collegium of the Kazakh SSR Procuracy and Ukases promulgated by the President of the Kazakh SSR regarding the formation or elimination of Kazakh SSR ministries and state committees—all these actions shall be carried out only when conclusions drawn by the appropriate committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet are available.

Article 13. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to introduce motions or proposals regarding the unfitness for holding positions by persons elected, appointed, or approved by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 14. Upon a committee motion or a proposal, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet can—at any time—hear a report from the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers concerning its work as a whole or with regard to certain specific aspects of its activity.

Prior to its examination and consideration at a session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, such a report shall be submitted to committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet so that the latter may reach their own conclusions.

Article 15. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall introduce or submit for examination and consideration by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet reports and information regarding matters concerned with the Kazakh SSR's foreign-economic and foreign-political activities. Upon a committee motion, declarations, appeals, or statements of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be adopted concerning general or specific matters of foreign or domestic policy and international relations.

Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to introduce into the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or its Presidium proposals regarding the composition of official parliamentary delegations which are to be sent to foreign countries.

Article 16. Matters falling within the jurisdiction of several committees can—upon the initiative of the committees involved, upon the instructions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, or the recommendation of its Presidium—be prepared, examined, and considered jointly by such committees. Moreover, in order to coordinate the work, as well as to sum up the proposals and remarks, the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall specify or designate a pilot committee on the matter in question.

Article 17. If a committee deems that a matter submitted to it for consideration also falls within the jurisdiction of another committee, or if it recognizes the need to state its own opinion on a matter being considered by another

committee, it shall have the right to submit a motion regarding this to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or its Presidium.

With regard to matters being considered by it, a committee can inquire about and request the opinions of other committees.

Article 18. When examining and considering matters falling within its jurisdiction, committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall enjoy equal rights and bear equal obligations.

In case there is a divergence of viewpoints between committees regarding one and the same matter, they shall adopt measures to overcome their differences of opinion. If the committees do not succeed in reaching an agreement, they shall bring their opinions to the attention of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or its Presidium.

Article 19. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right of legislative initiative.

Article 20. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet can deliver reports or co-reports with regard to matters falling within their jurisdiction at sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or at sittings of its Presidium.

With respect to matters introduced by them into the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or on matters submitted to them for preliminary or additional consideration, the committees shall choose their own rapporteurs or co-rapporteurs.

With regard to matters prepared by committees jointly, the committees involved can deliver joint reports and co-reports, or they can present their own comments, suggestions, and conclusions separately.

Article 21. Draft laws of the Kazakh SSR and legislative proposals shall be submitted for consideration to committees—together with the justified needs for working them out—as developed for characteristic goals, tasks, and principal statutes of future laws, along with the anticipated socioeconomic consequences of their application. Moreover, the names of the collectives and individuals who have taken part in preparing the draft law shall be indicated. When submitting a draft whose implementation requires additional material and other expenditures, a financial-economic justification shall be attached to it.

Article 22. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet can introduce proposals or motions to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or its Presidium with regard to submitting draft laws of the Kazakh SSR and other extremely important issues of state life to a republic-wide discussion or a vote (referendum).

Suggestions and proposals received during the course of such a discussion from citizens, labor collectives, institutions, and organizations with regard to draft laws and

other issues shall be examined and summarized in the procedure specified by the existing legislation.

Article 23. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right, i.e., be entitled, at a session to address a request or a demand to the Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the President of the Kazakh SSR, the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, the leading officials of other organs to be formed or elected by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. They can also address a request or demand to the leading officials of associations, enterprises, organizations, and departments situated on the territory of the Kazakh SSR, insisting that they set forth their viewpoints on matters of great importance for the state, economic, social, and cultural development of our republic.

Article 24. With regard to matters falling within their jurisdiction, committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to demand from state and public organs, as well as from officials, that they submit documents, written conclusions, accounting data, and other materials.

Article 25. For submitting unreliable information to or intentionally concealing information from committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the leading officials of state and public organs—as well as other officials—shall be liable in accordance with the legislation of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR.

Article 26. With regard to matters falling within their jurisdiction, committees of the Kazakh SSR shall have the right to hear the Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, leading officials of the Kazakh SSR ministries, state committees, and departments, local state organs, as well as enterprises, institutions, and organizations situated on the territory of this republic.

Article 27. With regard to matters falling within their jurisdiction, committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to make proposals or motions to the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers.

Article 28. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to involve or recruit in their own work persons from ministries, state committees, as well as from public organs and organizations, scientific institutions, specialists and scholars.

Article 29. Upon the request of committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, materials and documents may be obtained by enterprises, organizations, or institutions, and their officials or staff members may become involved in the committees' activities; and this may be paid for either by the enterprises, organizations, and institutions concerned, or it may come out of the Kazakh SSR State Budget.

Article 30. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, in exercising monitoring controls over the implementation of USSR and Kazakh SSR laws, as well as on the activities of state and public organs, shall develop

proposals and adopt decrees within the limits of their own competence or jurisdiction.

Article 31. Decrees adopted by the committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be sent to the appropriate organs, organizations, enterprises, and institutions, and they shall be subject to mandatory observance. The committees shall be informed—within the deadlines set by them—about the results of the examination and the measures adopted.

Article 32. When isolating and identifying serious shortcomings in the work done by ministries, state committees, and other state organs with regard to carrying out the laws of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR, as well as other decisions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, committees shall have the right to pose questions to the appropriate organs concerning the responsibilities of the officials concerned. And this extends to the point of demanding that such officials be dismissed from their positions.

Article 33. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall carry out exchanges and other contacts with analogous organs of other Union republics' Supreme Soviets.

Article 34. Committee members of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be obligated to actively participate in the work of the committees, in organizing the implementation of their decisions, and in carrying out committee assignments.

A committee member shall enjoy the right of having a vote that counts on all matters being considered by the committee. He shall have the right to make motions and remarks regarding the agenda of a sitting, the procedure to be followed in considering a matter, and the substance of the issues under discussion. He shall also have the right to propose matters for consideration by the committee, participate in preparing and discussing them, as well as in adopting decisions regarding them.

A committee member whose proposals have not received the committee's support can introduce them in written or oral form when the matter involved is under discussion in the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

The chairman, deputy, or secretary of an appropriate committee shall have the right to assign tasks to a committee member.

Article 35. Committee members of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, when given a committee assignment or upon their own initiative, shall make an on-the-spot study of the matters falling within the committee's jurisdiction. They shall then summarize the suggestions received from the state and public organs and organizations, as well as from citizens, and communicate their own conclusions and proposals to the committee.

Article 36. Committee members of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet who have not been released from their

production or service duties can—during the time necessary to carry on their activities as deputies in a committee—be relieved from the need to perform their production or service duties, while retaining their average salary at their principal place of employment. And the reimbursement of the expenditures incurred in connection with their activities as deputies shall be paid from funds of the Kazakh SSR State Budget.

Article 37. Committee members of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet can be released from performing their production or service duties for their entire period of office on a committee.

When a committee member is released from performing his production or service duties, the expenditures connected with his activities as a deputy shall be reimbursed to him by means of funds from the Kazakh SSR State Budget.

Article 38. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall have the right to hear information reports from committee members concerning their committee work, participation in carrying out its decisions and assignments.

III. Procedure for Committee Work

Article 39. Committee sittings of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be convoked as necessary and can be held either during or between sessions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 40. Committee sittings of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be deemed legally empowered if they are attended by more than half the committee's members.

In case a committee member is unable to attend a sitting, he shall so inform the committee chairman.

Article 41. In committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet all questions shall be decided by a simple majority of votes from among the total committee membership.

When joint sittings of several committees are held, decrees are passed by a majority of votes from among the total membership of each committee.

Article 42. Sittings of committees of the Kazakh SSR can be participated in with the right of a deliberative, i.e., consultative, vote by people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR, even though they are not members of the committee involved. This also applies to USSR people's deputies.

Soviet staff members [apparatchiks] of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall participate in committee sittings with the right to exercise a deliberative vote.

Article 43. Representatives of state and public organs, organizations, and scientific institutions shall be invited to sittings of committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme

Soviet; they shall take part in such sittings with the right to exercise a deliberative vote.

Article 44. Committee sittings of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall be conducted in an open manner. In case of necessity a committee can decide to hold a closed session by voting to do so.

Article 45. In order to prepare the matters to be examined and considered by them, committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet can create or set up preparatory commissions and working groups from among Kazakh SSR people's deputies, as well as representatives from ministries, state committees, departments, other state and public organs and organizations, scientific institutions, specialists, and scholars.

In case of necessity, committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall create joint preparatory commissions and working groups.

Article 46. A committee chairman shall perform the following tasks:

- convoke committee sittings and organize the preparation of materials for such sittings;

- assign tasks to committee members and send them materials and documents connected with the committee's activities;

- call upon committee members to work in preparatory commissions and working groups, as well as to perform other committee assignments;

- monitor the performance of these assignments by the committee members;

- invite representatives of state and public organs, organizations, associations, and enterprises to participate in committee sittings;

- preside at committee sittings;

- sign committee decrees and conclusions;

- represent the committee in relations with state and public organs and organizations;

- organize work with regard to carrying out committee decrees;

- in case of necessity, inform the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet about matters examined and considered in the committee, as well as about measures adopted to implement committee decrees;

- organize the work of carrying out committee decrees and inform committee members about the progress being made in carrying out such decrees.

Joint committee sittings shall be held by representatives of these committees upon their reaching agreement among themselves.

Article 47. The powers of a committee deputy chairman, secretary, and free member shall be specified by the committee in question.

Article 48. Committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet shall carry out their activities based on the principles of glasnost; they shall generously inform the public about these activities. Committee sittings can be attended by invitation by members of the press, television, radio, and other mass media.

[Signed] N. NAZARBAYEV, President of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

Alma-Ata, 16 February 1991.

Law on Criminal Code Changes

91US0442B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Mar 91 p 2

[A Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic: "On Introducing Changes and Additions to the Kazakh SSR Criminal-Procedural Code"]

[Text] In accordance with the USSR laws dated 10 April 1990 and 12 June 1990, entitled: "On Introducing Changes and Additions to the Fundamentals of the Criminal Legal Procedure of the USSR and the Union Republics," as well as in order to improve the criminal-procedural legislation, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet hereby DECREES the following:

1. The Kazakh SSR Criminal-Procedural Code, as approved by the Kazakh SSR Law dated 22 July 1959 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA I PRAVITELSTVA KAZAKHSKOY SSR, 1971, No 22-23, p 178; 1962, No 46; 1965, No 37 and No 52; 1966, No 9 and No 43; VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA KAZAKHSKOY SSR, 1971, No 16 and No 31; 1972, No 51; 1973, No 11; 1974, No 17, 1975, No 9 and No 25; 1976, No 29; 1977, No 14; 1978, No 22; 1980, No 24; 1981, No 14, p 381; 1983, No 15, p 155; No 25, p 242; No 41, p 434; 1984, No 24, p 321; 1985, No 19, p 193; 1986, No 25, p 242; 1987, No 32, p 421; No 35, p 445; No 45, p 542; 1988, No 22, P 229; 1989, No 16, p 127, No 28, p 212) the following additions and changes shall be introduced:

1. Add the following contents to Article 30-2 of the Code:

"Article 30-2. The obligation of the organs of inquiry, the investigator, procurator, and court to take measures to ensure the safety of the participants in the trial and other persons

"When there is sufficient information available that the victim, a witness, or other persons participating in the trial, as well as members of their families or close relatives, have been threatened with homicide, the use of violent force, destruction or damage to property, or other illegal actions, the organ of inquiry, investigator, procurator, and court shall be obligated to adopt the

measures provided for by the legislation of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR for safeguarding the lives, health, honor, dignity, and property of these persons, as well as ascertaining the guilty parties involved and holding them liable.

"In case of necessity, the procurator and the investigator shall have the right to issue their own decrees, whereas the court can specifically mandate the internal affairs organ to adopt such measures as will ensure the safety of those persons indicated in Part 1 of the present article, as well as the preservation of their property."

2. Parts 2 and 4 of Article 9 shall be set forth as follows:

"In a court of the first instance, i.e., a lower court, criminal cases shall be tried collegially, employing a judge and two people's assessors or jurors. When cases are being tried involving crimes for which the law provides the death penalty or incarceration for more than 10 years, the number of people's assessors must be increased to four."

"Trying cases in a cassation, i.e., appeals, or a supervisory procedure shall be carried out by employing at least three judges."

3. Part 2 of Article 12 shall be set forth as follows:

"A closed trial shall be allowed, furthermore, if the court has ascertained that the cases involve crimes committed by persons under the age of 16 years, if the cases involve sex crimes, or other cases in order to prevent the divulging of information about the intimate aspects of the lives of those persons participating in the case, as well as in instances where this is required in the interests of ensuring the safety of the victim, a witness, or other persons participating in the case, as well as members of their families or close relatives."

4. Articles 13, 23, and 26 shall be set forth as follows:

"Article 13. Ensuring that a suspect, an indicted person, and a defendant have the right to a defense

"A suspect, an indicted person, and a defendant shall have the right to a defense.

"The person handling the inquiry or inquest, the investigator, the procurator, and the court are obligated to ensure that a suspect, person indicted, and a defendant shall have the chance to defend himself by the means and methods established by the law, as well as the safeguarding of their personal and property rights."

"Article 23. Participation of a counsel for the defense in a legal or court proceeding

"A counsel for the defense shall be allowed to take part in a case beginning from the moment when charges are brought, whereas in the event that a person has been arrested as a suspect in committing a crime, or if measures have been taken in the form of keeping him isolated and under guard prior to bringing charges—it

shall be from the time his arrest is announced or a decree has been issued concerning the above-mentioned isolation, but not later than 24 hours from the moment of the arrest. If it is impossible for the counsel for the defense chosen by the suspect or indicted person to show up during this time period, then the person conducting the inquiry, the investigator, or the procurator shall have the right to suggest to the suspect or indicted person invite another counsel for the defense. Or they should provide him with a counsel for the defense through the legal-advice office.

"Participation of a counsel for the defense during the inquiry procedure, the preliminary investigation, and during the court trial shall be mandatory in the following types of cases: those involving minors, i.e., juvenile cases, dumb, deaf, and other persons who—by virtue of their physical or psychological defects—are incapable of exercising their own rights to a defense, as well as persons who are not fluent in the language in which the legal proceeding is conducted. In these cases the counsel for the defense shall be allowed to participate in the case from the moment indicated in Part 1 of the present article.

"In cases where a person is charged with committing a crime for which the death penalty could be imposed, the participation of a counsel for the defense shall be mandatory beginning from the moment when the charges are brought.

"Participation of a counsel for the defense during a court trial shall be mandatory when cases are being tried with the participation of a procurator, as well as when there are conflicts of interest between the defendants, and if one of them has a counsel for the defense. If no counsel for the defense has been invited by the defendant himself, then the court is obligated to appoint a counsel for the defense for him.

"The following shall be permitted to serve as counsels for the defense: lawyers, representatives of trade unions or other public organizations, close relatives or legal representatives of the suspect, person under indictment, or defendant.

The chief of a legal-advice office or the presidium of a collegium of lawyers shall be obligated to select a lawyer to conduct the defense of a suspect, an indicted person, or a defendant. The chief of a legal-advice office or the presidium of a collegium of lawyer, as well as the organ of inquiry, preliminary investigation, procurator, or court which has jurisdiction over the case involved, following the procedure established by the legislation of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR, shall have the right to fully relieve the suspect, person indicted, or defendant fully or partially from the need to pay for legal assistance. In the event that such a relief is granted by the chief of a legal-advice office or the presidium of a collegium of lawyers, the remuneration for the work done by the counsel for the defense shall be handled by means of

funds from the collegium of lawyers, whereas in other cases—it shall be handled by state funds.

The expenses for remunerating lawyers, following the procedure to be specified by the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, shall also be handled by budgetary funds in cases where the lawyer has participated in the inquiry, the preliminary investigation, and in the court by way of appointment. In such a case reimbursement of the expenses to the state can be imposed on the person convicted."

"Article 26. Obligations and Rights of a Counsel for the Defense

A counsel for the defense is obligated to utilize all the means and methods of defense indicated in the law for the purpose of bringing to light those circumstances which would clear the suspect, indicted person, or defendant, mitigate their liability, and render them the necessary legal assistance.

"Beginning from the moment when he is allowed to participate in the case, a counsel for the defense shall have the following rights: to be present when the charges are brought, to participate in the interrogation of the suspect or the indicted person, as well as in certain investigative actions carried out with their participation, to become acquainted with the statement of the arrest, the decree or order regarding the use measure of isolation, and—at the end of the inquiry or preliminary investigation—with all the materials of the case, and to copy out of them the information which he needs; he may also participate in the court trial, present evidence, submit petitions, make objections or challenges, bring complaint against the actions and decisions of the person who handled the inquiry, the investigator, procurator, or the court. From the moment when he has been permitted to participate in the case a counsel for the defense shall also have the right, after the initial interrogation of the arrested person or the suspect or indicted person under guard, to meet with him one-on-one without any limitation on the number of such meetings or their duration.

"A counsel for the defense who is present during the investigative procedures shall have the right to put questions to the interrogator, to make written comments or notes a propos the inaccurate or less-than-full notes in the minutes, i.e., record, of the investigative process.

"A lawyer shall not have the right to refuse to defend a suspect, indicted person, or defendant after he has undertaken to do so."

5. Article 24 shall be excluded.

6. Part 1 of Article 115 after the words "inspection, search, and seizure," shall add the words "attachment or sequestration of property," whereas after the words "interrogation of the victims and the witnesses," the following words shall be added "and, in case of necessity, an expert opinion shall be solicited."

7. Paragraph 1 of Part 2, Article 116 shall be excluded. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be deemed to correspond to Paragraphs 1 and 2.

8. In paragraph 123:

—Part 2 shall be set forth in a new version consisting of two parts, and they shall be considered as Parts 2 and 3. It is presented below as follows:

“The time period for a preliminary investigation can be extended by a rayon- or city-level procurator, a military procurator for the army or navy, garrison unit, or a procurator equivalent to them, in the event that it is impossible to complete the investigation of a criminal case—up to three months. With regard to cases where the investigations present particular complexities this time period can be extended by an oblast-level procurator, a procurator for the city of Alma-Ata, a military procurator for a branch of the USSR Armed Forces, a district, a group of forces, a fleet, or a procurator equivalent to them—up to six months.

“A further extension of the time period for a preliminary investigation shall be allowed only in exceptional instances, taking into account the particular complexity of the case involved. And such an extension can be handled by the Procurator General of the Kazakh SSR, the Chief Military Procurator, the Procurator General of the USSR, or their deputies;”

—Parts 3 and 4 shall be deemed Parts 4 and 5 respectively.

11. The present Law shall go into effect from the moment of its publication.

[Signed] N. NAZARBAYEV, President of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

Alma-Ata, 16 February 1991.

Kazakh CP Central Committee Secretary Favors Rethinking Party Tactics

91US0467A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 91
Second Edition p 3

[Article by V. Anufriyev, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan: “The Communists in the Soviets: The Mandate and the Party Card”]

[Text] Alma-Ata—More and more frequently we have been observing heated squabbles in parliaments and soviets at all levels. An extremely clear example of this is the Congress of People’s Deputies of Russia that just ended. Now one can see with the naked eye, as they say, the coordination of some and the obvious helplessness of others. In a word, what has happened is what should have happened: The separation of various political forces has also generated the forms of parliamentary activity inherent in them. One could say that our lack of polemical training has been in evidence up to this point.

Among the deputies who speak I am always looking for those who represent the CPSU. How different they are! There are active ones but there are more who remain silent. One is struck by the fact that among the ardent opponents of the CPSU there are also deputies from the Communist Party. They do not let their thoughts be known: Why does this happen? It was with a heavy heart that I observed the chaotic, poorly thought-out work of the communist deputies at the first three USSR congresses of people’s deputies and the passivity of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee and its former secretaries Yakovlev, Medvedev, and Razumovskiy who, I recall, were also elected from the party. All this is sad and unacceptable. Therefore, at the CPSU Central Committee December (1990) Plenum I introduced proposals to consider the question of the work of the deputies representing the CPSU.

And today I would like to share a few ideas regarding this and the work experience we have, however limited it may be. It is my profound conviction that the altered sociopolitical situation and the growing polarization of political forces insistently demand restoration of Leninist principles of relations between the CPSU and the representative organs of state power.

Today nobody will deny that it is in parliamentary activity that the CPSU should manifest its role as the leading force of the society. Evaluating the results of the past elections to the local soviets and the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR, I can say that many of the republic party committees have undoubtedly acquired the skills necessary for real political struggle.

For the first time the Communist Party of Kazakhstan has gone to the elections with its own election platform. The fact that 94.5 percent of the Kazakh SSR people’s deputies are communists and 52.7 percent of those in the local soviets are can be regarded as support for this platform. Let me note the considerable increase in the proportion of communists in the republic’s deputy corps as compared to the last convocation. Having won the elections, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan now has the opportunity to speak on behalf of the majority of our voters.

Perhaps the main lesson that can (and should!) be drawn from the last election campaign is that the struggle for deputy mandates must be started long before election day, in the early stages of preparation for the elections. It is necessary to begin by searching for worthy candidates from among communists and nonparty members, revealing the informal leaders in the labor collectives and in the territory so we can tie our hopes to them.

The tactics for working in the places of residence are in need of serious revision. This is the more important since, with the adoption of the Law on Local Self-Government and Local Soviets of People’s Deputies, the role of the territory as a self-governing unit is growing significantly. It is no secret that our candidates do not feel as confident in the territory as they do in the labor

collectives. There would appear to be several reasons for this. First, we are still seeing the effects of the underestimation of this work, the lack of experience, and the lack of the ability to organize our activity directly in the places where the citizens live. Second, we must not fail to take into account that the party structures themselves are still poorly oriented for this, and the breakdown of stereotypes and the office-based style is proceeding with difficulty.

It is important to accumulate a maximum of information about the voters, their ages, their professional and ethnic composition, and their political biases. Only with a complete picture of one electoral district or another is it possible to predict the outcome of the elections with any degree of precision. We are trying to use these approaches in our practice even now. Certain districts are already holding elections of new deputies to replace those who have retired. In our republic there is perhaps not a single nomination of a candidate or other measure related to elections that takes place without the participation of the party committees. This year there were elections of USSR people's deputies in two districts and of Kazakh SSR people's deputies in six districts where there were vacancies. They were won by candidates who were supported by the party committees.

We have already begun preparing for the future elections. We must not be late with this, the more so since we can see how the structures opposing the CPSU are fairly actively getting this work underway. Therefore, in the apparatus of our Central Committee we have formed a group whose duties include a study of the experience in electing deputies on a multiparty basis, the disclosure of potential allies and opponents, and the search for future candidate people's deputies.

But this is just one aspect of the party parliamentary activity. Practice convinces us that victory in the elections in and of itself still does not guarantee us the necessary influence over the activity of the representative organs of authority. In order for the work of the communist deputies to be effective, we must more boldly make use of such structures as party groups and factions of communists in the soviets of people's deputies.

Our first experience in creating such formations suggests that certain communists who have been elected to parliaments have a kind of prejudice against party groups. Where does this come from? The idea that the deputy is accountable only to his constituents. Of course, his direct duty is to carry out the demands and orders of the voters. There is no dispute here. But let us look at this problem somewhat more broadly. Does a communist deputy not have an obligation to the party that supported him in the elections? And the majority of voters voted for those communists who, relying on the election platform of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, advocated tasks to radically renew society. Therefore the party card is not an impediment but a boon for the mandate.

We cannot say that the awareness of this essentially simple truth came immediately or painlessly. Quite the contrary. At first there was the opinion that it was inexpedient to unite the communist deputies into party groups since such formations would lead to splitting up the soviets and would impede their constructive activity. Possibly a weakening was also caused by the fact that communists comprised the majority in the organs of state power. But the first few months of work of the renewed soviets showed that the impasses that sometimes arose in their activity required coordination of the positions of the communist deputies. Now party groups are operating in the majority of soviets of the republic.

By a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, model provisions on the party group in the soviet of people's deputies were approved. Commissions for organizational and party work of the Severo-Kazakhstan, Chimkent, and a number of other party obkoms [oblast committees] are helping party groups actively and in all ways. Apparently it is necessary to note that the principle of voluntary participation is observed in their formation, and they operate within the framework of the Kazakh SSR Constitution. There was much that was constructive during the recent consideration in the Central Committee Politburo of the question "On the Work of Party Committees of Vostochno-Kazakhstan Oblast With Party Groups of the Corresponding Local Soviets." The interaction between the Central Committee and the party group of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, to which 13 deputies have been elected, is becoming more concrete. The group's main goal is to develop a general position for the communist deputies regarding fundamental issues. Thus its members had to meet repeatedly when considering the draft law on local self-government and local soviets. As a result, they managed to resist attempts to work into the law many provisions that violate human rights to one degree or another. The party group is engaged in preliminary development of issues included on the agendas of the sessions, of the preparation of deputies for speeches and providing assistance to them in exercising their authority. And the Central Committee has taken responsibility for providing communist deputies with the necessary reference materials and consultative assistance. A group of experienced workers from a number of departments has been singled out for this. The party committees are trying within the limits of their competence to help communist deputies to carry out their orders as well. For today the deputy's authority in the electoral district depends largely on this.

The party group of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet includes 202 communist deputies out of 336. Why not all of them? There are several reasons for this. As concerns the republic Supreme Soviet, it is necessary to keep in mind that some of the deputies were elected from trade unions, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and other organizations, and they want to unite into their own groups. As they say, more power to them.

The party group intends to cooperate in all ways with these deputy formations, as well as, incidentally, with any "single" political allies.

In my view, we must be very specific about how we will relate to communists who do not consider themselves bound by party decisions. As for the deputies themselves, with the adoption of the CPSU Rules and the Rules of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, they have a real opportunity to decide with whom they will side, whom they will support, and under whose flag they will work. Political impartiality is a myth, a smoke screen, which we have seen from extremely eloquent examples. It does not do any good for party committees to remain silent about this or for party organizations not to properly assess those "neutrality games." Apparently there are not enough examples: Not a single deputy elected from the party at the Union level has reported on his activity. In this connection, in my view, it would be expedient to develop a document such as, say, a code for the communist deputy which would clearly outline his rights and responsibilities and the principles of his relations with party committees and the voters.

Party groups do not have enough solidarity; if you will, they do not have enough camaraderie or discipline. Sometimes an emotional speech by a popular leader can shake the conviction of the members. The party group does not always act as a unified block on disputed issues. But these are growing pains. With time, I am sure we will have both experience and an awareness of the need for firm factional discipline. World practice in parliamentary activity speaks in favor of this. But so far the formations of communist deputies do not go beyond making changes and suggestions regarding normative acts that have already been developed. And they should be speaking about exercising their rights of legislative initiative. To this end, the Central Committee has created a group of consultants on legislative initiatives. The first practical steps have also been taken. Thus for the spring session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet we are preparing draft laws on social organizations and the press.

In order to compensate more rapidly for our lack of experience in parliamentary activity, we must create a well arranged system for training to help both deputies and party workers. It would not hurt to examine foreign experience and take a look at the activity of factions in the prerevolutionary Russian parliament (Duma). The party's scholarly potential should be put to work in this important matter.

Based on the Alma-Ata Higher Party School we have already organized seminars for people's deputies of Kazakh SSR and the local soviets. We plan to have six classes with 120-130 students each. The deputies are glad to learn and see this as a benefit. This training should also be started in the stage of preparations for elections. We must train candidates in the art of oration and give them the ability to present arguments and prove their points, and at the same time they must present a good

appearance. We are even speaking about the image of the deputy with a party card in his pocket. They must learn about this as well.

V.I. Lenin in his work: "The Childhood Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism" emphasized: "...All party work goes through the soviets, which unite the working masses without distinguishing occupations." This thesis is timely today as well. In order to realize it, we must take full advantage of the possibilities of party groups in the representative organs of state power.

More Details on Tajikistan Earthquake

LD1904130891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1232 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Dushanbe, 19 April (TASS)—One person was killed and six seriously injured as a result of the earthquake that occurred on Thursday over a wide area of Tajikistan (a Soviet republic in Central Asia). At the epicenter, which hit agricultural areas in the republic, the strength of the subterranean force reached seven points [no scale specified as received].

According to preliminary information, 500 peasant houses and several cultural and social facilities were destroyed. Electric power lines and irrigation channels were damaged. The underground tremor sparked off avalanches that brought down nearly 200,000 cubic meters of clay and stone on to orchards and market gardens.

The extent of the damage is being assessed. Work has started on eliminating the aftermath of the disaster, and help has been provided to families who lost their homes.

Law on Tajik Territorial, Administrative System

91US0421A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 12 Mar 91 p 3

[Text of law, signed by K. Makhkamov, President, Tajik SSR, 23 Feb 91, Dushanbe: "Law of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic: On the System To Resolve Problems of the Administrative-Territorial Organization of the Tajik SSR"]

[Text] Administrative-territorial units and populated areas of the Tajik SSR are: Oblast, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, district, city, municipal district, village [kishlak] council, municipality, settlement, and village.

Populated areas of Tajik SSR are subdivided into municipal and rural populations.

Municipal populations include cities and municipalities, and rural populations include settlements and villages regardless of their administrative subordination.

Cities may be subordinate to the republic, oblast, or district.

I. Formation and abolishment of oblasts, districts, municipal districts, and kishlak councils, and the changing of their boundaries.

Article 1. Formation and abolishment of oblasts is carried out by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in accordance with a representation made by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR. When an oblast is formed, its borders, district divisions, and administrative center are established.

Article 2. Changes in the boundaries of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and other oblasts, and the transfer of their administrative centers are carried out by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in accordance with a representation made by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR on the basis of a petition from the appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies.

Article 3. Formation and abolishment of districts and municipal districts are carried out by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in accordance with a representation made by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR on the basis of a petition from the appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies. When a district is formed, its boundaries and administrative center are established, and in the case of a municipal district, its boundaries are established.

Article 4. Changes in district boundaries and transfers of their administrative centers are carried out by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in accordance with a representation made by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR on the basis of a petition from the appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies.

Article 5. Changes in municipal district boundaries are carried out by the municipal Soviet of People's Deputies on the basis of a petition from the appropriate district Soviets of People's Deputies, with prior notification to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

Article 6. Formation and abolishment of kishlak [village] councils are carried out on the basis of a petition from the appropriate district or municipal Soviet of People's Deputies: In districts having a republic subordination—by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in accordance with a representation made by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR; in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and in other oblasts—by the Soviet of People's Deputies of the autonomous oblast or the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, with prior notification to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

When a kishlak council is formed, its boundaries and administrative center are established.

Article 7. Changes in the boundaries of kishlak councils or transfers of their administrative centers are carried out on the basis of a petition from the executive committee of the appropriate district or municipal Soviet of People's Deputies: In districts having a

republic subordination—by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR; in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and other oblasts—by the executive committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the autonomous oblast or by the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, with prior notification to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

II. Categorizing populated areas as cities and municipalities.

Article 8. Categorizing populated areas as cities being subordinate to the republic, oblast, or district, as well as changing subordination of cities, is carried out by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in accordance with a representation made by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR on the basis of a petition from appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies.

Article 9. The category of cities subordinate to the republic may include those cities which are rather large economic, cultural, and administrative centers and have a population of no less than 200,000 people.

Cities subordinate to the republic may also include those cities with less than 200,000 inhabitants, but which have administrative, industrial, and socio-cultural significance, and whose administration is logically vested directly in republican organizations.

Article 10. The category of cities subordinate to oblasts may include cities with a population of no less than 30,000 people and which are large economic, cultural, and administrative centers.

In individual cases, cities subordinate to oblasts may include those cities with under 30,000 inhabitants, as well as municipalities, if these cities and municipalities have important administrative, industrial, and socio-cultural significance, and prospects for economic development and growth in population in the near future.

Article 11. The category of cities subordinate to districts may include those populated areas which have industrial enterprises, construction and transportation organizations, a municipal economy, a state housing fund, a network of sociocultural institutions, and enterprises for trade and consumer needs, and a population of no less than 10,000 people.

In individual cases, if the conditions listed above are met, cities subordinate to districts may include those populated areas with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants provided that they have prospects for economic development and growth in population in the near future.

Article 12. Categorizing populated areas as municipalities is carried out on the basis of a petition from the appropriate district or municipal Soviet of People's Deputies: In districts subordinate to the republic—by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in accordance with a representation made by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR; in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and other oblasts—by the Soviet of

People's Deputies of the autonomous oblast or by the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, with prior notification to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

In categorizing populated areas as cities or municipalities, their municipal or settlement boundaries are delineated accordingly.

Article 13. The category of municipalities may include populated areas located around industrial enterprises, construction sites, railway stations, hydro-electrical facilities, sanatoriums and other permanent medical and health institutions which have a population of no less than 2,000 inhabitants. In categorizing a populated area as a municipality, the following must be considered: Its administrative significance, degree of services and utilities, existence of a state housing fund, and networks for municipal economic facilities, trade enterprises, and institutions for public health, education, and culture.

Article 14. Changes in the boundaries of a city subordinate to the republic, oblast, or district are carried out by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in accordance with a representation made by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR on the basis of a petition from appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies.

Article 15. Changes in the boundaries of a municipality are carried out on the basis of a petition from the executive committee of the appropriate district or municipal council: For districts subordinate to the republic—by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR; in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and other oblasts—by the executive committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies, with prior notification to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

Article 16. The territory of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast may not be changed without the consent of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast.

Questions on changing the boundaries of oblasts, districts, and kishlak councils and on transferring their administrative centers, as well as changing the boundaries of a city or municipality, are preliminarily decided in sessions of the appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies.

Disputes and disagreements among kishlak councils, districts, and cities subordinate to oblasts regarding the above questions are examined by higher Soviets of People's Deputies; and disputes and disagreements among districts and cities subordinate to the republic, as well as oblasts are examined by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

III. Naming and renaming administrative-territorial units, populated areas and their components, as well as enterprises, organizations, and institutions.

Article 17. The naming and renaming of administrative-territorial units and populated areas is carried out

with consideration of overall state interests, geographical, historical, national, natural and other local conditions, as well as the opinion of the populace.

Article 18. In naming or renaming oblasts, districts, cities, municipal districts, municipalities, kishlak councils, villages, and kishlaks, it is not permitted to use a name that already exists in the republic.

Article 19. The renaming of administrative-territorial units and populated areas takes place only in exceptional cases.

All financial and material expenditures connected with renaming are borne by the budget of the local Soviet of People's Deputies on whose territory the given administrative-territorial unit and populated area is located.

Article 20. The renaming of populated areas which have postal and telegraph facilities, and railway stations, is carried out by giving prior notification, as required, to the USSR Ministry of Communications and the USSR Ministry of Railways.

Article 21 It is not permitted to use personal names for naming administrative-territorial units or populated areas.

Article 22 The naming of oblasts, districts, municipal districts, and kishlak councils takes place when they are formed, with consideration of the opinion of the inhabitants. The naming of cities and municipalities takes place when populated areas are categorized as cities or municipalities. The naming of settlements and kishlaks takes place when they are registered as such.

Article 23 The renaming of oblasts, districts, cities, and municipal districts is carried out by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR; the renaming of municipalities, kishlak councils, settlements, and kishlaks is carried out by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR on the basis of a petition from the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, district or municipal Soviets of People's Deputies, or cities subordinate to the republic, with consideration of the opinion of the inhabitants of the given administrative-territorial unit.

Article 24 The naming and renaming of city blocks, avenues, lanes, squares, parks, bridges, and other parts of populated areas takes place in accordance with procedures of municipal, settlement, or kishlak Soviets of People's Deputies.

Article 25 The naming and renaming of state enterprises, railway stations, airports, institutions, organizations, and other facilities subordinate to the Union, as well as physical-geographical features, take place in accordance with established procedures.

Article 26 The naming and renaming of state enterprises, institutions, organizations, and educational institutions subordinate to the republic or local authorities, and kolkhozes, cooperatives, and other facilities takes

place in accordance with procedures established by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tajik SSR.

Article 27 The naming of administrative-territorial units in the Tajik SSR is in the language of the state, with an authentic translation into other languages.

IV. Statistical accounting and registration of populated areas.

Article 28 Populated areas that have a defined territory and a permanent population are subject to statistical accounting and registration.

Temporary settlements with a non-permanent population (foresters' houses, field camps, meteorological stations, houses in road maintenancesectors, shepherds' huts in distant pastures, etc.), as well as small populated areas are not subject to registration and statistical accounting. Such settlements do not comprise independent populated areas and are statistically accounted for by the nearest large settlements with which they have economic, administrative, or territorial ties.

Article 29 Statistical accounting for existing populated areas and registration of those that have once again come into existence is carried out by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR on the basis of a petition from the executive committee of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, district or municipal Soviet of People's Deputies, and cities subordinate to the republic administration.

Statistical accounting for populated areas within the districts and oblasts of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast takes place in accordance with procedures of the executive committees of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, and oblast, district, and municipal (those which have an administratively subordinate rural district) Soviets of People's Deputies.

Petitions for registration of populated areas must indicate: Location of the populated area and distances to the centers of the kishlak council, district, municipality, city, and nearest railway station; circumstances of its origin; by whom and when was the area delineated for the settlement and construction plans approved; population total; and proposed name for the settlement and justification for this name.

Article 30. Populated areas which inhabitants have left or from which they have moved elsewhere are subject to being excluded from statistical data. Statistical data will also exclude those populated areas which have been included within the limits of a city or municipality, or have been combined with other populated areas.

Exclusion of populated areas from statistical data takes place in accordance with procedures established for registration of these areas.

Article 31. In order to resolve issues pertaining to the administrative-territorial organization, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR is provided with documents and reference material in accordance with the attached enumeration.

Minister on Shortcomings in Tajik Press, Post, Communications

91US0465A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST

TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 6 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by I. Usmanov, Tajik SSR minister of communications: "Communications: A Lag Instead of Leadership"]

[Text] A lot has been written in the press about shortcomings in the work of communications personnel. The ministry also receives a stream of petitions, complaints, and proposals directly from our clients. Therefore, we have complete information; we are profoundly grateful to all who facilitate improvements in the operation of communications facilities by informing us about the shortcomings. This is why it is necessary for us to discuss the main problems of development in our sector as well.

A foundation for ensuring the further growth and automation of communications facilities has been laid in the republic mainly in the last two decades. Long-distance cable lines to the oblast and rayon centers of the republic have been put in which make it possible to organize adequate bundles of high-quality telephone channels. They are complemented by radio relay lines in many directions which increase the reliability of communications. For several years, multichannel satellite links with Moscow and Khorog have operated successfully. The commissioning of a large modern exchange in the capital city has offered extensive opportunities for automating long-distance telephone communications in the republic. The republic data and computer center which makes it possible to automate settlements with the customers of all telephone networks connected to this exchange was commissioned almost simultaneously with the exchange. Between 22 and 23 million long-distance phone calls are made every year.

Technical facilities created in the sphere of telegraph communications fully meet the needs of the populace and the national economy. The development of telex communications connected to the international network has begun. This will make business contacts with foreign partners considerably easier. The reception of newspaper pages transmitted by phototelegraph through a communications satellite has been organized.

Urban and rural telephone communications have developed. In the 12th Five-Year Plan alone, automatic telephone exchanges with a total capacity of 86,300 numbers were commissioned, and the number of phones increased by 75,600. Work on building, expanding, and refurbishing intrafarm telephone networks was performed on 60 kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhoses

[state farms]. At present, 90 percent of the kolkhozes and 60 percent of the sovkhozes of the republic have them.

Means of radio communications, radio broadcasting, and especially television broadcasting were developed further. Virtually the entire territory of the republic receives radio broadcasts; 97 percent of the populace receive channel one of Central TV, and 87 percent of the inhabitants of the republic receive the republic TV channel. It is possible to receive three to four TV channels in Dushanbe and the adjacent areas, Khudzhand, Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab, Nurek, Yavan, Kanibadam, Isfar, Tursunzade, Pendzhikent, Shurab, and in the rayon center Khovaling.

Satellite television is developing in our mountainous republic at a faster rate. Within a relatively short period of time, two receiving and transmitting Orbita stations were built; more than 250 receiving stations of the Ekran and Moskva types were installed which make it possible for the residents of mountain areas to receive channels one and two of Central Television. The programs of Union radio broadcasting are also relayed to us by satellite.

Perhaps, postal communications are the most popular: More than 1.5 billion pieces of mail and periodicals are processed annually, as well as retirement benefits for hundreds of thousands of retirees and benefits for mothers of many children. As of now, about 800 postal enterprises and offices operate in the republic.

As you can see, it appears that a lot has been done and is being done. However, there are as many problems, shortcomings, and unresolved issues in the industry as before. The commissioning of automatic telephone exchanges has been hampered by a shortage of production premises in a number of cities and rayon centers of the republic—Kurgan-Tyube, Dzhalikul, Pyandzh, Kuybyshevskiy, Vakhsh, Moskovskiy, Khovaling, Ganchi, Gissar, Komsomolabad, and others. The construction of production communications centers ("shells") by the contractor organizations of the Ministry of Construction and the Tadzhikstroy Concern has proceeded extremely slowly: Standard terms of one to one and a half years are extended to four or five years.

The issue of a telephone shortage is, perhaps, the most acute and burning issue. Unfortunately, there are long waiting lists for telephone installation almost everywhere, both in the cities and in the rural areas. The people wait for years, and on occasion for 10 to 15 years. According to data as of the beginning of this year, the number of unfulfilled requests to have a phone installed exceeds 100,000, out of which about 2,500 are from the veterans and disabled veterans of World War II.

The buildings of automatic telephone exchanges are built by executive committees in all republic and oblast centers of the country; only in our republic are communications workers saddled with their construction, apparently in keeping with the principle "It is up to a drowning man to rescue himself." If it were not bad

enough that we are forced to spend our meager funds to erect buildings instead of outfitting automatic telephone exchanges, the buildings are erected as poorly as can be.

The failure of the executive committees and other developers to put in telephone lines and work on other means of communication in a timely manner has virtually become the norm in the republic. As a rule, work on communications facilities is left to be done last when large facilities and housing developments are built.

The lag is particularly great in rural areas. On the average, one family in two has a phone at home in urban areas, whereas in rural areas one in 12 families does. More than 1,540 localities do not have phone lines (150,000 throughout the country); 1,722 have no radios (cable broadcasting). To this day, 136 sovkhozes of the republic do not have intrafarm telephone networks.

At present, the situation is being exacerbated further by an all-encompassing shortage of equipment and material resources (round timber, telephone cables, wires, and so on), and a many-fold increase of their prices. Hundreds of millions of rubles are required in order to perform all types of work. Meanwhile, rural telephone communications have always been unprofitable for the industry because the cost of construction and the self-cost of maintenance of the network exceed installation fees and telephone fees considerably. This gap has now increased many-fold, and the problem of the accelerated development of telephone networks became a utopia, given the existing investment environment and material-technical supply.

Is there a way out?

First, it appears to us that it is necessary to resolve the issue of financing either by increasing fees for communication services until a necessary profit margin is attained, or by revising the relationship between the industry and the budget.

The accelerated commissioning of a shop producing multicore telephone cables at the Tadzhiklabel Plant in cooperation with the Dushanbe City Executive Committee and the Ministry of Agriculture of the republic would help the development and improvement of the operation of telephone communications greatly. The Ministry of Communications has already transferred 0.5 million rubles [R] to the plant as its contribution to this end.

For a long time, numerous proposals by Western companies to deliver communications and TV equipment to the republic through barter trade have not been accepted. As early as October 1990, the Ministry of Communications opened a current foreign-currency account at the Operations Administration of the Industrial Construction Bank in the city of Dushanbe (000070405, MFO 711548) in order to accumulate the funds of interested regions, enterprises, and farms of the republic with a view to competently selecting and acquiring the communications equipment they need.

Alas, only R5,000 has been contributed since. Is it really more prestigious to have imported VCR's and cars than it is to have civilized communications? Or have we achieved a level of welfare at which overseas VCR's and cars have become necessities for us?! I am profoundly convinced that this is due solely to the failure to appreciate the role and significance of the means of communication under modern conditions. Incidentally, Western partners are increasingly voicing dissatisfaction with their poor development and the consequent inability to establish regular cooperation.

Studies of the national-economic effectiveness of communications done by economists in our country indicate that one ruble in capital investment in the development of electric [as published] communications ensures R3.1 in annual cost savings (or incremental profits) in material production, or an increment of the national income amounting to R1.9. It was calculated that the loss of national income in our country due to the insufficient development of the means of electric [as published] communications amounts to about five percent. This translates into billions of rubles. It is no accident that in most countries of the world the rate of development of electric [as published] communications networks is 30 to 40 percent higher than that of the leading sectors of the economy.

At present, it is impossible to imagine the cultural life of our society in the absence of television. We are drawing closer to the complete availability of the Central Television channel in the republic by using satellite technology (97 percent). However, more than 12 percent of the population of mountain villages, which means about 700 villages, do not receive the republic program. By the end of this year, the Tashkent TV channel will remain unavailable to about one-third of the Uzbek population of the republic.

The construction of the radio relay lines Kurgan-Tyube-Kabodien-Ayvadzh (under construction since 1983) and Leninabad-Ura-Tyube-Ayni at the expense of the republic budget will help to partially resolve these issues. However, it is impossible to completely solve this problem by traditional means. In view of this, we have succeeded in acting on only five out of 24 deputy enquiries having to do with the development of television. It is possible to resolve this issue comprehensively by leasing a trunk (channel) on a communication satellite. Still, the lease and the construction of a ground transmitter, as well as 100 receivers, will call for capital investments which are tremendous by our standards. It has become necessary to build a new TV station with a tall tower in Dushanbe, for which no less than another R18 to R20 million will be needed. Where are we to get these funds? It is clear that we will not solve these problems without financing from the budget.

Incidentally, until now we have not been a debtor of the budget. Despite our poor material and technical facilities and a great deal of unsolved social and other problems,

the industry made a "feasible" contribution to replenishing the budget. For example, in the 12th Five-Year Plan alone, the ministry contributed more than R130 million to the budget, including R57 million from profits, while taking from the budget only R20 million. In all of this, we should remember what kopeks our millions consist of, and what effort is required to earn them.

Finally, let us touch on the issues of postal services. Justified complaints and grievances concerning the operation of this subindustry are particularly numerous.

Without absolving postal workers of guilt, we will nonetheless find that the condition of the service is, without exaggeration, calamitous if we take an in-depth look at the issues of postal communications.

In 1990, the press runs of republic and central newspapers alone totaling 68 million copies (2.5 times more than in the previous year) were published 645 times with delays ranging from half an hour to several hours. Meanwhile, the work of all types of transportation carrying periodicals is calculated to the minute, and they cannot wait. This is to say nothing about magazines. Delays in their case are measured in months. Thus, the magazine PAMIR beginning with the issue for August of last year still has not been printed; SADOI SHARK has not been printed since October, RODNIK and CHASHMA—since December.

The issue of organizing the decentralized printing of central and republic newspapers in Khorog and Khudzhand has been on the agenda for many years now, and it has not been resolved yet. This is the only way to ensure the timely delivery of newspapers to readers in the high mountain areas of Pamir.

Postal administrations do not distribute newspapers virtually anywhere in civilized words; instead, they engage in purely postal operations. It is no accident that mailmen used to be called letter carriers. We have now burdened them with the press to such a degree that at times they forget what their main mission is. Judge for yourselves: The labor intensiveness of processing the press accounts for 80 percent, and in profits for less than 11 percent, new prices for postal services in the distribution of periodicals notwithstanding. There was much ado about them (about nothing!) because the share of communications is calculated based on the old nominal prices of newspapers.

Let us look at what the growth of prices for periodicals has given us. The mailing of one four-page, regular-format newspaper costs 0.51 kopeks, its delivery 1.16 kopeks, and its forwarding 0.09 kopeks; in total, 1.76 kopeks, or 17.6 percent of the current nominal price of a newspaper (10 kopeks). As a result, the additional profits of the postal service due to higher prices for periodicals will amount to no more than R2 to R2.5 million. At the same time, the expenditures of the postal service for transportation by air and by rail alone will increase by

R1.8 million. Expenditures for motor-vehicle transportation will also increase, plus the higher cost of materials, electricity, and so on.

The issue of providing motor vehicles for the postal service has not been resolved for many years. Almost one-half of the vehicles are extremely wornout. We should add to this an acute shortage of spare parts and equipment for motor vehicle repairs, and a gasoline shortage.

More than 75 post offices are located in substandard buildings. The operation of the postal service is hampered by what appears to be trifles—lack of order in the naming of localities and streets, numbers of houses, the absence of customer mailboxes in the rural areas, and so on, and so forth.

Let us also look at the most acute issue of wages. It has been on the agenda at the Union level for years, but

communications workers still remain a low-paid category. We should add to this that the employees of the industry do not have any preferences at all. It would be unfair to count on enthusiasm alone, especially given the current rate of inflation.

These are the problems of the communications workers.

We cannot say that they have never been raised with the governments of the Union and the republic. Resolutions have been adopted. Unfortunately, the good measures planned merely remained good wishes.

It appears that people's deputies at all levels may help to develop communications if they want to.

In a word, until we actually grasp that communications are no luxury but rather an economic necessity, and even a necessity of life, it is hard to expect progress in the development of the industry.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Latvians

91UN1308A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 2, Jan 91
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] The native name **Latieshi** comes from the name of the ancient Latvian people, the **Latgals**. In the Russian chronicles they are referred to as the **Letgols**.

According to the 1989 census, 1,458,986 Latvians live in the Soviet Union.

The Latvian language falls within the Baltic group of the Indo-European language family. Structurally it is close to the Lithuanian language. The linguistic relationship between the Baltic and Slav languages is relatively close, which provides justification for concluding that they had a common origin. In colloquial speech, the Central Latvian, High Latvian, and Latgalian dialects are distinguished. On the basis of the first of these, a Latvian literary language was formed in the mid-19th century based on the Latvian script.

The basis of the ethnogenesis of the Latvians was the Baltic tribes that settled on the territory of what is now Latvia in the third and second millennia B.C. Early in the first millennium B.C. the Latvians consisted of the **Latgalian**, tribes settled north of the Daugava River; the **Sels**, based on the left bank of the middle reaches of the Daugava River; the **Zemgals**, who chose the territory in the basin of the Lielupe River; and the **Krushey**, who preferred the littoral of the Baltic Sea. Moving gradually to the north, these tribes opened up new land, supplanting and partially assimilating the aboriginal Baltic-Finnish population living there (for example, the **Livs**).

The early trend toward ethnic consolidation that had started at the turn of the first and second millennia A.D. among these tribes, including the process of forming a single Latvian people, was blocked in the late 12th century and early 13th by the Livonian Order, which invaded the region, spreading destruction. Despite the desperate combined resistance against the invasion offered by the ancient Latvian and Estonian tribes, and the help given them by the ancient Russians (the successful battle on the ice of Lake Chudskiy in 1242), the German colonizers succeeded in consolidating their positions up to the time of the "Livonian war" of Ivan the Terrible in the second half of the 16th century, and later, right up until the Peace of Nystad in 1721.

During the 16th and 17th centuries the formation of a single Latvian people was slowed down by the division of the territory of Latvia between Rzeczpospolita and Sweden. After liberation from the crusaders and their ideology and the annexation of Latvia to Russia early in the 18th century, conditions emerged for the normal development of the Latvians and their knitting together into a single people with a single national self-awareness.

The formation of a single Latvian nation was completed by the mid-19th century.

The main traditional occupations of the Latvians—arable and livestock farming, and, along the littoral, fishing—were augmented with developed handicrafts—weaving, pottery making, working with timber, and blacksmithing.

The dominant type of settlement for the Latvian is the manor-type farmhouse (the "myza") and the farmsteads associated with it. During the years of the bourgeois republic, instead of the myza, which earlier had belonged to the German barons, highly profitable Latvian farms became widespread. The Latgals and the fishermen of the Baltic littoral preferred to live in villages.

The traditional peasant buildings, made primarily of wood and logs, are differentiated territorially and socially. Several types are distinguished. For example, in the southwestern part of Latvia, in Kurzeme, the residential home, which sometimes has similarities to Lithuanian dwellings, was built in the middle of the country estate, with a pigsty on one side and a cattle shed and stalls for cattle on the other. In Zemgali and Vidzeme the domestic buildings are set around a polygonal courtyard.

The Latvians have created a rich prose and song folklore. The well-known "Song Festivals" have been held regularly since 1873 and they play an important role in the development of an original national culture, the reproduction of ethnicity and supporting its stability, and passing on national values from generation to generation.

The overwhelming majority of Latvian believers are Protestants (Lutherans).

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Mansi

91UN1313A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 6, Feb 91
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Their native name is **Manz**, meaning "person." The old name of the Mansi is **Voguls**.

According to the 1989 census, 8,474 Mansi live in the USSR.

Together with the Khanty and Hungarian languages, the Mansi language belongs to the Ugric group of the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic family of languages. The overwhelming majority of Mansi live in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.

The Mansi are descendants of the indigenous population of Western Siberia. We can assume that in earlier times the Mansi were settled on a significantly broader scale in the west and south. To all appearances, the Mansi were

the first Ugric population with whom Russian explorer-pioneers came into contact at the beginning of our millennium.

Trade relations with the Yugra—as the Mansi were also called—were common by the 15th-16th centuries not only for residents of the Novgorod principality, but for other northern regions of Russia as well.

The forested “lands of the midnight north” rich in valuable fur-bearing animals long attracted hunters, trappers, and traders. The inhabitants of these regions were in great need of metals, metal wares, and later—bread. Trade relations between Mansi and Russians arose long before the official entry of various Mansi groups into the composition of the Russian state.

The Mansi developed a remarkable civilization of taiga hunters and fishermen. The main targets of “meat” hunting for the Mansi were wild deer, elk, forest game, and waterfowl. The Mansi knew a great many ways of catching hoofed animals. They set up hunting nooses along animal paths and cunningly devised trip-wire devices—strong bows which struck the animal when it disturbed a trip wire made of animal vein. They made snare pits and other types of traps.

The hunters always knew not only about the numbers of animals in their indigenous habitat, but their sex and age, habits and practices.

Hunting for the Mansi trapper was no less well-ordered a matter than the slaughter of domestic animals was for the cattle-breeder.

The Mansi raised a remarkable breed of hunting dog, formerly known as the Vogul husky. The somewhat slight, hardy, intelligent dog was the hunter's irreplaceable assistant, particularly when hunting fur-bearing animals. The husky found squirrels, sable, marten, Siberian polecat, ermine, fox, otter, and similar game. The dog would “hold” a squirrel until the arrival of its master, and stand guard over a sable taking cover in fallen trees.

Fishing played a most important role in the life of the Mansi. Mansi settlements were usually found along rivers abounding in fish and having many tributaries. Mansi families built water traps in these rivers—a fencing composed of stakes driven into the river bed which were then interlaced with branches. Openings would be left in these traps for the fish to pass through, after which they would be caught in creel networks. The Mansi strictly observed sacred rules in exploiting fish resources—they allowed the fish to spawn and never caught more than was necessary to feed one family. Under these conditions fish reserves never grew scanty, and the groups of Mansi we see today live in the same locations their ancestors did many hundreds of years ago.

The Mansi resided in small settlements which Russian tradesmen of the 17th century called “gorodoks [small towns].” These communities were headed by elders, usually referred to in tax documents as “minor princes.”

The Mansi were shamanists. Their hunting and other cult practices survive to our day, such as sanctuaries in the taiga where, according to legend, the “Golden Base” is hidden, the main idol of the Ob Ugrians.

**Supreme Soviet Decree Against Pornography,
Violence in Media**

*91UN1321A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 91
First Edition p 2*

["Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Urgent Measures To End the Propaganda of Pornography and a Cult of Violence and Cruelty"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet, while acknowledging the inalienable right of every person to free creativity and to meeting his cultural and spiritual needs, expresses its alarm concerning the dissemination of cinema, video, and printed works and other products that propagate pornography and a cult of violence and cruelty, and concerning the showing of episodes in a number of television broadcasts, plays, and shows at leisure centers that are an affront to human dignity and the ethnic and religious feelings of the peoples, and which promote the commission of violations of the law and of psychological disorders among children and young people, and resolves:

1. To instruct the USSR Cabinet of Ministers:

- to set up, within a month, a state panel of experts, the composition of which shall include highly skilled specialists, for evaluating plays, concert and show programs, TV programs, printed matter, cinema, audiovisual, and other products with an eye toward establishing the presence of the signs of pornography and a cult of violence and cruelty in them;
- to create a register of movies, videotapes, and video programs, charging it with classifying the works and issuing authorizations (certificates);
- to develop, within two months, and to adopt regulations on the public showing of movies and audiovisual works, providing for conditions for demonstration and distribution, imports and exports, and procedures for starting and registering video show establishments, receiving authorizations (certificates) for the distribution of the above products, age-based restrictions on access to video show establishments (organizations), and other issues;
- to set up in the organs of internal affairs a specialized service for preventing and ending violations of the law in the sphere of public morals;
- to take additional measures ensuring that an end be put to the transportation of products with pornographic content and works propagating a cult of violence and cruelty across the state border.

2. To establish that the sale, dissemination, or advertising of products with erotic content may be effected by enterprises, organizations, and citizens only in specially designated places determined by the executive organs of the local soviets of people's deputies.

3. To recommend that the supreme soviets of the republics:

- set up republic panels of experts and registers of movies, videotapes, and video programs;
- establish age-based restrictions which rule out the possibility of minors getting involved in the manufacturing, dissemination, advertising, and sale of products with erotic content;
- establish rules for the sale, dissemination, and advertising of materials with erotic content;
- establish statutory penalties for violating rules for the sale, dissemination, and advertising of materials with erotic content and regulations on the public demonstration of movies and audiovisual works.

4. To propose that the USSR Supreme Court study the practice of applying legislation providing penalties for manufacturing, disseminating, advertising, and selling pornographic objects, as well as objects propagating a cult of violence and cruelty, and provide pertinent explanations to the courts.

5. To instruct the Cabinet of Ministers to inform the USSR Supreme Soviet about the progress of implementing Point 1 of the present resolution before 1 November 1991.

6. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Culture and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation and Legal Order shall ensure the monitoring of compliance with the present resolution and shall report to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the progress of its implementation at the end of 1991.

A. Lukyanov, chairman,
USSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow, the Kremlin, 12 April 1991

**Latvian Government Blamed for Stalemate Over
Publishing House**

*91UN1236A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
1 Mar 91 p 2*

[Article by Economist Ye. Zaytseva, under the rubric: "Once More About the Publishing House": "The Government Stands To Gain From Silence"]

[Text] The January tragedy in Vilnius—the capital of Lithuania—and the tragicomedy on the squares and in the streets of Old Riga have almost completely overshadowed and relegated to the background the earlier January events in the capital of Latvia—the events in the Publishing House and the near paralysis of the republic press. But, despite this, the Publishing House problem continues to trouble republic journalists and printers, all of those whose interests it affects.

The republic did not receive republic and central newspapers for nearly a week and a half in January. Some are still not being published. Republic residents almost do

not have any information about radio and television programs. Other newspapers have little by little begun publishing. Rayon and small printing houses are printing them in a smaller circulation than planned and in a reduced, diminished version. Editorial staffs are not fulfilling their responsibilities to subscribers. Soon many newspaper and magazine editorial staffs may find themselves on the verge of economic collapse and all of them have been working on a cost-accounting basis since January 1 and their survival directly depends on printing issues regularly. The promised government assistance has not been felt so far. Editorial staffs are attempting to swim in the new economic conditions independently. Only time will tell if they will succeed.

Today something else is more important—to sort out what happened and why on the first working day of the new year at the CPSU Central Committee Latvian Publishing House. January 2 is only the tip of the iceberg and, in our opinion, it is a legitimate finale to the entire chain of events in preceding months. Therefore, let us just let the facts speak for themselves....

During the period from 1965 through 1967, a combined publishing house was created under the management of the Latvian CP Central Committee which consisted of both printers and also the editorial staffs of the majority of republic newspapers and magazines. Later, during 1969-1978, a new facility was built for this publishing house in accordance with a Communist Party order. A director, designated by the Latvian CP Central Committee, headed the Publishing House for all these years and right up until Autumn 1990. And whether we like it or not, the Publishing House both de-facto and de-jure belonged and continues to belong to the Communist Party of Latvia. That is the prologue of history.

Its first act was begun on March 4, 1990 when the newly elected parliament adopted a Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Latvian Republic. And later on May 30 the republic Supreme Soviet promulgated a resolution "On the Return of Illegally Seized Property—Newspaper and Magazine Publishing Houses—to the Latvian Republic." Among this resolution's political declarations and paragraphs, there is one specific resolution that is particularly important for our story: There it is written: "Under the procedures prescribed by law, accept into state property the publishing house named above in paragraph 1 of this resolution and provide its management." Let the reader excuse us for the clumsiness and aloofness of the official language but too there is too much of a verbal husk surrounding this story. Therefore, we have to repeatedly resort to the aid of only reliable facts that have been set forth in documents and speak the language of these documents.

The Latvian Council of Ministers had to file a suit with Gosarbitrazh [State Arbitration Commission] against the Communist Party to carry out this decision. Based on documents submitted by both sides, Gosarbitrazh would make the appropriate decision that was mandatory for

execution. This is how the procedures for resolving property disputes look in accordance with existing civil law and this is how any executive organ of power must act in a rule-of-law state. But, unfortunately, "free" Latvia is still not a rule-of-law state.

The Council of Ministers began from the other side. On June 10, 1990, it adopted Resolution No. 57 "On the Latvian Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House." It stated that "for the purpose of eliminating the monopoly situation in the periodical press, the Latvian Republic Council of Ministers considers it necessary to create 'Latvian Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House,' an independent extra-departmental joint-stock company." Well! The republic Council of Ministers decided to create its own publishing house in the form of a joint-stock company. And why not? This is certainly easier and more advantageous, economically and politically, than to gather documents, rummage through the archives, compare numbers, and perform calculations.

And in September 1990, while relying on this same Council of Ministers resolution and on the Publishing House director's agreement, the republic newspaper and magazine editorial staffs "found" economic independence. As a result, only the Publishing House's printers' collective, the administration, and equipment maintenance personnel remained part of the CPSU Central Committee Latvian Publishing House in question. For some reason, no one recalled this right up until December.

So, there were two essentially different decisions on the Publishing House's future before its "seizure": A May 30 parliament resolution on its seizure as republic state property and a July 10 government resolution on the need to create a new, alternative publishing house. None of this story's participants knows why they did not see this contradiction. The events unfolded according to their normal course. On September 28, the government adopted yet another resolution "On the creation of the 'Latvian Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House' Joint-stock Company." Its text is truly the government's "Solomon's" wisdom: "To create an extra-departmental enterprise—a joint-stock company based on the fixed and working capital that are at the disposal of the CPSU Central Committee Publishing House at the moment this resolution is adopted (!)." We can understand this Latvian government decision as a supplement to the proverb "A box elder in the garden, and a peasant in Kiev" [Translator's note: Meaning, there's no connection whatsoever between these two things]. What did the government want to say by this decision?

Just that it had made a decision on expropriation of CPSU Central Committee property. This action completely repeats the year 1917 in Russia when the sacred law of property was rejected for the first time and when our country made a first step away from a rule-of-law state. Consequently, if this is an expropriation, what is to be done with the law and mission of parliament so that the Council of Ministers abides by the requirements of

the law in relations with the CPSU Central Committee? Why has the Council of Ministers rejected its own decision that was adopted in July?

Here the very economic and juridical essence of the September Council of Ministers decision is incomprehensible. If the Publishing House is nevertheless nationalized, why has a decision not been made to create a state enterprise? The resolutions state that an "extra-departmental enterprise—a joint-stock company"—is being established. This is some sort of new political association of different, from the economic and legal point of view, management forms. And if extra-departmental enterprises had already operated at that time in Latvia's national economy based on normative acts adopted by that time, there were not yet any joint-stock companies. Furthermore, both of these economic forms totally exclude the possibility of them being state property which the draft resolution states. Both of these forms of the organization of production legally reinforce precisely non-state property in the republic.

Therefore, according to this Council of Ministers resolution, the CPSU Central Committee Publishing House was taken away and it was transferred to the property of one person—its interim executive director.

Later, events began to develop according to the snowball principle. The second party to this conflict—the Communist Party—which had been silent until now began to defend itself. At the October 3 Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau session, a decision was made to release K. Dundurs, CPSU Central Committee Latvian Publishing House director, as a result of his transfer to other duties (a government resolution assigned Kazimir Dundurs as Latvian Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House interim executive director). Having found himself holding two positions at the same time, K. Dundurs, a former Latvian CP Central Committee official, selected the new position that, in his opinion, certainly offered the greatest opportunities. According to the government's "Solomon" decision, he became not only the person in charge but also the actual owner of Latvian Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House.

Therefore, already on October 5, the former CPSU Central Committee Publishing House director, two days after being released, closed the publishing house's books and transferred the remaining 5.66 million rubles in monetary assets to the new account of the not yet founded publishing house whose executive director he became on September 28. Further, again taking advantage of the ignorance and juridical illiteracy of his former coworkers from the Publishing House collective, the new former director acquainted the printers and administrators with his October 1 order on their transfer to work in the new publishing house on October 9. This scenario was presented differently and much more simply for editorial staff workers located in the Publishing House who have already become legally independent and who observed all of this from the sidelines: "The Publishing

House was previously called the CPSU Central Committee Latvian Publishing House and it belonged to the Communist Party. Now the Publishing House is called the Latvian Newspaper and Magazine Publishing House and it belongs to Latvia, including you, its employees. K. Dundurs was the previous director and now the Publishing House director-owner will be—K. Dundurs. Therefore we need to work and establish a joint-stock company. And the CPSU Central Committee has agreed to all of this and we will issue some of the stock to it." But the real owner has asserted its own rights although the illegal stockholders have tried not to think about this.

Despite the appearance of OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment], in October-November 1990 a working group for the establishment of a joint-stock company regularly gathered here at its sessions. It is true that the absence of CPSU Central Committee or Latvian CP Central Committee representatives did not put anyone on guard at that time. The government representatives—V. Kudryavtsev, chief of the social sphere department, and I. Groskaufman, Ministry of Economics expert—were the main inspirations for this work. They defended the interests of their claimant for the property—the government. According to the variation that they adopted, 65 percent of the shares distributed must belong to it (given the government's inability to stimulate production, it needs the money too much) and they proposed giving the CPSU Central Committee 17.6 percent of the shares. Publishing House workers had to purchase the shares allocated to them with cash when other shareholders did not have to do this. In so doing, their money would not go into the joint-stock company's account but into the Council of Ministers budget. Not too bad, right?

The Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum confirmed A. Brublevskiy as the new CPSU Central Committee Latvian Publishing House director. But K. Dundurs did not want to give up his home of many years. The sale of Publishing House stock was hastily organized in December. Despite the unfinished state of the joint-stock company's documents, the absence of laws on joint-stock companies, and the republic parliament's ban on conducting property conversion, the joint-stock company was founded with the tinkling of congratulatory toasts.

The terrible hangover arrived after the New Year's holidays—the owner announced its rights in practice: Protection of the Publishing House was totally transferred into the hands of OMON and then to USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. As a result, there was a political strike of people instead of a dialogue between the property owners. Publishing House workers quit their jobs. What did we get as a result and who gained from this? Today newspaper and magazine editorial offices are cooped up in small offices that have been offered to them by various sympathetic organizations and they are attempting by themselves to resolve the mass of new problems for them. How do they make ends

meet under conditions of price increases and the ambiguities with the cost of paper and printing services?

There are government promises but they are only words for now. The maximum of all listed numbers of the future printing output is 300,000 copies of newspapers per day and the circulation of LATVIYAS YAUNATNE alone exceeds 100,000 copies. The printers have lost their guaranteed salaries and this is under conditions of price increases. Everyone has lost and everyone is suffering losses. Yes, even the CPSU Central Committee is bearing losses, Publishing House equipment is operating at just half capacity and the buildings themselves require continuous expenditures for operations. It is also unclear where the stockholders' money is. The output of all newspapers is under the constant threat of disruption. And in general it is impossible to understand when and where magazines will be published. Just who is the innovator?

I think that it is the Latvian Council of Ministers. Why? It is the Council of Ministers that did not resolve its relations with the CPSU Central Committee in the legally prescribed manner with regard to property rights at the Publishing House. It is the Council of Ministers that made two contradictory decisions on one and the same issue. It is the Council of Ministers that was the initiator and inspiration of the creation of the joint-stock company in the Publishing House which allowed it to involve its workers in the conflict. It is the Council of Ministers that loaded its own unresolved problems on their shoulders. But why did the Council of Ministers of the sovereign Latvian Republic need this?

When on January 2-3, 1991, having hoped for the government's assistance, the printing and editorial office workers left the Publishing House and total paralysis of the republic press set in for nearly a week and a half. An information shortage was formed for republic residents. But since January 3 the government has increased food prices by a factor of three to four and even five. At the same time, prices have increased for many other goods and for the cost of services. The government has not completely worked out the compensation mechanism. The threat of social tension in the republic was clear to the experts even back in December when they became acquainted with the draft of the new prices. Under these conditions, an independent republic press which is frequently called the fourth estate in democratic countries could have become the detonator of this social explosion of dissatisfaction with the government's policy. And as a result of the government's "Solomon" decrees, all of the information that republic residents received during the course of the first ten days of January and even today is only that information that is to the government's advantage. **Latvian TV and radio have transmitted good reports and subjects about residents who are satisfied with the numerous sharp price increases and about the allegedly full store shelves. This is understandable. Radio and television workers are maintained by the government that increased their salaries by 50 percent beforehand at the expense of outside budget social assistance fund assets,**

that is, at the expense of increasing prices for beer, wine, and tobacco products by a factor of two.

But the Publishing House's problems remain. We need a juridically competent solution of the property problem. There have been enough ultimatums and declarations, we need to sit at the negotiating table.

Chairman of Journalists Union Advocates Professional Rights, Ethics

*91UN1309B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 91
Union Edition p 3*

[Interview with Eduard Sagalayev, chairman of the Union of Journalists, by V. Arsenyev; place and date not given: "Journalists Need a Union"]

[Text] Eduard Sagalayev was elected to the post of chairman of the Union of Journalists on the most democratic basis. And by a majority of votes.

...These are hard times in the country... Our "foundations" are being destroyed. And the press and the entire host of journalists make up the basis of ideology, which has seemed for centuries to be the collective agitator, the propagandist, and the organizer—in a situation of disorder and instability.

And he came. And he had the courage.

[Sagalayev] The suggestion to run for the position of chairman was quite unexpected for me. A day before the elections a group of journalists I barely knew came up to me. They said: "We believe in you!" I stayed awake all night thinking. And then I decided.

[Arsenyev] Eduard Mikhaylovich, all the leaders of the Union of Writers who preceded you were appointed by an order. And they justified the confidence placed in them by the marshals of ideology fairly well. Did you have the confidence of the journalists? What did you decide to do?

[Sagalayev] I would like very much for us to have, first of all, a union for journalists. Journalists have too few rights in comparison to their immense number of responsibilities. The Law on the Press has now partially corrected the situation—at least with respect to creativity. But I myself began my work as a staff writer for the Samarkand Oblast newspaper LENINSKIY PUT and worked as the official secretary of the youth republic newspaper KOMSOMOLETZ UZBEKISTANA... Then, after I was already in Moscow, I worked in radio and television. I know about the problems first hand—both those related to housing and those related to wages and office equipment. The journalistic profession, in spite of the fact that it plays an immense role in the life of society, has always been known for its inferiority on the social plane and the plane of daily life. This should not be the case. I would like to change journalists' life for the better, to the best of my power and abilities.

This will not be easy. Even now I can see that it will even be very difficult...

[Arsenyev] We have known each other for a long time. Let me be frank. Quite recently, at the beginning of the year, when you began to create a new image for the educational program on Central Television, I was about to decide that you had left politics and gone into education. Now you are right in the middle of things again.

[Sagalayev] Yes, I had to make a decision to do that too. Before going to the educational program, as you will recall, I was in charge of the Head Editorial Office for Information of Central Television and the "Vremya" program. Even though I am a person capable of compromise, I got tired. Of the contradictions within me myself—human, political, professional—which had accumulated to excess. I hit a positive peak, as I defined it for myself—that was during the first wave of miners strikes in 1989. They tried to suppress us, the "Vremya" program. But we managed to tell the truth. But there was another peak, one with a minus sign, and it was very difficult. That was when, on the recommendation of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, last year they discontinued the Sunday program "Seven Days." And they were going for "Vremya" as well. I thought that "Vremya" should be an informative program. They disagreed with me: But how? The "Vremya" program does not convey a positive image of the country or perestroika.

That was when I left. You are right, I left politics. For the field, as they said in the olden days, of enlightenment, having decided at least to do something realistic and in keeping with my convictions. The more so since the condition of our education and enlightenment was tragic. But several months of work creating the new program "TV of the 21st Century" convinced me that there would be no "picnic by the side of the road." And the political storms did not bypass the provincial Shab-olovka, where the editorial offices of the Educational Program are located. Everything is interconnected. It is impossible to sit things out. The struggle for culture is also closely related to the political and philosophical struggle.

Now in the Union of Journalists, I hope, I will have a better chance of not losing myself and not having encroachments on my independence of judgment and actions. I have come to do everything possible to prevent our sliding back to the old times of the directive-command administration of journalism, the return of our profession to the sphere of service.

[Arsenyev] But you have entered a situation which is complicated even more by the open war of publications in which it is difficult to call journalists of various political persuasions to unity. It is even hard to figure out which of them is closest to being right. I, for example, subscribe to ZNAMYA and NASH SOVREMENNİK, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and LITERATURNAYA

ROSSIYA, OGONEK and VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. And I still do not always manage to put together an adequate picture. Now you have not simply to read but also to lead the journalists who, possibly, do not even want to sit down next to one another...

[Sagalayev] Yes, that is true. But journalism reflects life itself. Was it not an open reflection of life as it is to which we were called five or six years ago when we were rejoicing in the first steps of glasnost? It is another matter that in journalism today fairly frequently there is more arbitrariness than rule of law. I experienced this widespread lawlessness, true, in a unique form, after I was already chairman of the Union of Journalists. For example, all the most important and major things I discussed on the television program "Before and After Midnight" were left out. And the newspaper KOMMER-SANT quoted me but they completely distorted what I had said.

But still there is a way out. Even from the "backbiting school" through which both left-wing and right-wing publications have passed, asserting their principles only through unmasking and discrediting opponents. It, this way out, lies in a high level of professionalism and the ability to be precise in our proof. The work of journalists can and should be creative.

Yes, the Union of Journalists, as a nonparty organization, is obliged to protect both the right and the left when the Law on the Press is violated. But it is also obliged to protect the readers—from lies and disinformation. At the Seventh Congress of USSR Journalists, which will begin on 23 April, we will discuss the draft "Code of Professional Ethics of the Journalist." It has already been prepared. Incidentally, you can read it...

[Arsenyev] *Eduard Mikhaylovich handed me the draft "code." This was the first time I had seen the document which, one wishes to believe, will make it possible for journalists to work in keeping with the norms of morality, ethics, and decency. And honestly. It says in the preamble: "The code will also serve as a guide when considering cases of violations of principles and norms of journalistic ethics." Sagalayev explained that his idea is for this to be handled by a special Union of Writers council which would include authorized specialists not only in the profession but also in jurisprudence. The second section of the draft "code" in five articles describes in detail all the possible violations of journalistic ethics...*

[Sagalayev] We also want to present for the attention of the delegates to the congress proposals that will make it possible to improve our activity in the most diverse areas. These include questions related to legal policy and legal defense of journalists. And also socioeconomic policy in our work and commercial activity. The union should also work to solve at least the social problems of journalists. For example, it should create a life insurance fund for journalists and a fund for aiding our unemployed colleagues. The third area includes the creative,

scholarly, and educational policy. Unfortunately, the level of training and education of a great many of our journalists is very low. Perhaps we will create a journalism academy and a high school as a part of it, and we could change the system of education in journalism departments in higher education.

And our fourth area is international ties. This is also a very important sphere of activity, the more so since the republic journalists unions are delegating to our Union of Journalists some of their rights and finances for the development of bilateral and multilateral ties, including commercial ones, with foreign partners.

[Arseniyev] Are there many republic and regional unions of journalists that would like to enter the USSR Union of Journalists?

[Sagalayev] From now on the USSR Union of Journalists will be built, as you know, on a confederative basis. Not as before—along the vertical—but with equal rights for all who belong to it...

So far the majority of republic unions have expressed a desire to enter this confederation, and also, with the rights of independent unions—the Moscow and Leningrad journalistic organizations. The agreements are now being signed and ratified. In my opinion, the advantage from this cooperation, especially under the conditions of market relations, is obvious. But, of course, the viability of the USSR Union of Journalists on a confederative basis will depend on how it works and what it actually produces. As for the apparatus of the USSR Union of Journalists itself, I will have to present the new structure at the congress. I can say now that the apparatus in its previous form is not needed and will be transformed.

[Arseniyev] You have hard work to do, as is always the case when one is getting rid of old habits. I have in mind,

of course, more than just the reorganization of the apparatus of the Union of Journalists...

[Sagalayev] I understand you. Let me say frankly that there are some things we cannot do. But the Union of Journalists will always have the right to its own opinion—in any collisions, even heated political ones.

[Arseniyev] Do you have many like-thinkers?

[Sagalayev] Yes, if you consider the fact that the Union of Journalists has more than 90,000 members.

[Arseniyev] And how do you envision, say, the ideal journalist?

[Sagalayev] Oh, that is not easy! Although... He must write well, in other words, he must have literary talent. He definitely must be competent in the sphere of activity about which he is writing. He must understand that he is dealing with the fates of people and so he must be a decent person. Education, incidentally, in the sense of a journalism faculty, is not such an essential factor. Many editorial writers who are valued and loved have other than a journalistic education per se. Tsipko, for example, has a philosophy degree, Migranyan—history, and Smelev—economics.

[Arseniyev] How do you feel about IZVESTIYA?

[Sagalayev] I include your newspaper among the publications which, in keeping with common sense, are looking for a way out of the difficult situation in which society has ended up. And I do not think one should hamper IZVESTIYA. One could probably change the course of the newspaper. And turn a blossoming tree into a telegraph pole. But nature will not tolerate a vacuum. If this happens, the place now occupied by IZVESTIYA in the world of journalism will inevitably be taken by another publication.

Incidentally, common sense and decency are the most necessary things everywhere and in everything.

Nationality Composition in Autonomous Republics, Oblasts, Okrugs

91UN1261A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 13, Mar 91 p 1

[Untitled report by R. Morozov]

[Text] Yu. Voronin of Ufa writes, "When they agreed to sign the Union Treaty, many republics belonging to the RSFSR wanted to sign this treaty directly with the Union power structure."

"In connection with this, I want to ask a question: What is the percentage of the indigenous population, and what percentage is Russian?"

Our correspondent, R. Morozov, appealed to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, where he received information on the national composition of the population of autonomous republics, oblasts and okrugs, according to data from the 1989 census. The information was compiled by RSFSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], and as the RSFSR Supreme Soviet informed us, is effective as of 1 January 1991.

On the basis of this information, we have prepared a table which characterizes the proportion of the individual nations to the total population of the republics and autonomous entities (Their status is indicated in accordance with their composition as of 1989).

Proportion of Total Population (in %)			
Autonomous Republics, Oblasts, Okrugs	Nations	Indicated Nationality	Russians
Bashkir ASSR	Bashkirs	21.9	39.3
Buryat ASSR	Buryats	24.0	70.0
Dagestan ASSR	Avars	27.5	9.2
	Aguls	0.8	
	Dargins	15.6	
	Kumyks	12.9	
	Lakhs	5.1	
	Lezgins	11.3	
	Nogays	1.6	
	Rutuls	0.8	
	Tabasarans	4.3	
	Tsakhurs	0.3	
Kabardino-Balkar ASSR	Kabardins	48.2	32.0
	Balkars	9.4	
Kalmyk ASSR	Kalmyks	45.4	37.7
Karelian ASSR	Karelians	10.0	73.6
Komi ASSR	Komis	23.3	57.7
Mari ASSR	Maris	43.3	47.5
Mordvinian ASSR	Mordvini-ans	32.5	60.8

North Osetian ASSR	Osetians	53.0	29.9
Tatar ASSR	Tatars	48.5	43.3
Tuva ASSR	Tuvinians	64.3	32.0
Udmurt ASSR	Udmurts	30.9	58.9
Chechen-Ingush ASSR	Chechens	57.8	23.1
	Ingush	12.9	
Chuvash ASSR	Chuvash	67.8	26.7
Yakut ASSR	Yakuts	33.4	50.3
Adyge AO	Adyges	22.1	68.0
Gorno-Altay AO	Altai	31.0	60.4
Jewish AO	Jews	4.2	83.2
Karachayevo-Cherkess AO	Karachays	31.2	42.4
	Circassians	9.7	
Khakass AO	Khakas	11.1	79.5
Aga-Buryat AOKr	Buryats	54.9	40.8
Komi-Permyak AOKr	Komi-Permyaks	60.2	36.1
Koryak AOKr	Koryaks	16.5	62.0
Nenets AOKr	Nenets	11.9	65.8
Taymir (Dolgano-Nenetskiy) AOKr	Dolgans	8.9	67.1
	Nenets	4.8	
Ust-Orda Buryat AOKr	Buryats	36.3	56.5
Khanty-Mansysk AOKr	Khanty	0.9	66.3
	Mansy	0.5	
Chukotsk AOKr	Chuchki	7.3	66.1
Evenki AOKr	Evenki	14.0	67.5
Yamalo-Nenetsk AOKr	Nenets	4.2	59.2

Growth in Moscow Population Cited

91P50168A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 91
p 4

[Article by B. Babeshko from Armavir: "We Answer Readers' Questions; You Have Been Writing to Us"]

[Text] In 1991, there were 8,992,000 persons registered in Moscow. One hundred and twenty nationalities live here. On the average, 100,000-110,000 persons are born annually. But approximately that many die. Nonetheless, in the capital, there has been an increase in the population due to marriages with persons from other towns and resident permits issued to students and military personnel. There are also the invitations of hired workers, called "limitchiki" [temporary help], which practically all the city's leaders oppose, but whom some enterprises continue to invite because of the lack of manpower in Moscow.

Unfavorable Demographic Situation Reported in Ukraine

91UN1166A Kiev LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 14 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Serhiy Plachynda: "The Ukraine in Danger"]

[Excerpts] [Passages omitted]

Standing alone as a grim symbol of the misery that exists throughout the Ukraine, silent and terrible as the Ukraine's fate, is the statue of Zhyva—the world's only stone depiction of the goddess—in Sulymivka, formerly a hetman village and now plundered by "officials of the rayon committee." This is the Zhyva which, twenty years ago, was doused with gas and set on fire by the last tenth-grade class to graduate from the Sulymivka school. The goddess of life cracked, but remained standing. She still stands today, surrounded by weeds, but there is no longer any school in Sulymivka, not even an elementary one. For here, as in thousands of other Ukrainian villages, there are no students, because the birth rate in the republic is declining year by year.

"...Ten years ago, at a 'round table' discussion for publicists organized by the Ukrainian Writers' Union, the eminent agricultural scholar, V. V. Yurchyshyn, shouted out the fact that in the Chernigov region, areas of depopulation had appeared, in which the mortality rates surpassed the birth rates; that is, the dying out of the Ukrainian nation had begun from the Chernigov region. At that time, Yurchyshyn's shouts went unheard. But today, economist Iryna Prybytkova states on the pages of the journal UKRAYINA that the rural population is dying out in eight oblasts—Chernigov, Sumy, Poltava, Zhitomir, Cherkassy, Vinnitsia, Kirovograd, Dnepropetrovsk..."

These are the words of LITERATURNIA UKRAYINA of August 3, 1989 (when it presented my speech, given at the open party meeting of the Kiev organization of the Ukrainian Writers' Union).

Not even two years have passed since that time, and already, according to data from the Ministry of Health of the Ukrainian SSR, there are sixteen oblasts in which the rural population lives (or, more precisely, lives out its days) under a terrible minus sign. The Sumy oblast is in first place—its designation is -10.00 (that is, in the villages of this oblast, ten more people die than are born [as published]); Chernigov: -9.9, Cherkassy: -7.8, Kirovograd: -7.3, Poltava: -7.0, Khmelnytsky: -7.0, Vinnitsia: -6.6, Kharkov: -5.8, Kiev: -4.7, Zhitomir: -4.2, Dnepropetrovsk: -3.8, Lugansk: -3.1, Zaporozhie: -2.9, Ternopol: -2.9, Donetsk: -1.8, Odessa: -1.0.

And in seven oblasts of the republic, we see that the whole population—both rural and urban—is dying out. These oblasts are: Chernigov: -2.1 (that is, 2.1 more people die here than are born [as published], Sumy: -1.7, Poltava: -1.3, Kirovograd: -1.1, Cherkassy: -0.7, Vinnitsia: -0.9, Kharkov: -0.1.

In other oblasts, the natural increase of the population is quickly declining. Let us see how this decline is occurring (the figures show how many more people are born than die):

Oblast	1988	1989
Volyn	6.0	5.2
Lugansk	1.7	0.6
Dnepropetrovsk	2.8	1.7
Donetsk	1.6	0.1
Zhitomir	1.9	1.5
Zakarpatskaya	9.1	8.0
Zaporozhie	3.0	2.0
Ivano-Frankovsk	6.4	5.4
Kiev	3.0	1.3
Crimea	5.2	3.9
Lvov	5.2	4.7
Nikolaev	4.0	2.5
Odessa	2.2	1.4
Rovno	7.3	6.6
Ternopol	2.8	2.0
Kherson	4.8	3.7
Khmelnytsky	1.0	0.2
Chernovtsky	5.8	4.2
Kiev City	6.5	5.3

Recently, the SILSKI VISTI correspondent, in his supposedly objective, but, in fact, false report about the second extraordinary congress of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party (USDP), was crudely ironic about the supposed panic evident in the statements of USDP leaders that the year 2040 will mark the death of the Ukrainian nation. In fact, if the Ukrainian people continue to die off at the rates shown in the tables, the death of the Ukrainian nation may come significantly earlier than 2040, the date hypothetically indicated by the renowned scholar and doctor of biology, Vitaliy Volodymyrovych Polishchuk, in his scientific analysis.

Let us consider the following: today in the Ukraine, 80 percent of pregnant women are sick (10 years ago, it was 30 percent). And 40 thousand woman are unable to bring their pregnancies to term. There is also the terrible phenomenon of maternal deaths. Regardless of the efforts made by our dedicated obstetricians, out of every 100,000 live births, 36-38 mothers die. Perhaps that is why sociological questioning of the population has shown that 60 percent of married women would prefer to have not more than one or two children. In addition, the Ukraine stands in the tragic and shameful first place in the world with regard to numbers of abortions performed: more than one million are recorded in the republic every year. And the number of abortions performed on minors is increasing (1985—3,640; 1989—5,517).

No honest person and Ukrainian patriot can help but be distressed by the rate of child mortality in the republic. The most recent figures show that 12.97 deaths occur per one thousand live births (in rural regions, 14.01). Tragically in first place in this regard is the Kherson region, the black earth of which is poisoned as a result of irrigation negligently done with polluted water (let me

remind you, that such resort regions as the Skadovskoe and Golaya Pristan rayons are now suffering ecological damage as a result of rice cultivation and soil improvement). In second place is the Zaporozhie oblast and in third place, the Odessa region (with regard to child mortality in rural areas, Odessa is in first place). To be more precise, let us look at the figures (all the data relate to 1989):

Oblast	Deaths per 1000 births in oblast	Deaths in rural regions	Births per 1000 population in oblast	Births in rural regions
Kherson 15.99	17.11	14.7	14.2	
Zaporozhie	15.01	17.41	13.3	13.5
Odessa	15.00	18.04	13.3	12.8
Kharkov	14.47	16.43	12.1	11.1
Lugansk	13.89	12.95	12.4	12.3
Ivano-Frankovsk	13.87	11.29	15.6	15.4
Dnepropetrovsk	13.82	15.61	13.1	12.9
Chernovtsy	13.46	12.38	14.6	15.3
Kiev City	13.40	—	13.5	—
Zakarpatskaya	13.16	13.38	17.0	17.5
Donetsk	12.93	16.26	11.8	12.7
Crimea	12.88	15.75	13.6	14.6
Lvov	12.78	15.27	14.6	15.0
Khmelnitsky	12.57	12.82	13.1	10.6
Nikolaev	12.40	13.55	14.2	15.0
Chernigov	12.34	12.88	11.7	9.0
Rovno	11.96	12.00	16.5	15.2
Poltava	11.86	12.35	12.4	11.4
Sumy 11.36	14.45	11.9	9.2	
Ternopol	11.26	10.29	14.3	12.3
Zhitomir	11.18	11.00	13.7	11.7
Volyn	11.08	10.30	15.9	14.5
Vinnitsa	10.48	9.86	12.8	10.9
Cherkassy	10.46	12.82	13.0	10.4
Kirovograd	10.06	8.77	13.1	11.5
Kiev	9.66	9.6	13.6	12.1

And let us add the fact that 80 percent of all children in the Ukraine are sick. What will the Ukraine be like tomorrow? What kind of children will her sick children produce?

The Ukraine is in danger! In danger...

For with regard to birth rate, the Ukraine is in last place in the Union. And with regard to the death rate, she is one of the first (figures for 1989):

Republic	Births per 1000 population	Deaths per 1000 population
Tajikistan	38.7	6.5
Turkmenia	35.0	7.7
Uzbekistan	33.3	6.3
Kyrgyzstan	30.4	7.2

Azerbaijan	26.4	6.4
Kazakhstan	23.0	7.6
Armenia	21.6	6.0
Moldova	18.9	9.2
USSR	17.6	10.2
Georgia	16.7	8.6
Estonia	15.4	11.7
Lithuania	15.1	10.3
Byelorussia	15.0	10.1
RSFSR	14.6	10.7
Latvia	14.5	12.1
Ukraine	13.3	11.6

And the most recent figures: in 1990 in the Ukraine, there were 12.7 births per one thousand of population and 12.3 deaths.

The Ukraine is in danger! In danger. . .

"...We are for a renewed Union. Unless the new Union treaty is concluded and the multinational Soviet state is preserved, we cannot have stabilization of the political and economic situation, guarantee of civil peace, a way out of the dangerous dead end in which both the country as a whole and our republic find themselves."

This citation comes from the recently-published declaration of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, "For a Sovereign Socialist Ukraine within a Renewed Union." This document lacks even the most basic arguments about the things which are most important—productivity of labor, productive forces; they are not even mentioned. It does not contain even elementary analysis. Nowhere in this declaration is there evident any concern about the people. And nowhere does anyone ask the question:

How To Stop the Dying Out of the Nation?

But the leaders of the Communist Party will probably never raise this question. On the contrary, they will term it provocative, for they never even use the word "nation." In their lexicon, the only word that exists is "people." But a nation is the individuality of a people, its dress, psychology, character, ethnic spirituality, its character and thousand-year-long experience, its particular way of seeing and creating the world. A nation is the historical memory of a people, its dignity, its roots and traditions, and finally, its degree of civilization. A nation is a people's home, the home with its unrepeatable architecture. And existing outside of a nation is like existing outside of one's home; it is to be a homeless and faceless mass, which can be used as a silent, obedient force, as cannon fodder or as a faithful guard dog.

The leaders of the Communist Party of the Ukraine carefully ignore the problem of the decline of the Ukrainian population, for otherwise, they would have to explain the reasons for this terrible phenomenon. And those reasons are obvious. . .

After the NEP, the mutual relations between the center and the republics of the USSR already became clear, in particular, the relations between Moscow and the Ukraine. These were the relations of a metropolis and a colony. In 1929, the colonial specialty of the Ukraine was set: heavy industry and orientation on raw materials. And also, within the socialist scale of prices, the lowest (pillage) prices for products and raw materials, the lowest wages for work and the most back-breaking labor, pollution of the environment and damage to the human organism.

And what did this lead to? To the fact that, in 1988, for example, the relative balance between group "A"—production of means of production, and group "B"—production of consumer goods, was 72.1 to 27.9 percent. Here lies the tragedy of the great laboring Ukrainian people.

If the Ukraine were independent, then, of course, this perilous disproportion would not occur; on the contrary, the republic would see a harmonious development of all the economic activity of which this wealthy country is capable, and the Ukraine would be the wealthiest, most flourishing country in the world. But she is a colony, and all her wealth is turned against the people. For example, we see that the portion of her workers who are employed in sectors of particularly heavy labor (fifth grade) is much greater than in the USSR overall and in other Union republics.

More specifically, 51 percent of all the workers of the Union who work in ferrous metallurgy and the coal industry are in the Ukraine, as well as 58 percent of those who work underground (I am using figures supplied by Ivan Vasylovych Rozputenko, who holds a PhD in Economics). And 53 percent of workers in the republic are employed in sectors which have working conditions that are harmful to health.

Incidentally, in his analysis, Rozputenko considered only industrial workers and used data from 1988. Here are the figures for 1990, which were prepared by a group of experts, commissioned by the USDP, who took into account rural workers as well. They also considered in their work the degree of pollution in the republic through radiation, chemicals, gasses, poisoning of the soil and waters. And it turns out (using a simplified method of calculation) that in the Ukraine, 96 percent of workers and peasants work in ecologically harmful conditions.

In the worst conditions are the men. Because of this fact, and given the low wages paid for the work of production workers, the lack of fair compensation, that is, given the devouring attitude of the metropolis towards the productive forces of the colony, which have been laboring to the point of exhaustion for more than 60 years, the mortality rate among the male population of working age has risen. Today, demographers are using a frightening term—overly-high death rate among men of viable age (20-44).

Thus, the lifespan of men in the Ukraine is sharply declining from one year to another. And this is not only in industrial regions. In the primary places are the agricultural oblasts which are polluted to the limit by chemicals, poisoned by herbicides and soil improvements: Crimea, Kherson, Nikolayev, Kirovograd, Odessa. Let us look at the figures showing the menacing decline of the lifespan of men in the Ukraine (I am not providing data regarding women, who now live 10 years longer than men; the figures here give the lifespan of men in years):

Oblast	1988	1989
Vinnitsa	66.77	65.5
Volyn	67.48	66.3
Lugansk	63.64	64.6
Dnepropetrovsk	65.86	65.0
Donetsk	66.23	64.6

Oblast	1988	1989
Zhitomir	66.70	65.6
Zakarpatskaya	66.31	65.5
Zaporozhie	66.05	64.9
Ivano-Frankovsk	67.32	67.0
Kiev	66.46	65.0
Kirovograd	64.95	63.3
Crimea	66.47	64.8
Lvov	67.73	66.9
Nykolaev	65.16	63.4
Odessa	64.44	63.5
Poltava	67.00	65.7
Rovno	67.37	66.3
Sumy	66.16	65.3
Ternopol	67.29	66.4
Kharkov	66.21	65.1
Kherson	64.46	63.2
Khmelnitsky	67.03	65.9
Cherkassy	66.53	65.2
Chernovtsy	68.03	66.7
Chernigov	66.52	65.6
Kiev City	68.69	67.4
Ukraine overall	66.42	65.3

(A comparison: the average lifespan of men in France is 70.4, the FRG—70.8, England—71.6, Japan—74.5).

And now, let us imagine that the Ukraine signs the Union treaty and remains a part of the "renewed federation." What then? Things will continue exactly as before! All that will be new will be the optimistic slogans and madly-increased prices for all goods. But 96 percent of workers and peasants will still labor in ecologically harmful conditions, and 72.1 percent of production will continue to be in group "A". That is, the exhaustion of the people will continue. And the lifespan of men of working age will continue to decline. To what limit?

"As we know, the Khibin apatite deposits are in Russia," says Ivan Rozputenko. "And the ecologically-harmful superphosphate factories are in the Ukraine. The raw material is brought here (what price do we pay for this?) And from here, the prepared, packaged superphosphate is sent to Russia, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan. Our republic fully supplies Belorussia and Moldova with superphosphates. And why in exchange for our bread, coal, iron ore, steel and sugar should superphosphates not be brought into the Ukraine in prepared form. And why—if we continue to consider the list of facts concerning the brutal and senseless, but, at the same time, far-reaching, colonial policy of the center, which wants in any way possible to make the Ukraine economically dependent—why is the Ukraine the main supplier of raw leather for the enterprises of Russia, Belorussia, the Baltic region and the Caucasian republics? Why do our factories poison people and the environment, preparing untreated pigskin and synthetic and

tannic extracts, while finished footwear is brought in from Russia and other republics? Or why does the Ukraine send out linen fibre, natural wool and synthetic silk, and bring in 95 percent of its linen fabric, 90 percent of its cotton fabric and 70 percent of its woollen fabric? All of this, obviously, is not to the benefit of the economy of the republic.

Families Leaving Soviet Union for Lithuania

91P50164A

[Editorial Report] Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS [NATIVE LAND] in Lithuanian for 21-27 February 1991 carries on page 3 a 500-word article by Leonardas Aleksiejunas entitled "Lithuania, Are You Warming the Exile?" which reports that as of 9 February the Ministry of Social Security's Migration Department had received 1,296 applications from families wanting to emigrate from the Soviet Union to Lithuania.

The majority of those wanting to move to Lithuania are deportees and their family members. The Migration Department sends these applications to the republic's local governments providing them with information on which citizens want to immigrate to Lithuania or to emigrate from Lithuania and what their circumstances are. In the last few months dozens of families have exchanged housing in this manner. The problem is that few want to exchange Lithuania for Siberia or the North, where the greatest number of Lithuanian deportees live.

The RSFSR-Lithuania Treaty promises good news in this respect, since the draft of the treaty provides for material assistance and other forms of help, from both parties, to those moving from one country to the other. The article goes on to give individual examples of families who have made the move and the difficulties they have encountered, particularly not being able to get work. The article also notes that about thirty families have already moved from Vorkuta to Lithuania. This was accomplished by the Vorkutaugol Association paying 600,000 rubles for the housing vacated by these families in Vorkuta to the Kaunas, Panevezys, Siauliai, Alytaus and other local governments which promised to provide housing in Lithuania.

Role of Islam in Federation Addressed

91US0445A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 2, Jan 91 p 11

[Article by Vyacheslav Muntyan, candidate of legal sciences, and Sergey Kadyrov, expert of the National and International Security Foundation Strategic Studies Institute: "The Islamic Factor"]

[Text] [first paragraph is enclosed in box in center of article] A traditional mistake of domestic and, primarily, nationality policy is obviously the fact that it has taken insufficiently into account the particular features of the culture, traditions, and customs of Soviet peoples in regions with the historical spread of Islam.[end box]

Political leaders, legislators, and representatives of the executive of the center have frequently examined and resolved problems of Central Asia, the North Caucasus, and other Islamic regions from the standpoint of the clichés and standards of European culture and mentality. The "real essence of Islam" stereotype was imposed strictly and uncompromisingly for decades. Even when a reinterpretation of the significance in society of the Russian Orthodox Church has begun and the positive aspects in its activity came to be emphasized, the negative evaluations of and, simply, disregard for the Muslim religion have continued.

A standardized approach from European standpoints, without any serious consideration of the specific features of the Islamic regions, has been observed constantly at the time also of the adoption of most important decisions in the perestroika period—from every conceivable algorithm of "acceleration" of scientific and technological progress through programs of transition to a market economy. All this has caused and continues to cause at the present time rejection, at least, and in a number of cases, opposition to the center on the part of the regional power structures and the social and political forces taking shape, and is a serious precondition for new interethnic conflicts.

The most striking illustration of what has been said is the draft new Union treaty being discussed at this time. After all, despite the fact that the presidents and parliaments of the Central Asian republics have agreed to sign this version of the treaty, it could be asked: Does it correspond to the actual national and religious processes occurring in the Islamic regions and to the intensively developing political forces? Or is the signing of the treaty being secured by the former party and state administrative system, which remains in power and whose survivability depends on the annual multibillion-ruble subsidies of the center and a number of other factors?

So which propositions of the concept of the Union state and the draft new Union treaty require additional interpretation and amplification from the viewpoint of the processes in the Islamic regions of the USSR? First of all, the preamble of the draft treaty contains no sufficiently clear answer to the question of why such a union of states is necessary and what its nature will be. How will the sovereign formations react to the contradiction newly invested in the Union treaty between upgraded unitarism and formal federalism, which persists to a considerable extent. After all, relations between republics that have declared their sovereignty and the center have already in a number of cases gone beyond possible federalism. A new, artificial state, on the other hand, with all the attributes of statehood, such as the USSR has been, could exist only given unitary or federal principles of the formation of the Union. In other cases this would be merely a coordinating center between sovereign states which have entered into confederal or associative relations with one another. This center would possibly, after a certain length of time, in accordance with the principle of the European Union, once again become, with regard

for the integration tendencies which there in fact are between the republics, a state structure. In addition, throughout the world and in a number of republics of the Soviet Union also there is an ever-growing understanding that the most conflict-free form of the organization of a polyethnic society is a unitary state and that unitarism is, possibly, an achievement of civilization and a very great value common to all mankind.

What, however, is happening in this connection in the Central Asian republics? On the one hand there is consent here to the proposed principle of the building of a union of states and thereby to the center's continuation in the status of sovereign state with the declared democratic institutions in it. On the other, a manifest aspiration to exclusiveness and an authoritarian system of power. Thus Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for example, are adopting measures to curb the developing public movements and parties and other structures of the civil society.

At the same time there is no ignoring the powerful wave of the revival of Islam within the framework of the new stage of its modernization brought about by objective historical factors and the subjective role of this religion in the life of the peoples practicing it and also its further politicization brought about largely by the Afghan war. The phenomenon which has come to be called the "Islamic factor" differs sharply from purely religious assertiveness, primarily by the presence of a broad set of Islamic ideologies and corresponding structures, which differ in terms of their "political potential" and its focus. We may distinguish among them also those that will contribute actively to the process—which has already begun in Central Asia and which is developing at the present time—of the integration of the Muslim peoples, which could lead to a fundamentally new attitude toward the Union and the Union state, from all-around support for it through its possible total rejection virtually.

In our view, all this has been brought about by the paths, which are taking shape objectively, of the solution of a fundamental contradiction at the present time—between the ethnic and religious (Islamic) factors. So the signing of the new Union treaty means preservation of the process pursued in the twenties and thirties of separation on a nationality basis into the present independent national-state formations of a united Islamic Turkestan. Together with the whole number of positive aspects expressed in the acquisition of statehood for the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and other peoples—albeit declared formally, their own nonetheless—and the increased economic potential of each republic, colossal interethnic contradictions were also embedded. They were expressed primarily in the artificial division of territory and the degree of domination in the republics of the central ministries and departments, dissimilar long-term capital investments, voluntarist demographic policy, the creation of industrial infrastructures without regard for national mentality and traditional orientation and, most importantly, disparagement and neutralization of the role of Islamic religion, which consolidates and unites

these peoples. These and other contradictions have already led to many interethnic conflicts in Dushanbe and Fergana and Osh Oblasts with many human casualties.

Is the new Union treaty being invested with a mechanism for surmounting and resolving them? After all, there is in evidence a trend inspired by the "pan-Turkic" concept, the essence of which amounts to the fact that many of the particularly divided peoples want to unite on an ethnic basis and create common states (Tajiks, Kirghiz, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis). The practical slogans reflecting this trend are, for example, the Azerbaijanis' point that "we are first and foremost Turkic, then Muslims." And the rapid development of relations with Turkey is already under way (joint ventures, charitable foundations and so forth are being created).

At the same time an analysis of material on the conflict situations in the Islamic regions, official documents of the republic governments and parliaments, and the programs and platforms of certain newly emerged political movements and parties shows that the "pan-Islamic" concept is blazing a trail for itself in a strict confrontation with the "pan-Turkic" trend. Certain Islamic movements and parties are employing as the philosophical and organizational basis all the centuries-old wealth of Islamic doctrines and concepts and the traditional infrastructures of Islam (the Sufi Brotherhood, supernumerary clergy and so forth). Within the framework of this unificatory idea intrinsic contradictions between the Shi'ite and Sunni tendencies and between official and unofficial Islam will possibly be erased for a certain period. It cannot be ruled out that they will be supported in the interests of their own survival by the present power structures in the republics also.

Will the new Union treaty be capable of curbing these processes and proposing political and legal mechanisms of the localization of interethnic conflicts? For it is absolutely obvious that it is necessary to seek harmony and interaction with forward-looking Islamic ideology, which is filling the spiritual and moral vacuum that has formed. After all, the war in Afghanistan sharply spurred the objective process of the politicization of Islam and imparted to it, aside from an anti-imperialist, an antisocialist and anticommunist thrust and coloration. Thus a powerful unifying trend, which could after a certain length of time lead to the formation of either a unitary Islamic state or an Islamic federation, is maturing within the framework of the Asian states. It is unlikely that such a unified state would continue to be a part of a Union built in accordance with European standards and inadequately oriented toward Islamic culture, law, and traditions.

An analysis of the draft Union treaty makes it possible to distinguish a number of provisions which are probably in need of an additional orientation toward these regions in wording appropriate to them. The applicability of a standardized European approach to the current complex

social structures of these regions with family-tribal, religious-patriarchal, and clan relations would seem controversial from the standpoints of the need for the formation of a civil society (chapter 1, paragraph 4). Nor, probably, does the concept of a state based on the rule of law in the fundamental provisions that have been discussed in our press correspond in full measure to the mood of the religious masses, which link the state itself with the need for it to conform with religious precepts and consider the law to ensue directly from customary law and sharia (chapter 1, paragraph 5).

The factor of the voluntary approach as an indispensable condition of membership of the Union (chapter 2, article 1) in the European understanding does not include religious approval, which is required in the traditional precepts of Muslim society. An analysis shows that the incipient public movements and parties on a religious basis adhere to different Muslim ideologies, not all of which allow of entry into the Union as a multiconfessional state. The absence of such approval could for their part be an argument concerning the illegality of entry into the Union.

There is the viewpoint that a parallel of the administrative command system being abolished in the USSR was taken from the "Asiatic mode of production" and formed the basis of the so-called socialist model of society's development. But the difference is that the first is based on the millennial culture and religion of the oriental peoples, and the second, merely on the isolation of the interests of one class in the name of "general prosperity." Hence an attempt to reform the administrative command system here and impose the European understanding of and attitude toward private property could evoke nonacceptance and ultimately rejection. Decisions on the transfer of land not into private ownership, as were adopted at the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, but into a long-term lifetime lease with the right of inheritance are meanwhile being adopted as a defensive reaction in the Central Asian republics. This gives rise to the need for a differentiated approach to its Islamic regions on the part of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. A monopoly of power in republics with the historical spread of Islam has been and is preserved, in our opinion, not by the influence of the CPSU or ideology but the actual social and class structure of society.

So in endeavoring to create a united Union on a voluntary basis and inviting to it peoples with different sociocultural complexes, it needs to be considered that this will evidently be a Eurasian Union and that to localize interethnic conflicts and ensure flexibility in the administration of the regions it is essential to create an interconfessional parliament on a deliberative basis under the auspices of the highest authority of the polyethnic state. In critical periods of history this body has been created in a number of multinational countries. The Islamic factor should be taken into consideration constantly in order to overcome the confrontation and complication of interethnic relations on the territory of

the Islamic regions, which are extraordinarily complex in terms of ethnic and religious composition.

Moscow Leader of Islamic Party on Membership, Difficulties

91US0434A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 10, 8 Mar 91 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Kazakov: "Ready for Dialogue"]

[Text] A news conference given by leaders of the All-Union Islamic Revival Party for Soviet and foreign journalists was held at the Islamic Cultural Center in Moscow.

Mukhammed Salakhitdinov, leader of the Moscow branch of the party, told the journalists that the party, which was formed less than a year ago in Astrakhan, numbers approximately 20,000 members at present. Both men and women, mainly ethnic Muslims, may participate in its activity. There is an official press organ—the newspaper AL-WAHDAT (Unity). The party considers its main task to be assuring the opportunity for each Muslim to live in accordance with his religious beliefs according to the Koran and the Sunna. The party has particular influence, according to Mukhammed Salakhitdinov, in Dagestan, Chechnya, Karachayevo-Cherkesiya, Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley, and Tajikistan.

This year the party, registered in Moscow, has run into great difficulties. Its activity has been banned in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There was a curious incident connected with the constituent conference of the Uzbek branch of the party. While it was in session, Tashkent militia officers burst into the hall. Approximately 400 conference delegates and guests were arrested. They were charged with holding an unsanctioned meeting. The deputies were fined. And Mukhammed Bidzhi-Ulu, a member of the party's Coordinating Committee, was kicked out of the republic.

Valiakhmed Sadur, press spokesman for the party, told journalists about the illegality of such actions by the authorities. He placed the responsibility for the unlawful actions against the believers on the president of Uzbekistan.

Amir Akhmed-kadi Akhtayev, chairman of the party and an Avar by nationality, explained the reluctance of the republic leadership to agree to a dialogue as fear of a loss of influence among the Islamic population. This unlawful action, the amir observed, has evoked the reverse reaction on the part of Muslims. The number of those wishing to join the party has increased many times over.

"We have much in common with the new Christian parties in Russia," the leader of the Islamic Party declared. "For many years both we and they were deprived of an opportunity to defend the interests of

believers. To achieve our goals we are ready for dialogue and cooperation with various religions of the country."

Amir Akhmed-kadi emphasized that the Islamic Revival Party advocates the economic and political integrity of the Soviet Union. The party sees as one of its tasks also the peaceful solution of interethnic and, specifically, inter-Muslim conflicts.

Improvement in Kazakh Boarding Houses Urged

91US0448A Alma-Ata *KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 16 Mar 91 p 5

[Interview with R. T. Tleukhanov, by Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya, under rubric: "We Are Building a Law-Governed State: Outcasts"]

[Text] For the first time in Kazakhstan, the republic's procuracy has conducted an inspection of boarding houses where elderly and disabled persons, children, and chronic mental patients are living under state care. Our republic has a total of 63 such boarding houses. Let's remember that figure. It probably is not well known to every ordinary resident of Kazakhstan. He has heard or read something at one time about two or three of them. But 63 is a rather large number. Because these are the addresses of hundreds of persons who have been cast off by fate, by other people, and by society, places where mental pain and physical helplessness exist side by side, where human needs are by no means equated with our ordinary ones, if only because state care is financed by the budget, and thus there are confines "from these individuals to these."

The inspection that was carried out by the republic's procuracy enables us not simply to take a casual glance into one or two boarding houses, but to see and interpret the overall state of affairs. And that means the overall moral state of our society.

Nevertheless, why was it specifically an inspection by the procuracy?

That was the question with which we began our conversation with R. T. Tleukhanov, the chief of the Department for Overview Over the Observance of the Law and Citizens' Rights in the Social Sphere, of KaSSR Procuracy.

[T. Kvyatkovskaya] Ramazan Tleukhanovich, it would be an ordinary matter for us to have an inspection by workers of Minsobes [Ministry of Social Security], the Ministry of Health, the Red Cross, or even members of the "Miloserdie" [Charity] Society. But, suddenly [vdrug] we have an inspection by the procuracy, and suddenly this large-scale measure...

[T. Tleukhanov] The V. Dal dictionary defines the word *vdrug* in various meanings. If you have in mind the unexpectedness or suddenness of the inspection, then that meaning does not pertain to our situation. Because the procuracy has previously carried out inspections of boarding houses. True, most frequently these were inspections of individual boarding houses, in response to

specific complaints or warning reports. But the word **drug** has another meaning: "at once, at one time." And that meaning reflects the essence of the work that we carried out.

Why was it specifically an inspection by the procuracy? As long ago as April 1990 the board of the USSR Procuracy adopted the decision entitled: "The Unsatisfactory Execution of the Legislation Governing the Protection of the Social Rights of the Elderly and the Disabled." But even if there had not been such a decision by the union procuracy, we still would have conducted an inspection in our republic. The economic situation currently is very difficult. Market relations are approaching us, and are already becoming part of our life. The problem of the social protection of poor people is rising to its fullest height.

The procuracy's functions have always included the task of protecting the citizens' social rights, and we even have such a department. It is another matter that, with regard to the rights of those who are under state care, everything traditionally has been considered in a relative procedure. They are being taken care of, they have a roof over their heads, and they are being fed. So everything is fine...

Currently the economic basis of yesterday's "relative procedure" can prove to be very unreliable. And, in addition, the roof over a person's head and regular meals by no means exhaust all the social rights of those who are being taken care of.

[T. Kvyatkovskaya] I spoke to several procuracy workers who participated in the inspection and I was astonished at the emotional intensity of their stories. Because each of them had the occasion to study all the violations of the law, the absolutely most grievous violations. It is not by hearsay that they know of, and keep within their mind the memory of, instances of terrible, heinous crimes. It would seem that it should be difficult now for them to be surprised by anything, or for them to have the reaction of a painful psychological shock. But this inspection did indeed prove for many of them to be a painful syndrome.

[T. Tleukhanov] Why should this be surprising? When you analyze a criminal act, much is explained by the tragic confluence of circumstances, by randomness. Nevertheless a criminal act is an exception to the rules of social life, and each criminal act, regardless of how many are perpetrated, is an individual instance. But what the inspection of boarding houses showed was the everyday nature, the standard of life, or, I would say, at times, a life that is unworthy of a human being.

[T. Kvyatkovskaya] Which of the problems at the boarding houses is the most widespread and most critical one?

[T. Tleukhanov] First of all, let me say that 63 boarding houses is a very small number for the republic. They have been planned for fewer than 18,000 persons (and 5500 places for the disabled and elderly). The waiting list for people trying to get into boarding houses in the

republic has 4500 names on it. Even so, not all the individuals who want or need to be put on that waiting list have been taken into consideration. And those who have managed to get in are not very fortunate, either. You can imagine what it must be like to have six people occupying a room measuring slightly more than 20 square meters. Six beds, as in a hospital, with no space to put anything else in the room. In a hospital we suffer in close confinement as we hear our wardmates coughing or groaning. We suffer the complexity of their natures and their habits that may be uncomfortable for us, consoling ourselves with the thought that our situation is temporary and that our patience will eventually be rewarded. But in boarding houses these are the conditions that prevail until the end of a person's days. Practically no new, well-equipped boarding houses are being built, and the old ones, even the ones in critical condition, are, practically speaking, not being repaired. Sometimes it is not only running water that is nonexistent, as in the boarding houses for chronic mental patients in Kustanay Oblast, but there is even "a strained situation" with regard to wash basins and toilets.

Excerpt from the memorandum pertaining to the procuracy inspection:

In Kokchetav Oblast, in the Volodarskiy and Lobanovskiy boarding houses for chronic mental patients, the buildings need capital repair and remodeling. The boarding houses do not meet the sanitation standards for providing the inmates with housing space. In the Volodarskiy boarding house, each person receiving care is provided with no more than four square meters; and in the Lobanovskiy boarding house no more than two square meters, despite the standard of nine square meters. (T. Kvyatkovskaya: Two square meters is probably less than is allotted to the deceased in a cemetery!)

The sanitary state of the living accommodations in the boarding house for the elderly in the city of Panfilov, Taldy-Kurgan Oblast, is unsatisfactory. The building needs repair. It is damp in all the rooms. The water pipes are leaking everywhere, and the plumbing system goes out of commission frequently. The hygienic state of the persons receiving care also remains unsatisfactory. People's underwear is not changed promptly. During the inspection, there were instances in which lice were discovered in the inmates' underwear...

[T. Kvyatkovskaya] The picture that is being described is a gloomy one. But I am afraid that it is impossible nowadays to "make a dent" in public opinion by talking about the lack of toilets or about crowded conditions. Because we all know of working people who have been living with their families in buildings in critical condition for decades without any conveniences. A few of them mumble morosely, "Well, old people and sick people don't really need much," or "The more the merrier." "They've got medical care, they get their meals, and everything is free for them..."

[T. Tleukhanov] "The more the merrier"? Well, one of our workers brought back from an official trip a pair of "footwear" that an old woman had been wearing in a boarding house. He placed that "footwear" (it is difficult to select a specific word for it) on the table during our working session, and, if he had not been a man, he would have probably burst out crying when discussing those shoes. In our republic, he said, the public sometimes throws onto the rubbish heap shoes that would be considered a king's shoes when compared to these. In our republic, he said, the Dzhetyssu company burned thousands of pairs of shoes that had not been sold. Why couldn't they have been given to boarding houses to be issued to the elderly? Even in the army the standard service life of canvas shoes is one year...

You and I would probably be depressed by the free meals they provide at boarding houses. True, the elderly do not need much. Meat nowadays is expensive and, really, people do not need meat every day. But it would be nice to have vegetables, and to have them prepared in different ways. But the elderly are even deprived of this. Whatever boarding house you go to, there is the same depressing sameness in the menu, with tiny portions and insufficient calories. Many medicines are currently in short supply, even for normal, everyday citizens. But all of us have relatives, friends, or acquaintances who will go around to a dozen drugstores until they find and purchase something that can cure us. In the boarding houses, however, the medicines are subject to a budgetary limit. And if the medicines are not available in sufficient quantity, then they will not be available tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow. There is also an acute shortage of medical personnel. Currently there are 26 vacancies in boarding houses for doctors and 100 vacancies for medium-level medical workers. In the boarding houses in Kzyl-Orda, Tselinograd, Mangiastau, Ural, Karaganda, Chimkent, Kokchetav, and Dzhambul oblasts, there have been no doctors for a long time. If an inmate gets sick, he has two ways out: either he can cure himself "by drawing on his inner reserves," or he can die. But if he makes the latter choice, you must remember that the funds for an inmate's funeral are extremely meager and that the burial ceremony is yet another final debasement of the person's human dignity.

Excerpt from the memorandum pertaining to the procuracy inspection:

During a study of the food products that had been selected for preparation as food at a boarding house for the elderly and disabled in the city of Dzhambul, vegetables were found to be uncleared and improperly washed. Dirty conditions prevailed in the food-preparation and dining areas. And it is not surprising that, out of 20 swab samples tested for the existence of *E. coli*, infectious bacilli were detected in five instances.

Many physicians at assigned therapeutic and recovery institutions formally carry out annual medical comprehensive inspections.

One is alarmed by the state of dental and auditory prosthesis, and the rate at which the stomatological and physical-therapy departments are provided with medical equipment and apparatus.

[T. Kvyatkovskaya] Ramazan Tleukhanovich, you and I are experiencing these revelations so synchronously that it may seem to some people that this gloomy picture is being specially created. But the lines and facts of the memorandum pertaining to the procuracy inspection are dry and dispassionate. Even without the experiences that you and I have had, these lines and facts describe that gloomy picture. These unfortunate discarded old men and disabled people, half-deaf, half-blind, toothless, poorly cared for and haphazardly fed, ought to evoke in the personnel at the boarding houses a feeling of nagging sympathy. Only that feeling and the desire to help in every possible way. But the participants in the inspection said that the personnel even steal from the people they are supposed to take care of. If those people have been so deprived of everything, what do they have that can be stolen? If they are defenseless and submissive—and you know that the editorial office receives practically no complaints from boarding houses!—what encroachments can be made on them?

[T. Tleukhanov] The more submissive those inmates are, the broader the opportunities for the unscrupulous caretakers. The inspection showed that in almost all the boarding houses there is an abominable accounting of the movement of monetary and material assets. Against that background, thefts and embezzlements are not surprising. It happens that furniture intended for the inmates ends up in the personnel's apartments. Trip tickets to sanatoriums are issued to boarding houses. They are issued in small quantity, and not too frequently, but nevertheless they are issued to them. Trip tickets for disabled persons also prove to be a temptation for the personnel. When the table of organization has a large number of vacancies for service personnel, the personnel who are there quickly get additional wages by way of figureheads.

It is impossible to list all the different versions. Extortion has many faces and is very inventive.

Excerpt from the memorandum pertaining to the procuracy inspection:

M. I. Mezenova, chief accountant at a boarding house in the city of Dzhezkazgan, with the knowledge of K. M. Abilov, director of the boarding house, acquired for her personal use, using funds from the cash account, a set of upholstered furniture costing 472 rubles that had been received for the boarding house. In addition, the boarding house funds were used to pay for a trip ticket to the Shalgiya Sanatorium, with a value of 113 rubles, for treatment to be provided to deputy director M. R. Rakhmetov, who had worked only one month at the boarding house. Workers from the oblast social security department—N. Seylbekov, K. Utemisov, and S. Musanov—and

families of boarding house workers Abdykozhin, Zhalkhanov, Tazhimbetov, and Zhakupov lived at the boarding house without any kind of payment. Moreover, all of them were provided with refrigerators, television sets, and other property intended for the elderly and disabled.

At the same boarding house, a 700-ruble shortage of material-commodity assets under the control of housekeeper-nurse G. Azybayeva was detected. A shortage of medical alcohol in the amount of 3.43 kilograms, with a value of 147.49 rubles, was discovered in the accountable records of senior nurse S. Beksultanova. That shortage was a result of the fact that that amount of alcohol had been transferred to director Abilov and deputy director Rakhmetov for personal use.

In the city of Shakhhtinsk, Karaganda Oblast, in a boarding house for chronic mental patients, manager A. Ch. Li falsified a job position for his relative, T. N. Li, gave fictitious job assignments to her, and appropriated for himself 280 rubles of wages.

At a boarding house for the elderly and disabled in the city of Tselinograd, chief accountant P. I. Tsareva, in criminal connivance with materially responsible individuals at that boarding house, during the period from 1989 through 1990 stole material-commodity assets with a total value of 5535 rubles.

As a result of the failure of the administrators at a boarding house for the elderly and disabled in the city of Aktyubinsk to provide a list of participants in the Great Patriotic War, G. N. Poleshchuk, a participant in that war, failed to receive a lump-sum grant in aid in accordance with Ukase of the President of Kazakh SSR.

[T. Kvyatkovskaya] We are throwing onto the heads of our readers and making public knowledge all the instances of insults inflicted on the defenseless and disenfranchised sufferers in the boarding houses. But what next? Will society begin to shame the extortioners and thieves, and will they become conscience-stricken and correct their ways? It is ridiculous even to think that way. But what if a miracle happens and they do correct their ways and stop stealing from people who have nothing to steal? Will the state of affairs improve to any appreciable extent?

[T. Tleukhanov] Well, for example, the inspection was certainly conducted on a broad and comprehensive scale not simply to give the latest series of admonitions to violators of the law. We have used the results of that inspection to initiate three criminal cases and are already conducting a preliminary investigation. We have brought 30 officials to material and other responsibility, and 18 officials have received a warning from the procuracy. We have made three representations to the ispolkoms of oblast soviets and 15 representations to oblast social-security departments.

We have the right to initiate criminal cases against those who repair boarding houses improperly or tardily, and against those who have acted illegally to prolong the

construction period for structures intended for those purposes. And we intend to apply that right on the level of the oblast procuracies, and even rayon procuracies.

And it is definitely necessary to make these revelations, because society will have to be ashamed of itself. When they began the inspection, our workers attentively studied the experience of the developed foreign countries and were convinced that in those countries the role of society in maintaining the boarding houses is tremendous. There is not only a well-developed system of material philanthropy, but also of charity provided by private individuals on a national scale. But what private individual among us will go to a home for the elderly in order to offer the assistance that he is capable of giving?

[T. Kvyatkovskaya] Well, excuse me for saying this, but in our country the boarding houses are all considered to be closed-type institutions. A journalist cannot get into one of them without first giving the leadership assurances of his uncritical intentions, and a private individual, in response to a surge of charity, will receive a dosage of insults in his face and will go away so insulted that he will never try to "butt in" again. For a long time our people have not trusted the Red Cross or any other foundations, because, on the basis of their structure and the principles governing the way in which they function, they have seemed for a long time to be parallel state institutions and bureaucratic offices.

[T. Tleukhanov] Well, that is the root cause of our problem. That is the root of the evil and the cause of all the anomalies in the life of the people being taken care of. But society must and will improve. It can no longer remain in the stage of moral deafness and blindness. Emptiness without any spiritual incoming tides or emotional flights for the majority of our people became burdensome long ago. It is not by happenstance that there has been such a widescale attraction recently to religion. And it is not by happenstance that philanthropy on the part of cooperatives has also become so widescale, if not actually fashionable.

Obviously, it is necessary to think carefully about what kind of assistance the workers in the procuracy agencies will be able to provide locally to those who respond to our conversation in this newspaper, and who want in some way to help the persons in the boarding houses, to take part in some way. But for the workers at the procuracy agencies themselves, from now on the boarding houses, I am convinced, will become a very important object of scrutiny. And not so much on instructions received from higher management, as, I feel, in response to the dictates of their own conscience.

Yes, with the changeover to market relations in our country, the prosperity level will not remain equal for all people. Some people will earn more than others, some will be able to satisfy their needs more completely. But we must not have any "lowest caste," pariahs, or

untouchables in our society. Otherwise we are not a civilized society, but wildmen. I would like to believe that this is not so.

Corruption, Substandard Conditions at Kazakh Boarding School Detailed

91US0431A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by Galina Vyborova: "A Little Hell for Children: It Cannot Be Shunted Aside!"]

[Text] This hell has been created by officials in charge of a charitable institution. I first had occasion to show up there two years ago while working for the local radio station. Raisa Grigoryevna Zanolina, who was serving as an inspector for—although not on the staff of—the Dzhambul Oblast People's Control Committee, accompanied me on a trip to this vocational boarding school [for handicapped children] in Assa.

What we saw there is difficult to adequately describe. Frankly, I thought all this—worn-out and filthy rags for clothing, close-cropped heads, and open sores—belonged to the distant past. True, there was one group there for a time in new sportswear (from the storeroom, apparently) on display for our inspection. They were huddled against a wall, a group of eight-year-old children of indeterminate sex, surrounded on all sides by others for whom there were not enough new clothes, wearing ridiculous slippers, dressed for summer despite the fact that it was then in late fall, in clothing ill-fitting for their heights, dirty and ragged.

Their mentors herded the children out and offered explanations for their appearance. As for the heads clipped by "electric razor" (a sign of lice), they said, "Nobody wears long hair today." The inappropriate dress, they said, was actually the uniform of the institution, and they were just about to send these clothes to the laundry prior to our arrival, but clean clothes were in the keeping of a replacement worker who was then on leave. The slippers were the responsibility of one of the mentors who likewise was on leave.

On this particular day, as it happened, the chief clerk, the chief cook, and the dishwasher also happened to be "on leave."

There were not even any toys for these children. As their guardians explained without a trace of embarrassment, they themselves had simply taken them home.

After a visit to the dining room, R. Zanolina reached the categorical conclusion: "The children are being robbed."

Why do I dwell in such detail on events that occurred two years ago? Because all the horror and tragedy of this story lies in the fact that despite the many inspections by numerous commissions, nothing has changed in this boarding school. To this day the children have the look of little waifs. And what an unhappy fate has befallen

them! Afflicted with mental illness and taken from their parents, their ill-fated lot is compounded by this so-called institution of charity.

And so the children are being robbed. Suspicions of this are to be found in the records of even earlier inspections by the People's Control Committee of Dzhambul'skiy Rayon.

Two months after our visit to Assa and the radio broadcast that followed it, the director of the Assa boarding school was relieved of his duties and expelled from the Communist Party.

If at the time the public education agencies or, better still, the law enforcement organs had paid more attention to all these inspection reports, then perhaps no further misfortune would have befallen this school.

As it happened, misfortune did not have long to wait. In April 1989, three months after the director had been replaced, there was a large-scale case of poisoning. Seventeen children were taken to the hospital. The official explanation was as follows. The children and their supervisors went for a walk. While the children were engaged in play, their supervisors sat down near a bush and had tea. Under another bush in the vicinity lay a box of preserves that had spoiled, waiting for the children to find it. When they found it, they opened it up, ate some, and so became victims of food poisoning.

In the opinion of A. Kultaseva, the school's present director, the poisoning incident was a sordid affair. The teachers involved were no longer employed there. In her own words, however, it was not a simple matter to get rid of the false teachers—there were retaliatory threats on their part. Incidentally, certain of these former teachers and caretakers—once more, in the words of the director—had criminal backgrounds.

So, once again, I was in Assa, and with similar People's Control representatives, in an ongoing situation. What did we see? The same little hell for children that was in existence last year, and the year before, and is apparently doomed to exist forever.

There have been some innovations. For example, the routine of the children has been altered so that they emerge from their quarters in the morning and return to them only late in the evening. That is, they only sleep there. And where do they live for the most part? Where do they spend the rest of the time when they are not sleeping, eating, or engaged in study?

They live in the classrooms. When they are through with their classes, they change their regular (read, filthy) clothes and remain right where they were. Yet here there is absolutely no room in which to play. After a certain amount of indecision, it was explained to me that the desks can be moved apart and a mat thrown on the floor for the children to play on.

As I acquainted myself a second time with the boarding school, I noted that there were still no toys to be seen in

the place. It would appear that the toys that were taken home by the children's mentors have yet to be returned. "We bought new toys at a cost of two thousand rubles," stated the director. "But the children broke them."

However, there were still some toys in existence. A small room, functioning as a kind of museum, was opened up to us. There we could see a sofa, armchairs, a television set, a spotless rug, and a few "exhibits" of mechanical toys in a cupboard behind glass. We were told that the children were taken to this room to play in the evening, a few at a time.

And just how do the children keep occupied in their classroom quarters? For the most part, by cleaning up the place. They scrub the classrooms and the corridors. I should like to find out what the seven service workers on the staff do in this school when even Sunday is designated as a "day of cleanliness" for the children. Yet here there is no such thing as cleanliness. I have never seen so much rubbish and trash in a courtyard. The institution is located in dilapidated and wretched buildings erected in the 1930's. Within sight of this location is a new building, which has been under construction for the past seven years, so that the first floor is now ready for major repairs. The MPMK-1 Dzhambulagropromstroy Trust is responsible for its construction. Their promises each year to turn over the finished project "next year" are no longer even taken seriously.

It would be interesting to know what sagacious mind conceived the idea of establishing this asylum for handicapped children here, so far from town and beyond the reach of a single bus, in one of the most ecologically unfavorable areas in the oblast, where the prevailing winds are such that all the smoke from the chemical factories is drawn this way. And a few meters off there are railroad tracks. "Here, the trains are quiet when they pass," one of the children told me. "Once I hitched a ride to Dzhambul. Then I rode back here."

Beyond the railroad tracks, in the rushes, the children relieve themselves, so that it is impossible to walk beyond because of the pollution. They wash their hands in a stoke hole for the steam boiler since their sleeping quarters are closed. The director showed us yet another pipe on the premises, its original purpose unknown, which she said served the need for washing one's hands until the water in it froze.

It took a long time to find a key to fit the institution's rest room. In it could be seen a number of wash basins in a row, but no soap, no toothpaste, no combs.

In their sleeping quarters, a lamp hung from the ceiling in the dim light of which could be seen the abandoned children's cots and a blanket-covered table on which was a tin bucket. The children's custodians experienced some uneasiness in responding to our inquiries as to whether the buckets (there was one in each room) were used for drinking or for the purpose of washing the floor.

When I glanced into a drawer of a bedside table (I owe the owner an apology), I found cards, cigarettes, and the remnant of a bar of soap.

Our arrival was undoubtedly a holiday for the children, for on this occasion they were allowed to take a walk off the grounds. "Usually, we sit in class," said one child. The littlest ones were shunted to one side, while the rest went off by themselves in two's and three's towards the steppe, strung out for a kilometer along the roadway. Nowhere was a ball or a skipping rope to be seen. I questioned my companions, the members of the People's Control Committee, regarding their impressions of what we had seen. Raisa Grigoryevna is a woman of refinement, but I cannot quote what she said.

Our visit to the dining hall is a subject that should be treated separately. Three glasses contained no more or less than 125 grams of fruit juice. Three pieces of meat weighed a total of 45 grams instead of 120 grams [for a single serving]. In the kitchen 1.5 kg of cheese were considered more than sufficient [for everyone].

On the next day, we again peered into the kitchen. Despite taking our visit into consideration, those in charge considered it expedient not to provide the children with any milk, nor was there any apple butter. By way of explanation they said "they were taking into consideration the results of yesterday's inspection."

What utter nonsense. No less absurd was a menu prescribing a daily diet of 200 grams of black pepper together with a detergent substance called "Perlin." Food service here includes providing for 21 working associates. According to the People's Control Committee report: "The menu for 17 January 1990 was artificially inflated by 40 kg of potatoes; that of 27 January 1990 by 40 kg of milk; that of 11 January 1990 by 15 bottles of fermented goat's milk. The padding of the food product list for the entire month comes to 215 rubles."

The foregoing data is derived from no more than a spot check.

I asked the representatives of the People's Control committee who took part in this inspection to comment on their trip to Assa.

V. Kozlovadeputy chief of the Budget Department in the Oblast Financial Administration:

"This situation in the boarding school is in no way due to a shortage of budget allocations. As an official working in the oblast financingsystem, I can state that we maintain strict control over this type of expenditure. Believe me, these orphans are not provided for by us according to the principle of what is left—they receive all that they are supposed and more. And just look how the money is spent! I have spot-checked the books as well as I could in the course of a day. The basic financial documents for the coming year were not to be found—which tells us right there what we need to know. And what papers there are contain contain gross errors."

R. Zanolina, chief accountant of the Dzhabul'skiy Rayon Public Utilities Combine:

"The boarding school has 135 children for a total of 70 employees—that is, a two-to-one ratio for each adult. And despite this, there is such a state of neglect! I am surprised in this respect by the indifference of the public education bodies, although some of the people there have the title of "Outstanding in the Field of Public Education." I am thinking of Zh. Sergeyeva, oblast administration inspector, who directly oversees all the boarding schools in the area. She won this title only recently—it would be interesting to know for what services."

After the oblast People's Control Committee met to review the question of the Assa Boarding School, the head of the Oblast Department of Education, A. Mamashev, gave instructions to hold back the documents recommending the title of "Outstanding." So, for the moment, they rest in a safe of the Cadre Department, waiting until the scandal dies down. More than one report "on the current state of affairs" is preserved by the administration in thick files. There it is possible to find information not only about the dirty clothes and wretched sanitary conditions, but the teaching process. Here is one example: "On the day of the inspection, Kazakh-language teacher Isayev S. came to class unprepared and spent almost the entire lesson doing nothing. Mathematics teacher Alsentov M. has not filled out a form since the first of September. History teacher Ovcharenko I. during the course of eight lessons failed to submit a single evaluation."

These facts are set forth in a 1989 report by the Oblast Education Department. They were recorded, and that was the end of it. In general, one seeks in vain to assign a specific role to the Education Department. Its response to the producers of the radio program is replete with vague assurances, such as "measures are now being undertaken"... "under supervisory control"... "to rebuild the methods and style of leadership...."

Much the same tone may be detected in a letter of explanation to colleagues excerpted in the newspaper *DRUZHNYE REBYATA* of 28 February 1990. Children driven to despair had written a letter to the newspaper, describing the methods used by their so-called "mentors." A. Mamashev, head of the oblast Education Department, responded by saying that the director of the school had been reprimanded and the firing of one of the mentors (as if this was going to change anything). She concluded the letter on a bravura note: "Methodological specialists and other officials of the Education Department have been dispatched to the school to render assistance to mentors and instructors."

It would be interesting to know exactly what sort of methodological assistance was rendered by the administrators to their working colleagues in the art of teaching. How to skimp on the orphans' food rations? How to keep children under detention all day in classrooms? It has

never entered the mind of any of them, evidently, that among these youngsters (who for the most part differ in no way from their peers outside of school externally) might be found a perfectly healthy child. I do not make this comment lightly. Not very long ago doctors at the oblast psychiatric clinic removed the diagnosis of "oligophrenia" from a mentor who had spent five years at the boarding school for the mentally retarded. This is not an isolated case. No one was punished because of it, nor was the fact regarded as worthy of even a superficial review.

Finally, in this little world of one's own, there is the inexplicable tendency of departmental officials to secrecy. In Sverdlovskiy Rayon, Dzhabul Oblast, there is yet another Assa, the Rovnensk Vocational Boarding School, where the same sort of ugly conditions obtain. Papers on file in the oblast Education Department testify to these conditions as well as eye-witness accounts. (Former members of the the People's Control Committee might have a little something to say as well about refrigerators and radio equipment written off at wholesale prices.) I wanted to be present at a meeting of the oblast Board of Education at which, I had learned, there would be discussion of this school. But the deputy chief, I. Kuznetsova, said that it was still not known for certain whether Inspector Sergeyeva had or had not prepared the proper material. The matter was still under investigation and I would have to be content with a written review of these materials by the Board. But even this much proved to be none too easy to obtain. Zh. Sergeyeva suggested at first that I get permission to familiarize myself with the material from the head of the Education Department, A. Mamashev. He, in turn, advised me to apply to the party organization secretary, A. Malininkova. She directed me, once again, to Sergeyeva. Zhumagul Zhakibayevna Sergeyeva said that she was not in a position to give department heads instructions in such matters. Feeling that I was about to travel in this circle a second time, I proposed a compromise, offering to read in the documents only what pertained to the Rovnensk School and closing my eyes to the rest.

Zhumagul Zhakibayevna thought for a moment, then took off the clamp holding the file together, removed from it a couple of papers, and carefully separated them from the bulk of it which it was not for me to read.

So it was that I came to learn of the "gross violations," the "unsanitary conditions," and the "decline of demandingness" that persists, this time in Rovnensk Vocational Boarding School. As for what may go on in the vocational classes of other schools (the report was titled "On Conditions For the Care and Instruction of Children in the Vocational Classes of Schools in Dzhabul, Dzhabul'skiy Rayon..." and so on), evidently, God only knows.

EDITORS' NOTE: The events described here occurred last year. Until the present, however, everything remains as it was. Actually, it may be up to the oblast enforcement

authorities to look into conditions at this school. Is this not so? After all, we are speaking of handicapped children.

International Antinarcotic Association To Help Soviet Drug Addicts

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Union Edition p 8

[Article by T. Khudyakova: "Soviet Drug Addicts in the Embrace of Patriarch"]

[Text] The largest international association is prepared not only to start its chapters in the USSR but also to accept 500 of our patients for treatment at their centers abroad.

This story began as recently as three months ago through correspondence between Secretary of the International Committee for Narcotics Control Mrs. L. Waldheim-Natural and our representative office of international organizations in Vienna. She offered to be a mediator in establishing business contacts with the association Patriarch, which is very well known throughout the world; it is headed by its founder Lucienne Engelmeier, the author of the books "Hope for Drug Addicts," "Hope in Action," and "Drugs and AIDS" which have become bestsellers.

Mr. Engelmeier immediately responded to the author. The Soviet side, represented by Narcology Association of the Soviet Charity and Health Fund, also proceeded rapidly. By now, not only a protocol of intentions regulating the relationship of the two associations has been signed but a group of Patriarch specialists and 30 tons of freight, including medicines, disposable syringes, and foodstuffs have already arrived, as well as even finishing supplies for Drug Rehabilitation Clinic No. 8 of the Pervomayskiy Rayon Health Care Administration in the city of Moscow which will become the central base of Patriarch.

Representatives of the French side, member of the directorate of the association Ricardo Rocci, and two employees, Daniel Babbas and Christian Marini, came to Moscow earlier in order for cooperation to proceed, as soon as possible, from the stage of talk to a practical dimension. They took to work with such vigor that the chief physician of the outpatient clinic, Marina Ibragimova, was terrified:

"This is the first time I have seen anything like this! We spend a great deal of time discussing issues; meanwhile, they said it yesterday, and they have done it today..."

As we found out, the energy and drive of the French are due not only to their attitude toward the endeavor and their responsibilities, which are different from ours. Something else is at work. The whole point is that all employees of the Patriarch Association are former drug addicts, including those who came to Moscow.

Having hit the very bottom of life and been cured of this horrible affliction, they have made helping their brothers and sisters in misfortune the task of their lives. Having learned that drug addiction in our country has not yet become as catastrophic as in the West, they desire very much to transfer the unique method of L. Engelmeier to our country as soon as possible.

The essence of the method is simple: No medicines at all! Phytotherapy, herb collection, acupuncture, massage, sports, and vigorous labor activities. However, the continuous presence of those who have already been cured next to the novices is the most decisive factor. Their example, support, and trust turn out to be more valuable than medicines. Statistics may testify to the effectiveness of the method: In the 20 years of Patriarch's existence, 232 centers and 126 societies for combating drug addiction and AIDS have been set up in 20 countries of the world. Forty-four thousand people have been completely cured.

Daniel Babbas said: "We are geared to long-term and fruitful cooperation with your country in the cause of combating drug addiction. However, I would like to stress in particular that we stay away from politics and ideology; we are not interested in the social system of a country in which we open our chapters and centers. Having recently started a center in Nicaragua, we did not become Sandinistas. As we cooperate with you, we do not want to be considered participants in your perestroika. We are in favor of human freedom which we interpret as the joy of a healthy lifestyle, and love of children and nature."

As documents suggest, Patriarch is indeed set for long-term cooperation. The clinic which ended up "under the wing" of the association is merely the beginning. In the future, it expects to create centers similar to those throughout the world. Conditions will be created for those staying there not only to be cured but also to engage in labor in any field—from agriculture and crafts to architecture.

In addition, specialists arriving from France will select 500 of our drug addicts for treatment in the foreign centers of the association. Our specialists—physicians, mid-level medical personnel, and social workers—will also leave for training. Patriarch is prepared to sponsor one or two centers in rural areas, assigning its representatives to them in order to organize the endeavor and the social adaptation of those cured.

Undoubtedly, the financial aspect of this unusual program is also important. Patriarch has already spent about \$40,000 for these purposes. This amount will certainly grow because the association would like to maintain a continuous supply of medicines and foodstuffs for the clinic it sponsors. Mr. Engelmeier has assigned the copyright for the publication of his books in the USSR to the Soviet side (and work on translating them has already begun). All of the profit will be used to carry out this large-scale action.

In addition, the preliminary consent of the UN Foundation for Controlling Drug Abuse to provide material and financial aid to the USSR in the event Patriarch proposals are carried out has been secured.

Taking into account the experience of financing such actions throughout the world, which presupposes participation by the state, public, and charitable organizations, and private donations, we would like to hope that the Soviet side will not just put its faith in Western aid, but will also take vigorous steps along this path,

The USSR Ministry of Health and the Executive Committee of the Pervomayskiy Rayon Soviet of People's

Deputies of the city of Moscow have already provided considerable help. However, there is not enough money, as is always the case. We publish the current account for those who are not indifferent to the fate of hundreds of thousands of patients who may get real help and return to normal life, and those who are prepared to donate funds for this action, which is extremely significant from the social point of view:

Orbita Commercial Bank, correspondent account No. 161227 of the Operations Administration of the Moscow State Administration of the USSR State Bank MFO 201791, current account No. 704002 of the Narcology Association.

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